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0) 
AIMS. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
O.IAIMES AND SCOPE: 
The question of Palestine itself is primarily a 
territorial issue, involving the struggle of Palestinian 
Arabs and Jewish settlers for possession of land the 
Middle East crisis spans almost 50 years since the 
creation of Israel and almost a century of aggression 
and distrust between the Palestinaian and Jewish people. 
Although Israel occupied vast Arab terr i tor ies in its wars 
with Arab states , there have been no real victors in the 
Middle East. The Arab strategic defeat at the hands of 
Israel transformed the character of Palest ine question. 
Increasingly it came to be viewed as a refugee issue. 
The problem in Middle East is nei ther religious the 
in nature nor a national or local dispute that can be 
militarily solved. It is a problem that concern the people 
of the region. 
Many at tempts have been made to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict but the lasting peace is not achieved till 
now. 
In this work I tried my best to highlight the "Arab-
Israfli relation and Question of Palest ine with the help 
of articles abstracted. Although this work cannot 
exhaustly cover such a wide area of the topic but it will 
Oi) 
be helpful to understand the "Arab-Israeli Relation and 
Question of Palestine". 
0 . 2 METHODOLOGY: 
To collect the material on the subject the following 
secondary source were consulted: 
1. West Asia Bulletin 
2. Index India 
3 . Ulrich International periodical directory. 
4 . Guide to Indian periodical literature. 
After searching the l i terature, entries were recorded 
on 7"x5" cards. 
To approach the primary sources, which were 
collected from the secondary sources, I visited the 
following libraries and insti tutions. 
1. Centre of West Studies . AMU, Aligarh 
2. Maulana Azad Library, AMU, Aligarh 
3 . Strategic Studies Library, AMU, Aligarh 
4. Sapru House Library, New Delhi. 
5. Seminar Library of Political Science Department, 
AMU, Aligarh. 
Ciii) 
(i) STANDARD FOLLOWED: The Indian standard 
recommended for bibliographical references (IS: 
2381-1963) , titles of periodicals are written in 
full form. In certain cases, where the said 
standards became unhelpful I have preferred own 
judgement (local variation). 
(ii) SUBJECT HEADINGS: Attempt has been made 
to give coextensive "subject headings" as much as 
possible and allowed by natureal language if more 
than one entry comes under the same subject 
headings these are arranged alphabetically by the 
author(s) name, or by periodical nawie-
(iii) ARRANGEMENT: 
The entrfes in the bibliography are arranged 
alphabetically among the subject headings . 
The entry element of the author is in capitals, 
followed by the secondary element in parenthes is 
using upper and lowers and then the title of the 
article, subtitle (if any) then name of the 
periodical being undrlined followed by the 
volume, issue number, the year, the month in 
abbreviated form, giving by using inclusive 
notation of the pages of the art icles. Then each 
entry is followed by indicative, annota t ive and 
descriptive abstract of the article. 
Civ) 
Entries of periodicals are arranged as follows: 
(a) Serial number 
(b) Name of the author(s) 
(c) A full stop 
(d) Title of the contribution including sub-title 
(e) A full stop 
(f) Title of the periodical underlined 
(g) A full stop 
(h) Volume number 
(i) Comma 
(j) Issue number 
(k) A semi colon 
(1) Year 
(m) A comma 
(n) Month 
(o) Comma 
(p) Date 
(q) Semi colon 
(r) Inclusive pages of the articles 
(iv) SAMPLE ENTRY: 
SAYIGH (Yezid). Turning defeat into opportunity: 
the Palestinian Guerillas after the June 1967 war. 
(V) 
Middle East Journal. 46 .2 ; 1992. Spr; 2 4 4 - 6 5 . 
Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas of 1967 was 
lies in aftermath of the war before that thier 
movement was a secondary force, with no clear 
course in sight. The war. by discrediting Arab 
authoriy and weaknfing state control and creat ion 
the opportunity for the rise of the Palestinian 
guerrillas as regional actors. Creation of an 
autonomous base and mount of an armed, 
interaction in the israeli occupied West Bank and 
this attempt led to a redefinition of the 
Palestinians relation with the other Arabs and to 
a transformation of internal Palestinian politics. 
• Impact of insurrectionary attempt is on relation 
between the guerrillas on the one hand and PLO 
and Arab governments on the other, before 
assessing the implications for the subsequent 
development of the Palestinian movement 
(a) EXPLANATION 
The article is taken fromt the periodical "Middle 
East Journal", which is entitled as "Turning defeat 
into opportunity: The Palestinian Guerrillas after 
the June 1967 war' "written by SAYIGH (Yezid), 
volume No. 46, issue no. 2 in Spring 1992 on 
the pages from 244 to 65 against this entry. 
(^1) 
(b) A B S T R A C T : 
The entr ies in the bibliography contain abstract 
giving the essential information abut the article 
documented. I have given indicative, descriptive 
and annotat ive abstracts. 
0 3 INDEX: 
This part of the bibiliography contains author, 
title indexes in alphabetical sequence. Each index 
gives the specific entry or entires in the 
bibliography. 
(vii) 
LIST OF PERIODICALS SCANNED 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Name 
Adelphi Papers 
Arab Studies Quarterly 
Asian and African Studies 
Asian Studies 
British Society of Middle 
Eastern Studies 
Contemporary Review 
Current History 
Democratic World 
Economist 
Foreign Affairs 
Foreign Affaris 
Forcing Affairs Reports 
Frontier 
Front Line 
Gardian Weekly 
International Affaris 
International Journal of Middle 
East Studies. 
Frequency 
After some 
intervals 
Three time 
a year 
Hali Yearly 
Bi-Annual 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Quarterly 
Bi-Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Fortinghtly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Place of 
Publication 
London 
London 
Israel 
Cakutta 
England 
England 
Philadephia 
New Delhi 
Singapore 
New York 
New York 
New Delhi 
Calcutta 
Chennai 
Washington Post 
Moscow 
London 
18. International spectator Quarterly Rome 
(\iii) 
S.No. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Name 
Index on Cencership 
India Quarterly 
International Organization 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 
Journal of Palestine Studies 
Journal of Peace & Research 
Journal of South Asian & Middle 
Easter Studies 
Journal of West Asian Studies 
Le Monde Diplomatique 
"Middle East 
Middle East International 
Middle East Journal 
Middle East Policy 
Middle East Quarterly 
Middle Eastern Studies 
Midstream 
Muslims & Arab Perspective 
Orbis 
Palestine Digest 
Peoples Democracy 
Frfqiifncy 
Bi-Monthly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Annual 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Place of 
Publication 
London 
New Delhi 
Boston 
London 
London 
New Delhi 
USA 
Aligarh 
Manchester 
New Delhi 
Washington 
Washington 
Washington 
London 
New York 
N. Delhi 
Philadalphia 
N.Delhi 
New Delhi 
Ox) 
S.No. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
52. 
Name 
Radiance 
Radical Humanist 
Strategic Analysis 
Strategic Studies 
Survival 
Third World Impact 
Third World Quarterly 
Time 
UN Chronicle 
World Affairs 
World Focus 
World Today 
Frequency 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Quarterly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Quarterly 
Bi-Annual 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Place of 
Publication 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
Pakistan 
UK 
New Delhi 
London 
New York 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
London 

(X) 
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
1300-1200 B.C. Jews and 
Philistines invade 
Palestine, then Known 
as Canaan. 
1000 B.C. Kingdom or 
Israel founded. 
140-63 B.C. independent 
Hasmonean Dynasty of 
Israel 
63 B.C. 638 A.D. 
Palestine 
Under Roman and 
Byzantine rule 
638-1918 Palestine under 
Muslim rule 
1099-1244 Palestine 
under 
Crusader control. 
1463 End of Byzantine 
Empire; ottoman Empire 
begins. 
1699 Treaty of Karlowitz 
1798-1802 Freeh 
occupation of Egypt. 
1854-1866 Crimean War. 
1869 Suez Canal opens. 
1882 Egypt occupied by 
the British 
1516-1918 Palestine 
under ottoman rule 
1839 Hatti Sharif of 
Gulhane 
1856 Hatti Humayun. 
1861-1918 Autonomous 
Status for Mount Lebonon 
under international 
guarantees 
1881 HibbatZion founded 
in Russia. 
1896 Theodor Herzl's Der 
Judenstaat Published. 
1897 World Zionist 
Organization founded 
at first Zionist 
Congress 
1901 Jewish National 
Fund established. 
1908 Young Turk Revolt. 
1908,1911 Palestian Arab 
Papers, alKamil and 
Filastin, founded. 
1914-1918 World War I 
November 1914 Ottoman 
Empire enters war on 
German side. 
February December 
1916 Gallipoli campaign 
March 1916 Constantinople 
convention 
July 1916 
January19t6 Husayn 
M c M a h 0 n 
correspondence. 
May 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. 
June 1916 Arab revolt 
begins 
March 1917 First Russian 
Revolution; British take 
Baghdad. 
November 1917 Balfour 
Declaration; Second 
Russina revolution 
December 1917 General 
Allenby takes 
Jerusalem 
June 1918 Alied 
Declaration to the 
Seven 
November 1918 Amistice 
ends war in Europe 
January 1919 Faysal-
Weizmann agreement; 
Peace Conference 
begins. 
March 1920 Syrian Arab 
National Congress 
proclaims Faysal King 
of Greater Syria. 
April 1920 San Remo 
Conference. 
May-August 1920 Iraqi 
rebellion. 
July 1920 French take 
Damascus, outs Faysal 
March 1921 Cairo 
Conference. 
July 1920 British military 
administration in 
Palestine ends. 
December 1920 Histadrut 
created. 
April 1921 Hajj Amin al-
Husayni appointed 
Mufti of Jerusalem 
January 1922 Supreme 
Muslim Council (SMC) 
created. 
August 1929 Zkxiist claims 
to Wailing Wall leads to 
Muslim riots 133 Jews 
and 116 Arabs killed; 
many moe wounded!. 
Hebron Jewish oomminty 
evacuated. 
March 1930 Shaw 
Commission Report. 
October 1930 Passfield 
White Paper. 
January 1933 Hitler 
becomes German 
Chancellor. 
April 1936 Arab Revolt 
begins 
Ju ly 1937 Peel com mission 
recommends parttion. 
November 1938 
Woodhead Commission 
Report. 
May 1939 British White 
Paper 
September 1939 World 
War II begins. 
May 1942 Biltmore 
conference 
November 1944 Jewish 
terrorists (LEHI) 
assassinate Lord 
Moyne 
March 1945 Arab League 
formed 
April 1945 Roosevelt 
dies; Truman becomes 
president. 
May 1945 Bar ends in 
Europe 
August 1945 Japan 
surrenders. 
November 1946-April 
1946 Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry 
investigation and 
Report. 
July-August 1946 
M o r r i s o n - G r a d y 
committee 
July 1946 Irgun bombs 
King David Hotel. 
(xi) 
February 1947 London 
Conference;Britain to 
submit Palestine 
question to U.N. 
June-July 1947 UNSCOP 
visit to Palestine. 
November 1947 U.N. 
General Assembly 
approves partit ion; 
Zionists accept; Arabs 
reject. 
April1948 Haganah takes 
the offensive 
May, 14 1948 State of 
Israeli proclaimed 
May 16, 1948 Arabs 
invade Israel; v/ar ends 
July 19; Israel later 
takes Negev. 
September 1948 Count 
B e r n a d o t t e 
assassinated by LEHI. 
January-July 1949 Israel 
and Arab states reach 
armistice agreemients. 
May 1960 Tripartite 
Declaration. 
July 1962 King Faruq 
overthrown; Egyptian 
army officers led by 
Gamal Abd a! Naseer 
take over government 
July 1964 British troops 
agree to withdrawn from 
Suez Canal Zone by 
June 1956 
August 1954 French-
Israeli arms deal 
February 1966 Baghdad 
pact. Israeli raid in 
Gaza 
September 1966 Soviet 
Egyptian arms deal 
July 1966 Nasser 
nationalizes Suez 
Canal 
October 1966 British 
French Israeli attack 
on Egypt 
February 1968 United Arb 
Republic formed; lasts 
to September 1961 
July 1968 Iraqi 
revolution. U.S. Forces 
land in Lebanon 
January 1964 Palestine 
Liberation Organization 
(PLC) formed. 
May 1967 Egypt closes 
Straits of Tiran 
June 1967 six-Day-War 
August 1967 Khartoum 
Conference 
November 1967 Security 
Council Resolution 
242, 
July 1968 PLO Charter 
revised at Palestine 
national Council 
meeting 
February 1969 Yasir 
Arafat elected head of 
PLO 
March 1969-August 1970 
Egyptian Israeli war of 
attrition 
September 1970 
Jordanian civil war. 
Nasser dies and is 
replaced by Anwar al-
Sadat 
November 1970 Hafiz al 
Assad becomes Syrian 
president 
September 1972 Fatah's 
Black September 
group takes Israeli 
Olympic athletes 
hostage in Munich. All 
die 
October 1973 1973 War 
(Egypt and Syria attack 
Israel). Faysal applies 
an oil 
and emargo. Cease -fire 
leads to security coucil 
resolution 338. 
January 1974 Egypt -
Israel "Disengagement 
of Forces Agreement" 
signed 
May 1974 Syriaa-alsrael 
disengagement pact 
regarding Golan 
Heights. 
October 1974 Arab summit 
(Rabat) declares PLO 
legitimate representative 
of Palestinians. 
September 1976 Second 
Egypt-Israel 
disengagement 
agreement 
April 1976-October 1976 
Lebanese Civil War 
March 1977 Carter 
endorses a Palestinian 
homeland 
March 1977 Carter 
endorses a Palestinian 
"homeland." 
June 1977 Begin becomes 
prime minister of Israel 
September 1978 camp 
David Agreements 
January-February 1979 
Shah leaves Iran; 
Ayatollah Khomeint 
returns 
March 1979 Egyptian 
Israeli peace treaty 
signed. Egypt expelled 
from Arab League 
November 1979 
American hostages 
taken in Teheran 
December 1979 Soviets 
invade Afghnistan 
June 1980 Venice 
Declaration 
September 1980 Iraq 
invades Iran 
January 1981 Reagan 
becomes president; 
American hostages in 
Iran released. 
July 1981 PLO-lsraeli 
Cease-Fire. 
October 1981 Sadat 
assassinated, replaced 
by Husni Mubarak 
December 1981 Israel 
annexes Golan 
Heights. 
April 1982 Israeli pullack 
from the Sinai 
completed 
June 1982 Israel invades 
Lebanon; surrounds 
Beirut 
August-September 1982 
PLO leaves Beirut; 
multinational forces 
arrive. 
September 1982 Reagan 
(xii) 
Plan Fez Plan, Gemayel 
assassinated, his brothei 
su(xeds 
August 1983 Begin 
resigns, replaced by 
yitzhak Shamir 
October 1983 241 U S 
Marines killed in Beirut 
Novcmbe 1983 U S -
lllsraeli strateic 
agreement 
February 1984 U S 
forces leave Lebanon 
February 1985 PLO-
Jordanian peace plan 
December 1987 Outbreak 
of the intifada 
February 1988 Hamas 
created in Gaza 
July 1988 King Husayn 
renounces claims to 
West Bank Iraq-Iran 
War armistice 
November 1988 PNC 
proclaims independent 
Palestinian state 
December 1988 PLO 
accepts Resolution 
•242, renounces 
terrorism, recognizes 
Israeli's nght to exist 
U S agrees to 
dialogue with PLO 
June 1990 US suspends 
dialogue with PLO 
August 1990 Iraq invades 
Kuwait 
January 1991 U S-led 
coalition boms Iraq 
and Iraqi positions in 
Kuwait 
February 1991 Coalition 
land assault begins 
Ceasefire declared 
after four days 
October 1991 Madrid 
Talks begin Will last to 
Summer 1993 
December 1991 Soviet 
Union dissolves into 
distinct republics 
Russian republic 
dominates 
June 1992 Labor party 
replaces Likud in 
Israel Yitzhak Rabin is 
prime ministei 
December 1992 Israeli 
bordei policeman 
killed by Hamas or 
Islamic Jihad Rabin 
deports 416 Islamists 
to South Lebanon 
where they remain foi 
months Lebanon 
refuses to accept 
them 
March 1993 Major 
outbreaks of violence 
in Israel and occupied 
terntories 12 Israelis 
23 Palestinians killed 
July 1993 "Operation 
Accountability" Israel 
invades South 
Lebanon 
September 1993 Israeli-
Palestinian accord 
Mutual recognition 
given and Declaration 
of Pnnciples signed 
February 1994 Israeli 
settler kills 40 
Palestinians in mosque 
in Hebron Hamas 
targets Israeli citizens 
October 1994 Jordan and 
Israel sign official 
peace accord Hamas 
kidnapping of Israeli 
soldiei leads to 
shootout and death of 
5 Islamist suicide 
bomb in Tel Aviv kills 
23, wounds 50 
November 1994 PLO police 
fire on Palestinian 
demonstration in Gaza, 
kill 12 wound 200 
January 1996 Sucide 
bombing in Israel kills 
19 Israeli soldiers, 
many wounded 
March 1995 Peres, Arafat 
promise agreement on 
election of Palestinian 
Council by July 
Part- one 
Introduction 
HISTORY 
The Middle East and Pa le s t ine t o 1 9 1 4 : An 
Overview 
Ancient Israel: Its origins and history to the roman 
conquest. 
The present slate of Israel encompasses a substantial 
portion of what was once called Palestine. Three 
thousand years ago it was known to the Jews asser ts 
Israel, the "land of Israel." A term they have retained 
to refer to the region down to the present day. Before 
the region was Israel of Palestine, it was Canaan, after 
a people who shared a cultural tradition derived from 
Mesopotamia and the civilf'zation identified with the city 
of Ebla, southwest of Aleppo in northern Syria. The 
Canaanites belonged to the northwest Semitic peoples of 
northern Mesopotamia and Syria, of which the Jews were 
also a part The Canaanites inhabited the area for most 
of the third millennium and the first half of the second 
nearly fifteen hundred yeas. They controlled Palest ine 
west of the Jordan river and parts of Phoenicia (coastal 
Lebanon) and southern Syria. 
The Canaanites made a major contribution to world 
culture by developing a linear alphabet . It was 
transmitted to Greece and became the basis of Western 
writing systems. The Semitic language of the Canaani tes , 
of which Hebrew was a dialect, was the dominant 
tongue spoken in the region; it reflected a sophisticated, 
literate culture existing at the time the Jews appeared. 
As one scholar put it. "the dominant pre Israelite 
population was In race and language not different 
from Israel itself." 
What then were the factors that gave Israel its feeling 
of distinctiveness? It stemmed from the Jews belief that 
their God, Yahweh. had chosen them to be His people, 
superior to and separate from all other peoples. This 
belief in Yahweh as a single god evolved into 
monotheism, the idea that one god. their God. was the 
lord of the universe and that no other gods existed. Faith 
in Yahweh was quite different from the polytheism or 
belief in many gods, that characterized most other 
cultures at that time. And it formed the basis of what 
later became Christianity and Islam. For many centuries, 
however, belief in Vahwe'^h as Ihe God of the Jews 
coexisted with acknowledgment of the gods of other 
peoples. 
The names Israel and Palestine derive from peoples 
that entered the region at approximately the same time, 
the twelfth centruy before the Christian era. The Jews, 
who called themselves "Bnei Israel" believed that the land 
had been given to them by their God, Yahweh. Palestine 
refers to the Philistines, a people of Greek origin who 
settled in the coastal plains of the area at about the same 
time the Jews took over the hill country in the interior 
the first literary reference we have to the region as 
Palestine is in herodorus (fifth century B.C.) After nearly 
two hundred years the Jews united to defeat and 
subjugate the Philistines and other peoples in Palestine, 
notably the Canaanites. The establishment of the 
Kingdom of Israel dates from about 100 B.C. 
Saul and then David were the first kings of Israel, 
chosen to lead the Jews against the Philistines. It was 
under David that the Jews triumphed. As part of the 
concrete he took Jerusalem, until then not in Jewish 
hands, and made it a religious sanctuary sacred to all 
who 'worshipped Yahweh. David, aided by the weak 
condition of his neighbors, then expanded northward 
through much of Syria to the Euphraretes and created 
a short lived empire that did not survive the reign of his 
son, Solomon. Solomon added to the wealth of Israel by 
expanding its trading networks, establishing contacts as 
far south as the Yemen. He also built the first Temple 
to Yahweh in Jerusalem, the focal point of Judaism from 
that time onward. But Solomon lost. Syria, and after his 
death the united kingdom broke in two as the nor thern 
tribes refused to accept the principle of hereditary 
succession within the family of David. The period of 
political unity had lasted just over seventy years, from 
circa 1000 B.C. to 927 B.C. 
Eretz Israel was then split into two kingdom: Israel 
in the north. which was composed of ten tribes; and 
Judah in the south, which controlled Jerusalem. The 
northern kingdom Israel, survived untill 722 B.C. when 
it was conquered by the Assyrians; thousands of its 
inhabitants were forcibly resettled in Mesopotamia, and 
other peoples subject to Assyrian domination were 
transferred to nor thern Palestine to replace them Judah 
lasted until 5 8 6 B.C. at that time it was absorbed into 
the Babylonian Empire, successor to the Assyrians in 
Mesopotamia, and many of its state and religious elite 
were t ransported to Babylon, an event known as the 
Babylonian exile. 
The nature and sability of the frontiers of these two 
kingdoms had depended on the relative strength or 
weakness of the neighbouring great powers-pharaonic 
Egypt and the warior states of Mesopotamia. The area 
called Palestine by biblical scholars more or less 
coincides with territory controlled by Israel and Judah 
around 860 B.C. Its boundaries extended from the base 
of the Golan Heights in present day Syria, westward to 
the Mediterranean Sea; then south ward to Gaza where 
the coast bends west to border the Sinai Peninsul; then 
directly south again to the harbor at the nor thern tip of 
the Gulf of Aqaba; then north to beyond the eastern edge 
of the Dead sea; and finally, northwest to touch Lake 
Tiberias at the foot of the Golan. These borders were 
not s t a t i c . Areas east of the Jordan river were often 
under Jewish rule. The frontiers of Israel extended for 
brief intervals beyond Damascus to the Euphrates River 
in northern Syria and. for longer periods, included the 
Golan Heights. On the other hand, there were centuries 
when Jewish rule was restricted to the southern part of 
Palestine, extending from Jerusalem and its environOs 
west to the sea and south to Aqaba. 
Jews stayed in Palestine after the fall of Judah, but 
their lot was difficult and they formed a majority of the 
population only in the south. The region from that time 
onward (c. 890 B.C.) was part of a greater empire. 
Following the conquest of Babylon by the Persian dynasty 
of the Achaemenids in 539 B.C. , those Jews who had 
been sent into exile were permit ted to return. Many 
chose to do so. though a significant number remained 
in Mesopotamia. In Palestine the temple was rebuilt, and 
Jews were permitted to observe their religious tenets, but 
they remained subject to outside rule for over 350 years. 
They might have remained in that situation longer but 
for the interference of their overlords, the Seleucids who 
were based in Syria and who decided to implant Greek 
culture throughout their domain. One ruler rededicated 
the temple in Jerusalem, the holiest site in Judaism, to 
the Greek god Zeus. This act inspired a violent rebellion 
that by 140 B.C. had restored Jewish independence 
which lasted for eighty years This was the revolt of the 
Macabees that inaugurated the Hasmonean dyanasty. 
Centered in Jerusalem. Jewish rule expanded to include 
much of territory controlled by Solomon nearly eight 
hundred years earlier. Imbued with religious zeal, the 
Maccabees forcibly converted the by now predominantly 
non Jewish populat ions in the northern districts of 
Samaria and the Galilee. But the achievements of the 
Maccabees and their successors had been due in part 
to Roman encouragement of their efforts, which served 
to weaken Seleucid power and facilitated the Roman 
encouragement of their efforts, which served to weaken 
Seleucid power and facilitated the Roman advance into 
the Near East. Palestine, which was known briefly as 
Judea, was incorporated into the Roman Empire as an 
autonomous unit. By 63 B.C. Jewish independence was 
over. 
PALESTINE UNDER ROMAN AND BYZANTINE RULE 
As part of the Roman empire, the Jews in Palestine 
were allowed political and religious autonomy as long as 
their rulers acknowledged Roman suzerainty. The best 
known of these kings, a continuance of the Hasmonean 
line, was Herod the Great (37-4 B.C.) who gained renown 
for his building efforts, especially his reconstruction of 
the temple in Jerusalem to its former glory. The emperor 
Augustus granted Herod master over much of southern 
Syria, standing ahnost to Damascus, to facilitate Jewish 
control of pilgrimage routes between Babylon and 
Jerusalem. Still, there was much discontent under Herod 
and his successors. Many Jews saw their rulers' 
collaboration with the Romans as a corruption of Jewish 
values. Sharp differences arose be tween those Jews who 
counseled moderation and. coopera t ion with Rome as a 
means of preserving the autonomy they did have and 
those, often known as the Zealots, who considered their 
subjection to Roman rule to be intolerable. 
The Zealots rebelled in A.D. 66 and held out until 
73 when their fortress at Masada was taken. Roman 
retaliation had been fierce; Jerusa lem was razed in 70 
and the temple destroyed . Autonomy was then restored 
under stricter Roman surveillance, but Jewish unrest 
persisted and led to a more carefully planned rebellion 
that lasted from A.D. 132 to 1 3 5 . This was the Bar 
Kokhba revolt. Althouth initially successful in inflicting 
heavy casualties on roman legions, the revolt ended in 
disaster. The Romans responded by systematically 
destroying many village throughout Palestine, killing and 
enslaving thousands of Jews. Pa les t ine /Judea thereby 
lost its autonomous status and became a roman colony 
known as Syria Palestine. Although a significant Jewish 
population remained in Palest ine, it was concentrated 
in the Galilee; Jews were forbidden to enter Jerusalem, 
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now in ruins, as punishment for their rebellion. Jews 
outside Palestine far outnumbered those within it. 
Jewish communities had sprung up in the Greco-Roman 
world prior to the Roman conquest, but their numbers 
were small compared with those that emerged as a result 
of the dispersions that followed the failed rebellions of 
A.D. 66 and 132. Nevertheless. Jews still considered 
Palestine to be Eretz Israel, the land promised them by 
Yahweh. and Jerusalem remained the focal point of their 
religious observances. 
The Romans eased their restrictions against the 
Jews in Palestine soon after they had crushed the Bar 
kokhba revolt Jews "were allowed pract ical self 
government in all their internal affairs and were able to 
set up their own administrative machinery." They were 
still banned from entering Jerusalem and were forced 
to pay special taxes which in the long run were not 
onerous, but they were permitted freedom of religious 
observance and teaching so long as they did not seek 
to convert Gentiles. In practice these regulatory laws 
were not enforced strictly, and Palestinian Jews were 
relatively free to direct their own affairs, especially 
during the decline of Roman power in the first half of 
the Eastern Roman Empire, and Palestine acquired an 
importance for Christian rulers equal to what it had for 
Jews. 
Palestine as the home of Jesus , was sacred to 
Christians. Once the rulers of the Eatern Roman empire, 
based in Constantinople, accepted Christianity, Palestine 
and Jerusalem in particular acquired a significance totally 
alcing in the traditional roman att i tude towards the area. 
Christians considered Jews to be rivals in Palestine, as 
well as a people who had rejected Jesus as the savior 
sent by God. As a result the Byzantines applied existing 
Roman laws limiting Jewish activities more rigorously and 
created new ordinance aimed a isolating the Jews. In the 
fifth century . laws were passed forbidding the 
construction of new synagogues and defining what types 
of repairs could be made to those already in existence. 
These laws were not always applied to the letter, 
however, similar to what had happened under pagan 
Rome. And new synagogues were built in the early sixth 
century, a period when Jews and the Christian majority 
in Palestine prospered. But the raging of the emperor 
Justinian saw the passing of new laws that interfered 
with the internal affairs of the Jewish community, 
something unknown previously. The articles applying to 
the building of synagogues were enforced, and mob 
hostility led to the destruction of may places of worship. 
Jews returned the favor when they were briefly permitted 
to rule Jerusalem after the Persian Sassanid dynasty took 
Palestine during its extended war with Byzantium in the 
early seventh century: churches were burned and many 
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Christians killed. But Byzantine authority was soon 
restored and remained in force for the next twenty years 
before Palestine and the ret of the Middle East fell to 
Arab invaders from the desert who brought with them 
a new religion. Islam. 
THE ARABS AND THE SPREAD OF ISLAM 
The Arab invasion of the urbanized areas of the Near 
East shattered the balance of power that had existed with 
interruptions for over two millennia. The region had 
usually been controlled and fought over by empires 
situated initially in Egypt and Mesopotamia and later in 
the northern Mediterranean and southern Mesopotamia/ 
Iran. The last series of wars between Byzantium and the 
Sassanids, which included the brief Persian occupation of 
Jerusalem, exhausted the military capacities of both 
camps and facilitated the Arab conquest. 
The Arabs are a Semitic people, ethnically and 
linguistically related to the northern Semitic tribes out 
of which came the Canaanites and the Hebrews. The 
majority of these peoples had become wandering 
sheepherders in Mesopotamia two thousand years earlier 
and later settled in the central Near Eastern lands. The 
people known as the Arab a continued to inhabit the 
desert; the desert; the term Arab first occurs in Assyrian 
texts of the eighth century B.C. referring to camel 
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herders of the deser t . Those who could settled in fertile 
oases with a stable water and food supply, but most had 
to pursue the wandering, life of the bedouin. Arab 
contacts with the peoples of the settled areas were 
frequent, through booty raids or when tribes served as 
auxiliary fighters during campaigns. The Arabs inclination 
and ability to invade in force the central Middle East in 
A.D. 632 6 3 3 indicated that major changes had occurred 
in their social and political organization. These changes 
reflected the impact of the personality of the Prophet 
Muhammad and the revelation from God that he 
delivered to the Arabs and that became the religion of 
Islam. 
Muhammad (C.A.D. 570-632) was born in Mecca, a 
trading community and religious sanctuary situated near 
the Red Sea coast along the caravan routes between the 
Yemen and the central Near East He was a member of 
the clan of the Hashim. a subgroup of the Quraysh tribe 
that controlled Mecca. Mecca's prosperity was derived in 
part from the caravan trade, but also from its possession 
of a black meteor i te that became the focal point of 
worship for the tribes of the Hijaz. According to Islamic 
tradition, Muhammad was visited by the angel Gabriel 
who informed him that he had been selected by God 
(Allah) to deliver a revelation to his people . Believing 
he had been chosen to preach God's word, he gave up 
a secure livelihood and place v^^ 'ithin Meccan society to 
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challenge the existing religious practices of Mecca and 
the Hjjaz that formed the basis of the prosperity of the 
Quraysh. 
Muhammad began preaching about the year 6 1 0 . 
Meccan opposition forced him in 622 to flee with his 
followers to the oasis of Yathrib (to be known as Medina 
henceforth). Once there Muhammad took advantage of his 
prest ige and Medinian factionalism to establish himself 
among the Arab tribes as the recognized leader of the 
oasis . He also endeavored to gain Mecca's submission, 
achieved in 630 after a series of inconclusive clashes. 
By Muhammad's death in 632 he had been accepted 
as the prophet of Allah in much of central and south 
Arabia. 
X 
Scholars differ over whether Muhammad intended to 
expand Islam beyond the Arabian peninsula, but such an 
expansion did take place. By 637 the Sassanian capital 
of Ctesiphon was taken, and all of Mesopotamia and 
western Iran were open to Muslim conquest. In Syria and 
Palestine, Damascus was captured in 635 and Jeruslem 
fell in 638; Muslim armies conquered Egypt in 640 . 
Expans ion eas tward and westward c o n t i n u e d 
intermittently for the next ninety years. By 730 , 
X 
approximately a century after Muhammad's death, the 
boundaries of Islam extended from the Pyrenees in 
Europe to beyond the oxus River in Central Asia and to 
the Indus River Basin in India. 
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This growth occurred ufider the direction of the first 
fourth caliphs of Islam, those who succeeded Muhammad 
as heads of the community, and the calips of the 
Umayyad dynasty (661-750). Their successors founded 
the Abbasid cal iphate (750-1258) and moved the capital 
from Damascas to Baghdad in Iraq which became the 
center of a sophist icated culture, but the Abbasids were 
unable to mainta in control over their vast empire. By the 
tenth centruy,even though Islamic civilization continued 
to flourish. 
In addit ion, the religion had broken into two major 
segments, Sunni and Shia Islam. The split originated in 
a dispute over the legitimacy if the claim of AH, the 
fourth caliph, to retain his position as leader of the 
Muslim community. Those who have continued to support 
the claims of AH and his family are called Shi ' i tes. They 
challenged the formation of the Umayyad caliphate and 
its successors that was accepted by the Sunni Muslims. 
Differences in religious interpretation followed from this 
rift. The Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates were Sunni, 
as were many of the provincial governors who broke 
with the Abbasids, but a major Shi'i dynasty, the 
Fatimids, established itself in Egypt in 696 and lasted 
until 1 1 7 1 . For a time tit even threatened the 
continuance of the Abbasid caliphate as head of Sunni 
Islam in Baghdad. 
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ISLAM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO JUDAISM AND 
CHRISTIANITY 
The word Islam means submission to the will of 
Allah; those who profess faith in Allah as the only God 
are called Muslims, " those who submit." Muhammad was 
selected by Allah to be his messenger. He was a human 
being who became a prophet to Muslims a messneger of 
God analogous, though not identical, to the selection of 
Abraham by Yahweh to deliver a connivent to the Jews. 
Allah's covenant was the Quran, the revelations that 
Allah delivered to the Arabs of the Hijaz through the 
mouth of Muhammad, who believed that Allah was 
speaking through him. These recitations were written 
down after Muhammad's death and have been the basis 
of Muslim life to this day. The Quran is believed to be 
the word of Allah sent to guide all Muslims in their lives. 
Along with the compilation of Muhammad's sayings ad 
examples, it became the basis of Muslim law, the shria. 
The sharia contains also the interpretations and 
elaborations by Muslim legal scholars, similar to the 
Jewish Talmud with its body of legal interpretation and 
commentary reflecting t h e ' divine wisdom found in the 
commandments and the Torah. 
Muslims consider Islam to be the culmination and 
perfection of the Jewish and Christian traditions; Allah 
is also the God of the Jews and Christina. According to 
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Islam, Allah gave His revelation to prophets he chose 
to establish both religions but in both cases the believes 
failed to adhere to His commands. This led to the 
fragmentation of the Jewish and Christian communities. 
Allah then sent a final revelation to Muhammad. Muslims 
believe that the black meteorite in Mecca, which 
Muhammad made the place of pilgrimage for Muslims, 
was intitally a shrine of Abraham, thus establishing a link 
between earliest Judaism and Islam. 
To Muslims, Jews and Christians are "People of the 
Books of Revelation." recipients of a divine message that 
they corrupted. As such, they were to be tolerated 
because of their place in the lineage of Islam, but they 
were nevertheless inferior to Muslims because of their 
treatment of God 's messages to them. Islam was the 
perfection of that revelation, and Muslims were superior 
to Jews and Christians who. though permitted to keep 
their religious beliefs, were to be kept in a humble status 
appropriate to their denial of G o d s gift. At the heart 
of the relat ionship was Is lams award of protection to non 
Muslims, including their right to worship, in return for 
payment of specified taxes, the jizya, a poll tax paid 
by non Muslims, and the kharj, a property tax that was 
later paid by Muslims as well Jews and Christian became 
known as dbimmis, those who were granted protection 
in return for their submission to Muslim rule and their 
payment of the jizya. 
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Muslim treatment of non-Muslims was consistent 
with, and in some ways, an improvement upon, the 
policies of Byzantium and the Sassanids toward Jews and 
Christians, respectively . Byzantine laws prohibited the 
construction of new synagogues, required the destruction 
of unsafe ones rather than their repair, interfered in 
Jewish doctrinal matters at times, and in general aimed 
at relegating Jews to eternal subordination in the 
probable hope that they would disappear; schismatic 
Christian groups were also treated harshly. Sassanian 
rules permitted Jews to regulate their own affairs but 
watched Christian sects more closely and forbade the 
construction of new churches. These rules, with 
modifications, were incorporated into islam's policies 
toward Christians and Jes . The construction of new 
churches and synagogues was banned, and the repair 
of existing houses of worship had to be approved. 
Dhimmis were forbidden to wear clothing identical to that 
worn by Muslims., in order to preserve visible signs of 
differentiation, or to build houses that overlooked the 
inner area of Muslim dwelling. Later, rules were imposed 
forbidding dhimmis to ride animals as large as those 
ridden by Muslims. The enforcement of these regulations 
varied considerably according to place and historical 
circumstances. Under Islam, jes experienced a lessening 
of control in certain aspects of their lives. Unlike the 
Byzantines. Muslim authorities did not interfere in 
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doctrinal mat te rs and allowed Jews to visit and inhabit 
Jerusalem. Indeed, Christians felt more debased by 
Muslim policies because they were now equated with Jes, 
after having ruled them and discriminated against them 
for over two centuries. 
As a rule dhimmi security or-insecurity reflected that 
felt by Muslims. The Crusades and the later European 
economic and political penetration of the Islamic world, 
especially during the nineteenth century, threatened the 
ongoing stability of Muslim society. In these situations 
tolerance declined, and regulations were imposed more 
harshly. In general, Muslims discriminated against non 
Muslims but did not persecute them, al though persecution 
was not unknown. Intolerant by modern Western 
standards of racial and religious equality, Muslim policies 
were consistent with the often an improvement on the 
prevailing t reatment of Jews and Christians as subject 
peoples in an age when equity was unknown and 
inconceivable. Similar legal protect ion for religious 
minorities in Europe did not appear for another 
millennium. Official tolerance and protect ion of dhimmis 
in a pluralistic society survived numerous dynastic 
changes from the seventh, century onward to confront 
ultimately in the eighteenth and nineteenth centureis 
European claims for dhimmi equality with-Muslims backed 
by Western military might. 
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PALESTINE UNDER MUSLIM RULE TO 1 5 1 7 . 
The place of Palestine in Islamic history down to the 
modern era was generally a minor one, the exception 
being the period of the Crusades that created a 
European presence in parts of the eastern Mediterranean 
littoral from 1097 to 1 2 9 1 . But Palestine was not 
unimportant to Islam. Jerusalem, as a holy city to both 
Jews and Christians, was thus sacred to Muslims as the 
heirs and perfecters of the Judeo Christian tradition. 
It became the third holiest city in Islam, surpassed only 
by Mecca and Medina, its sanctity reinforced when, 
according to Islamic tradition. Muhammad stopped there 
briefly during his night journey to heaven.-The place 
where he set foot is a rock on the Temple Mount, the 
site of the Jewish temples. An Umayyad caliph built a 
shrine over the stone, completed in 691 (the Dome of 
the Rock), to commemorate the event. 
The Umayyad caliphs situated in Damascus showed 
concern for Jerusalem But the Umayyads ruled for less 
than a century (661-750). Once the Abbasids shifted the 
capital to Baghdad, official attention waned, although 
during the ninth century Harun al Rashid did permit the 
Prankish emperor Charlemagne and his son Louis to 
endow several hostelries their to house Latin pilgrims. 
Caliphs were frequently unable to retain control of 
provinces adjacent to Iraq,' let alone those more distant. 
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Palestine fell under the sphere of those who controlled 
Egypt, whether Sunni Muslims such as Ahmad Ibn Tulun 
(868-883) or the Shi'i Fatimid dynasty, which held 
Palestine from 969 to 1099 . when the Crusaders took 
Jerusalem. 
The inhabitants of Palestine seem to have prospered 
during much of this period from the Muslim conquest to 
the appearance of he Crusader. A majority of the 
population was now Muslim, but there were many 
Christian and Jews. Palestine, especially Jerusalem, 
remained a center of pilgrimage for members of all three 
faiths. Muslim rule was generally unobtrusive, to the pint 
that new churches and synagogues were permitted to be 
constructed. Friction among the religious communities 
and the official sanction of violence against one group 
or another were infrequent. 
The Crusaders took Jerusalem in 1099 , subjecting 
much of its citizerny. Muslim Jewish, and Eastern 
Christian, to a bloodbath. The Crusaders saw themselves 
as wresting the most sacred city in Christianity from 
heathen Muslim rule. Jerusalem became for a time "a 
Christian city where no Muslim or Jewish cult was 
permitted and no non Christian could take residence 
permanently It took several years before Muslims and 
Jews were allowed to pray in the city But effective 
Christian ccMUrol of Jerusalem lasted less than a century. 
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Saladin recaptured the city for Islam in 1187, and it 
resumed its Muslim character, interrupted by a struggle 
between rival Ayyubid princes in Cairo and Damascus 
than influenced the return of Jerusalem to Christian 
governance between 1129 and 1244. 
From 1250 onward Palestine was ruled by the 
Mamluks, a Muslim military elite centered in Cairo and 
Damascus. The province was adminstered by those ruling 
from Damascus, but Jerusalem was considered a separate 
entity under Cairos authority, where the Mamluk sultan 
resided, in order to protect the holy places of the three 
religions. A weakening of Mamluk authority in both Cairo 
and Damascus in the early sixteenth century, permitted 
bedouin raids to disrupt the stability of the area a 
situation that persisted until the taking of Palestine by 
the Ottoman Turks in 1516 - 1517. The Ottomans then 
ruled Palestine almost continuously until 1918 . 
OTTOMAN RULE TO 1 8 0 0 AN OVERVIEW 
In 1 4 3 3 the O t toman Turks c o n c u r r e d 
Constantinople and ended the existence of the Byzantine 
Empire. Descendants of tribal warriors who established 
themselves in western Anatolia after the amonogol 
invasions of the thirteenth century, the Ottoman sultans 
inherited an imperial legacy they sought to expand for 
Islam. Vast areas of Eastern Christendom fell under 
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Muslim authority. By the end of the sixteenth century, 
Ot toman rule extended westward in Europe to Budapest 
and beyond; Vienna was nearly taken twice, in 1529 and 
1 6 8 3 . Ottoman power extended along the southern rim 
of the Mediterranean into Algeria. By taking greater Syria 
(including Palestine). Egype, and the Hijaz in 1516-1517, 
the ot tomans acquired the responsibility to protect 
pilgrims trafelling to Mecca and assumed more directly 
the mantle of authority held by Muslim rules. 
Still, Ottoman power 'did not easily translate into 
security for the inhabitants of the Arab world. During 
much of the sixtieth century, the sultans concerned 
themselves principally with military expeditions into 
Eruropean territory. Administrative reforms and the 
taking of Several censuses testify to the extension of 
Ot toman authority, but its effectiveness seems to have 
wanded by the end of the century. Scholars differ on 
the stability of life in Palestine during this period, but 
there is general agreemen't that bedouin encroachment 
increased during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and that land formerly cultivated fell into 
disuse. 
Palestine under Ottoman rule was eventually divided 
into districts known as Sanjaks, incorporated within the 
province of greater Syria governed from Damascs for 
much of this period. These were the sanjaks of Gaza, 
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Jerusalem, Nablus. Lajun, and Safad. Jeruslem was 
granted to the governor in Damascus as a source of 
income that sometimes led to the imposition of excessive 
taxes. In general , life in the towns and villages in the 
hill country was secure. The bedouin were a constant 
threat to travelers and farmers in the coastal area . Urban 
inhabitants and peasants often suffered more from 
exorbitant demands for revenue by local Ot toman officials 
left unsupervised by a faltering imperial government in 
Istanbul.. The ot tomans gradually began to rely on 
leading Arab clans to perform local governmental 
functions for them. During the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, a number of prominent Palestinian 
families first became established as tax • collectors, 
guardians of charitable endoments. and the like, among 
them were the khalidis, Nusaybas. Alamis, Husaynis, and 
Nashashibis. 
Ottoman society was pluralistic, similar in its 
inclusion of different peoples and faiths to its Byzantine 
and Arab predecessors but on a larger scale. In the words 
of a recent evaluation: 
Remarkably this polvtechnic and multireligious 
society worked. Muslims, Christians and Jews worshipped 
and studied side by side... .The legal traditions and 
practices of each community, particularly in matters of 
personal status death, marriage, and inher i tance were 
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r e s p e c t e d and enforced t h r o u g h o u t the 
empire Opportunities for advancement and property 
were open in varying degrees to all the empire 's 
subjects. . .For all their shortcomings, plural societies did 
allow diverse groups of peoples to live together with a 
minimum of bloodshed. In comparison with the nation 
states which succeeded them, theirs is a remarkable 
record. 
The restrictions of the dhimmis were similar to those 
mentioned before special clothing, denal of the right to 
build new churches or synagogues, and restrictions on the 
types of animals they could ride and the arms they could 
own. As Sunni Muslim, the Ottomans views the dhimmis 
with disdain as inferiors but accepted responsibility for 
their protect ion and usually acted swiftly when mobs 
threatened their safety. Their status was far better than 
that of the Jews in medieval and early modern Europe. 
Indeed, the Ottoman Empire became a haven for Iberian 
Jews who fled the persecution that became rampant in 
Spain following the reconquest. Ot toman Jews were able 
to advance and prosper during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centureis, in part due to their economic 
contributions such as the textile industry at Salonica, and 
in part because the ottomans permitted non Muslims to 
hold certain positions that involved contact with 
foreigners. But this situation began to change in the 
eighteenth century. Jews were replaced by Christian 
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rivals, not because of Ot toman policy but because of 
European influence. European patronage of Christian 
minorities was an extension of efforts by Eruropean 
powers to expand their commercial and political influence 
in the Ottoman Empire an to undermine Ottoman 
authority. Ottoman a t tempts to resist these pressures 
failed and led to a redressing of the nature of Muslim 
non Muslim relations in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, with serious repercussions for the empire and 
for the attitudes of Muslims toward their former subjects. 
THE OTTOMANS AND EUROPE, 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 0 0 
The treaties that ultimately weakened Ottoman 
sovereignty had their origin in agreements made at the 
height of Otoman power. During the sixteenth century 
the sultans offered privileges to several European states 
that permitted their agents to trade within the empire. 
The Ottomans saw these agreements as a convenient 
means of regulating their relationships with Christians 
who were not their subjects. They were made from a 
position of strength and did not pose a threat to Ottoman 
authority until the middle of the eighteenth century. By 
this time the balance of power had shifted. Western 
Europe had made t rematodes strides in developing its 
domestic economist and its military technology while the 
Ottomans had stagnated. In addition, the seventeenth and 
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s w i tne s sed great Eu ropean 
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commercial expansion as a result of overseas conquests 
an the exploitation of foreign markets . 
Hampered by internal disarray and court intrigue, the 
Ottoman rulers were unable to respond effectively to the 
challenges they began to face towards the end of the 
seventeenth century wh^n various European rivals 
initiated campaigns to recover lands and trade routes 
lost two centureis earlier. The Treaty of Karlowitz in 
1699 was the first in which the Ot tomans were forced 
to deal with Europeans as equals and cede territory to 
them From this time onward the sultans were continually 
faced with the territorial ambitions of Australia and the 
newly emerging power of Russia to the north. And, 
henceforth, military reverses were often accompanied by 
European demands for greater influence in the affairs of 
Christian subjects of the Ottomans as a means of 
expanding their own authority at the ot tomans expense. 
The first treaty exhibiting these tendencies was that 
between the French and the Ottoman in 1740. The 
French were granted the right to protect Roman Catolhics 
in the empire and to represent their interest before the 
sultans. In addition, French priests were given privileges 
and permitted to build new churches in Palestine. As a 
means of extending their influence through the protection 
of minorities, the French arranged for the Minorities of 
Lebanon to recognize papal authority and thus be 
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designated as Roman Catholics in return for papal 
permission for the Minorities to retain their own 
language for the mass, their own rites, and their own 
priestly oders. As Roman Catholics, the Minorities thus 
qualified for French tutelage in the Lebanon where the 
French had extensive commercial interests. Finally, the 
French acquired the right to grant special status (the 
barat) to Ottoman subjects that gave them trading 
privileges and legal immunity formerly reserved for 
foreigners. This set in motipn a process whereby dhimmis 
could escape Ottoman control by gaining the protection 
of a European power. Naturally . the french, and later 
other powers, awarded this status to Cistians who 
represented their interests, often at the expense of 
other minorities. For example, in the seventeenth century 
an Armenian replaced a Jew as a customs official in 
Aleppo, at the behest of the French consul there. 
Equally significant was the Treaty of Kuchuk Kanarji 
of 1774, signed after the Russians had driven the 
Ottomans out of the Crimea and gained access to the 
Black Sea. The treaty acknowledged Russian control of 
the north coast of the Black Sea / The treaty 
acknowledged Russian control of the north coast of the 
Black Sea and Russian rights of commercial navigation 
on it, but it also included clauses that affected the non-
Muslim subjects of the Ottomans. The Russians demanded 
and received the right to build in Istanbul a Greek 
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Orthodox church under its protect ion. They could 
intercede on behalf of the clergy and patrons of that 
church and, by inference, all Greek Ortrhodox in the city. 
Russian pilgrims were permitted greater access to 
Palestine, and Russian Orthodox clergy were allow to 
build hostels and churches there. These considerations 
were similar to those given the Rench in 1740 and led 
to an acrimonious rivalry among clergy of different faiths 
for possession of certain Christian holy places in 
Palestine. One such clash between Roman Catholic and 
Russian Orthodox monks, backed by their respective 
government sponsors, was the catalyst for the Crimean 
War of 1854-1856 . 
As a corollary of these developments, trade came 
increasingly under European cont ro l during the 
nineteenth century, often handled by non-Muslim 
Ottoman subjects who gained the protection of the 
countries they represented and thus became free of 
Muslim imposed restrictions. A mutuality of interests 
flourished, as the European nations were eager to claim 
protection of these minorities as a pretex for extending 
their diplomatic and commercial interest . As the century 
progressed, the Ottoman Empire became a focal point of 
larger imperial rivalries, with the European powers eager 
to due trading rights and control of non Muslims as tools 
to wield influence agonist their competi tors as well as 
against the Turks. For much of the period, the major 
protagonists were Great Britain. France, and Russia 
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THE OTTOMANS AND EUROPE, 1 8 0 0 - 1 9 1 4 . 
In contrast with France and Russia, Great Britain did 
not seek of the region and , if possible, the territorial 
integrity of the initially to use protection of Non Muslim 
Minorities as a wedge to expand its influence and weaken 
Ot toman power. The British ' wished to maintain the 
political stability of the region and, if possible, the 
territorial integrity of t h e ' O t t o m a n Empire in order to 
ensure the safety of their routes to India, the centerpiece 
of the i r own e m p i r e , a c r o s s O t toman l ands , 
Consequently, they strove for most of the nineteenth 
century to prop up the Ot tomans in order to block the 
ambitions of their European rivals and keep open their 
own lines of communication to the East. As part of this 
policy they joined the Ot tomans in successfully opposing 
Napoleon Bonaparte when he landed with a French 
army in Egypt in 1798 . seeking to interdict these routes 
and weaken British power in Europe as well as Asia. 
Likewise, the British strove during the 1830s to block 
the expansionist tendencies of the Ottoman governor of 
Egypt, Muhammad AH, who in 1833 took over Greater 
Syria, including Palestinian, and threatened to overthrow 
the Ottoman sultan. They were finally successful in 1841 
following a new international crisis in which Muhammad 
Ali's son and deputy, Ibrahim, once more seemed on the 
verge of taking Istanbul. 
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Britain's policy was part of what has been called 
"The Great Game in Asia," a contest in which it saw itself 
pitted primarily against the Russians, whose southward 
expansions threatened the security of India 's frontiers. 
Britains, whose southard expansions threatened the 
security of India's frontiers. Britain's actions in the 
Middle East were designed to keep the Russians out of 
Istanbul in order to forestall the prospect that a Russian 
fleet stationed there with access to the Mediterranean 
could cut Britains imperial lifeline to India. Muhammad 
Ali's challenge to Ottoman power established a pretext 
for Russian intervention at Istanbul's behest in 1832-
1833, illustrating how local rivalries could undermine or 
abet imperial strategies. 
Britain's success in achieving its goals depended on 
European cooperat ion, which was generally forthcoming 
following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 . British 
diplomats encouraged Ottoman official to undertake 
administrative and legal reforms in the hope of 
stabilizing the regime and. forestalling further European 
inroads. But Ottoman reform efforts, though relatively 
successful, were hampered by internal opposition and 
rising nationalist sentiment that fostered separatist 
movements backed by European nat ions. The Greek 
Rebellion of 1821 ultimately succeeded because of joint 
Anglo Russian intervention. More blatant interference in 
local matters followed the withdrawal of Egyptian forces 
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from Syria and Lebanon in 1840-1841 , when fighting 
broke out between Druze and Maronite Catholic elements 
in Mount Lebanon. A far more serious eruption in 1860 
led to the deaths of thousands in Lebanon and the 
massacre of similar numbers of Christians in Damascus 
by Muslims aroused by the ^specter of European intrusion 
into Ottoman Muslim affairs. Here the French were 
arming the Minorities and the British the Druze, the 
latter determined to block French hegemony through its 
own proteges. 
The Crimean War of 1854-1856, itself sparke by 
religious rivalries in Palestine between Catholic and 
Orthodox monks backed by France and Russia, 
respectively, resulted in a major Russians defeat at the 
hands of France and Great Britain. From this time onward 
tsars sought to fan Balkan separatist movements in order 
to acquire influence against both the Ottomans and 
Russia's major European rival in Eastern Europe, 
Australia-Hunghary, which itself strove to damapen 
nationalist order. Even Russian setbacks contributed to 
regional instability. Russian victories in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-1878 led to concerted European diplomacy 
art the Congress of Berlin (1878) that reduced the extent 
of Moscow's territorial gains, but at Istanbul's expense 
as well. The congress granted independence to Serbia 
Romania, and Montenegro, while the Austrians were 
allotted Bosnia-Herzegovinal all former Ot toman 
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possess ions . Mutual dissatisfaction at this dividing of the 
spoils contributed to further conflict: Austro Hungarian 
Serbian enmity over the status of Bosnia Herzegovinal 
resulted ultimately in the assass inat ion of the Austrian 
Archduke Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 in the Bosnian 
capital of Sarajevo, setting in motion the diplomatic 
exchanges and ultimatums that caused the outbreak of 
World War. I. 
Eleswhere, in their Ar.ab lands, the Ottoman Turks 
also lost extensive territory from the 1870s onward. 
Great Britain continued to encourage internal ottoman 
reforms and to discourage outside threats to Ottoman 
territorial integrity until a series of developments led it 
to part icipate in the carving up of the empire. In 1869 
the Suez Canal had opened, creat ing a direct sea route 
to India through the Mediterranean. Alarmed initially 
because construction of the canal was a joint French 
Egyptian venture, London soon decided to become 
involved in the Suez Canal company and in 1875 bought 
the shares of the Egyptian ruler, the Khedive Ismail. Most 
British diplomats gradually came to see the security of 
the canal as vital to their imperial interests, an 
association that created greater concern for Egypt's 
financial and internal stability. As part of this concern, 
the British acquired the island of Cyprus from the 
Ottomans at the Congress of Berline, viewing it as a 
potential naval base able .to protect the Suez Canal if 
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the Ottomans crumbled. Then, when Egyptian anger at 
European interference in its financial affairs threatened 
to topple Ismail's successor, the British invaded Egypt in 
1882; they remained until 1956. 
The British absorption of Egypt, though not decided 
on for several years, contributed to a scramble for 
African territories by the French and the Germans , who 
hoped to establish a balance of power abroad 
commensurate With their ambitions in Europe. In North 
Africa the French, having taken Tunisia in 1 8 8 1 , gained 
control of Morocco in 1912 following a series of crises 
with Germany. The Italians invaded Libya in 1911 . 
Ottoman efforts to oust the Italians were stymied by the 
outbreak of further Balkan wars in 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 1 3 . By 1914 
Istanbul controlled only a small strip of land in Europe. 
What remained secure were the Turkish heartland, 
Anatolia, and the Arab provinces of the Middle East down 
to the Sinai peninsula. The Germans were now the 
Ottomans ' major ally, as a result of British and French 
involvement in the carving up of the empire that occurred 
in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin. 
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MAJOR ISSUES OF CONFLICT 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
The hostilities which accompanied the establishment 
of the State of Israel in 1948 resulted in almost 750 ,000 
Palestinian refugees. Most of them fled to the West bank, 
held by Jordan, Others went to the Gaza Strip, held by 
Egypt, to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria. Egypt, and even 
farther afield. The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 led to yet 
another displacement of more than 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 Palestinians, 
Of these some 240 .000 were refugees uprooted for a 
second time. 
The General Assembly adopted in November 1948 its 
first resolution of providing assistance to Palestine 
refugees. In response to a report of Acting Mediator 
Ralph Bunche that "the situation of the refugees is now 
critical". it established United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), During its brief existence, 
UNRPR channeled emergency assis tance to refugees form 
Palestine through international voluntary agencies. 
On 11 December 1948, the Assembly declared in 
resolution 194 (III) that refugees wishing to return to 
their homes and live at peace with tier neighbours should 
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, 
and that those choosing not to return should be 
compensa t ed for their p r o p e r t y . The resolution 
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established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 
which was requested, among other things, to facilitate 
the refugees' repatr ia t ion, resettlement and economic and 
social rehabilitation. Efforts by the commission to secure 
the return of the Palestinians have been unsuccessful. 
As hopes for the immediate return of refugees to 
their homes faded, the General Assembly made more 
lasting ar rangements . In December 1949, it established 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to succeed 
UNRPR and carry out refugee-related activities in 
collaboration with local Government. 
In May 1950 . UNRWA. from its headquarters in 
Beirut, took over operat ions put together by international 
voluntary agencies. In the first few years of its work, 
UNRWA concentrated on providing immediate relief in 
the form of food, shelter and clothing. It has adjusted 
its programme over the years in keeping with changing 
needs of the refugees. 
Today education for Palestinian children accounts 
for nearly 50 per cent of the Agency's funds; over 10 
per cent of UNRWA's expenditures are on health 
services, while 11 per cent is spent on providing basic 
relief and social services. Over 390 .000 children were 
enrolled in UNRQWA's 641 elementary and preparatory 
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schools in the 1992-93 school year, in 1993, UNRWA 
disbursed $306 million for its regular and special 
programme. 
UNRWA was in 1993 serving over 2.8 million 
registered refugees almost half of the estimated 
Palestinian population. Less than one third of those 
registered live in refugee camps in the occupied 
territories and in Arab host countries. The Agency's relief 
services provide those unable to earn a living with food, 
blankets, clothing and small cash grants. Under the 
professional guidance of the World Health Organization 
(WHO). UNRWA provides p r e v e n t i v e , cu ra t ive , 
rehabilitative and trauma-related medical services. 
Education has been a joint undertaking of UNWRA and 
the United Nations Educational. Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). 
UNRWA'S vital humanitarian role was reinforced in 
recent years by events in Lebanon and the uprising 
(intifadah) in the West bank and Gaza Strip, as well 
as by the Gulf War of 1991 and the prolonged closures 
of the occupied Palestinian territory since then. 
In the mid -1970s , the 'beginning of the civil war in 
Lebanon resulted in the heavy casualties and suffering 
among the Lebanese and Palestinians, and UNRWA was 
forced to move its headquarters out of Beirut. The 
36 
Lebanon emergency caused by the 1982 Israeli invasion 
created the most difficult working conditions for the 
Agency. And led it to establish an emergency operation 
to cope with the crisis faced by Palestinians in the 
country. Later in the 1980s , fighting in Beirut caused 
considerable destruction of refugee housing and UNRWA 
facilities. 
The intifadah, with its resultant strike days, as well 
as curfews, closed military areas and other pubitive 
measures imposed by the Israeli authorities, exacted a 
significant economic and commercial toll to finance 
urgently needed activities in the occupied territory. 
The number of international staff serving with 
UNRWA in the occupied Palestinian territory was 
increased from 15 to 51 between 1988 and 1993 . They 
provided a measure of international protection, by 
helping to defuse tense situations, averting maltreatment 
of vulnerable individuals, reducing interference with the 
movement of ambulances, and facilitating the provision 
of food and medical aid during curfews. 
Following the 13 September 1993 signing of the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements. UNRWA, recognizing that the resolution 
of the refugee problem is one of the issues to be 
addressed later, within the framework of a permanent 
37 
solution after the interim arrangement for the West Bank 
and Gaza is in place, introduced a major new initiative, 
the Peace implementation Programme. The Programme's 
priori t ies are to enhance the social and economic lives 
of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Projects include construction and social development, 
business loans, training programmes, income generation, 
upgrading schools and women's and youth activity centres 
and addressing complex problems of environmental 
heal th. NRWA works in cooperat ion with the World Bank, 
other United Nations agencies, local and international 
non-governmental organizations, host Governments and 
the emerging Palestinian authori t ies. All these activities 
seek to contribute to sustaining the momentum of 
positive change set in motion by the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles. 
UNRWA has always recognized that it is a temporary 
and ad hoc agency. In the context of the Declaration of 
Principles and the emerging Palestinian authority. Which 
will have competence in all the sectors in which UNRWA 
opera tes , the Agency. With its large Palestinian staff of 
some 20 ,000 . is focusing on areas for which Palestinians 
will soon assume responsibility. 
The commissioner-General of UNRWA. addressing 
the Special Political and Decolonization Committee of the 
General Assembly in November, 1993, affirmed that. 
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despite UNRWA'S cont inuing, strong responsibilities over 
the next few years, "we now have a concrete sense that 
we are coming towards the end of the task entrusted to 
us over 40 years age. from now on, our main concern 
will be to complete this task as successfully as possible". 
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 
As early as 1 9 7 1 , there had been evidence of a 
emerging Israeli policy of establishing settlements in the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 
1967 . From 19778 on. the establishment of Israeli 
settlements was accelerated, and continues to this date. 
Today, there are about 120 ,000 settlers in' the West 
Bank, not including East Jerusalem, and 4 ,000 in the 
Gaza Strip. 
Addressing the issue in March 1979. the Security 
Council reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which prohibits settlements in occupied 
territory, and declared that Israeli policy and practice 
regarding settlements had "no legal validity and constitute 
a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East". The Council asked 
Israel not to take any action which would change the 
legal status, geographical nature and demographic 
composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967. 
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In particular, it asked Israel not to transfer part of its 
own civilian population info the occupied territories. It 
established a three member Security Council Commission 
to examine the situation relating to the Israeli 
settlements. 
In July 1979 , the Council strongly deplored Israel's 
lack of cooperat ion with the Commission in preparing its 
report,, and emphasized the need to confront the issue 
of existing sett lements. It called upon "the Government 
and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the 
establishment, construction and planning of settlements". 
In June 1980 . following assassination attempts 
against the mayors of three Palestinian towns, the 
Council called upon States not to provide Israel with any 
assistance to be used specifically in connect ion with the 
Israeli se t t lements . It was deeply concerned that the 
Jewish settlers in the occupied territories were allowed 
to carry a rms, thus enabling them to preopera te crimes 
against the civilian Arab population. 
The Assembly in 1983 requested the Secretary 
General to prepare a comprehensive report on the 
current and future impact of Israeli sett lements on the 
living conditions of Palestinians. The Secretary General 's 
1984 report on the direct impact of Israeli settlements 
concluded that Israeli policies of occupation, in particular 
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the establishment of set t lements , had a negative impact 
on the social and economic life of Palestinians in the 
occupied territories. Further reports reaffirmed these 
conclusions. 
In 1992, after the coming to power of a Labour 
Government in Israel, there were hopes for significant 
change in the settlement policy. The Labour Party's 
platform vowed that new sett lements would not be 
established, and existing sett lements would not be 
expanded except for those in "Greater Jerusalem", the 
Jo rdan Valley and the Golan Heights. Settlements in the 
latter two regions were referred to as "security 
set t lements" as opposed to "political settlements", which 
had been established in and around Palestinian 
populat ion centres. But outside the above mentioned 
regions, the new Government remained committed to 
building or completing and additional 11.000 new units 
in the territories, capable of housing 50 .000 more Israeli 
set t lers . The Greater Jerusalem area, encompassing today 
about 100 square miles reading form the Old City, 
cont inues to be open for sett lement. 
The Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 
status that the issue of sett lement is to be deferred to 
the permanent status negotiat ions, which are to begin no 
later than the beginning of the third year after the start 
of the interim period. Israel will, in the mean time, retain 
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legal and administrative authority over the settlements 
and their inhabitants, and be responsible for their 
security. 
THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM 
The General Assembly partition resolution 181 (II) of 
1947 envisaged a demilitarized Jerusalem as a separate 
entity under the aegis of the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council, which would draft a statute for Jerusalem and 
appoint a Governor. A legislature would be elected by 
universal adult-suffrage. This statute would remain in 
force for 10 years and then be duly examined by the 
Trusteeship Council, with citizens' participation through 
a referendum. 
The ensuing hostilities prevented the implementation 
of the resolution. Israel occupied the western sector of 
the Jerusalem area, and Jordan occupied the eastern 
sector, including the walled Old City. Thus came into 
existence a de fact division of Jerusalem. 
The General Assembly, however, by resolution 1994 
(III) of 11 December 1948. reaffirmed both the principle 
of internationalization and existing rights. The Arab 
States, refusing to recognize Israel, did not accept it. 
Israel also ignored the resolution and moved to extend 
its jurisdiction to that part .of Jerusalem it had occupied. 
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On 2 3 January 1950, Israel declared Jerusalem its capital 
and established government agencies in the western part 
of the city. Jordan, for its part , moved to formalize its 
control of the Old City; however, Jordanian legislation 
indicated that this action did not prejudice the final 
set t lement of the Palestinian issue. 
The war of June 1967 radically changed hat 
s i tuat ion. As a result of the war, Israel occupied East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. Since then, a number of 
demographic and physical changes have been introduced, 
and both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
is several resolutions have declared invalid the measures 
taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem. 
Security Council resolution 252 (1968) in particular is 
explicit in this regard. In it. the Council considered "that 
all legislative and administrative measures and actions 
taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and 
proper t ies thereon, which tend to change the legal status 
of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status". 
Israel was urgently called upon "to rescind all such 
measures already taken and to desist for with from taking 
any further action which tends to change the status of 
Jerusalem". The Security Council has reaffirmed these 
two positions many times. 
When Israel took steps to make a united Jerusalem 
its capital, the Security Council on 30 June 1980 
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adopted resolution 476 (1980). After Israel's non 
compliance with the resolution, the Council on 24 August 
adopted resolution 478 (1980). in which it reiterated its 
position hat all actions altering the status of the city were 
null and voided and called upon States that had 
established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw 
them. The General Assembly also considered Israel's 
action to be a violation of international law which did 
not affect the continued applicability of the fourth 
Geneva Convention. This understanding, affirmed by the 
Assembly in December 1980. has been reaffirmed in 
subsequent years. 
During the 1980s, United Nations resolutions dealt 
with the Jerusalem issue in the wider context of the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and 
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967. 
Jerusalem has been considered by both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council as part of the 
occupied terri tories. 
More recently, as the international community and in 
particular the Security Council continued to follow with 
concern developments affecting the question of Palestine, 
two resolution stand out as important actions of the 
Council. The first i resolution 672 (1990), adopted on 
12 October 1990 following the violence which took place 
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in Jerusalem at Haram Al-Sharif. where the Al Aksa 
mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam, is situated. The 
Council, after condemning "especially the acts of violence 
committed by the Israeli security forces resulting in 
injuries and loss of human life", called upon Israel "to 
abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and 
responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persona in time of War, of 12 
August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967" . 
The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
to Jerusalem was reaffirmed by the Security Council on 
20 December 1990. when it expressed grave .concern at 
the deteriorating situation in "all the Palestinian 
terri tories occupied by Israel since 1967, including 
Jerusalem", and called on Israel to abide by it. 
Today, the officially registered Jewish population of 
annexed East Jerusalem, about 160 .000 , outnumbers the 
Palestinian population, which stands at about 155 ,000 . 
The United States Department of State notes in its latest 
report to the US Congress that the Israeli Government 
has made no commitment to halt or reduce construction 
in East Jerusalem. 
Under the terms of the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self Government Arrangements , signed by Israel 
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and the PLO on 13 September 1 9 9 3 . the permanent 
status negot ia t ions on the issue of Jerusalem are to start 
not later than the beginning of the third year of the 
interim per iod. 
At this most recent session, the General Assembly 
determined once again, in December 1 9 9 3 , that Israel's 
dec is ion to impose its laws. ju r i sd ic t ion and 
administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem was illegal 
and therefore null and void. 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 
Concern for the human rights of the civilian 
population in the territories occupied by Israel during the 
1967 war was first expressed by the Security Council in 
resolution 237 (1967). which, among other things, 
recommended to the Governments concerned the 
scrupulous respect of the humanitar ian principles 
contained in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. The 
Convention, on the protection of civilian persons in time 
of war, forbids the forcible transfer of inhabitants out of 
an occupied territory and the movement into the territory 
of the civilian population of the occupying Power. The 
Convention also deals with other mat ters , such as the 
treatment to be accorded to the protected persons of an 
occupied territory and to those under detention; it 
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prohibits the imposition of collective penalties. Israel is 
party the Convention. 
In December . 1 9 6 8 , the Genera l Assembly 
established a three member Special Committee to 
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights 
of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the 
Occupied Territories, and, asked it to submit reports 
whenever the need arose. The Israeli Government, since 
the very beginning, refused to allow the Special 
Committee to visit the occupied territories to conduct its 
mandated investigations. It has maintained that the 
Specia l Commi t tee ' s es tabl ishing resolut ion was 
discriminatory in character and attempted to prejudge 
a l l ega t ions the Special Commit tee ' s es tabl ishing 
resolution was discriminatory in character and attempted 
to prejudge allegations the Special Committee was 
supposed to investigate. 
Since 1970. the Special Committee has submitted to 
the General Assembly annual reports, complemented 
since 1989 by two additional periodic reports. Without 
(\\rect access to the occupied territories, the members 
jgj^ided to base their reports on interviews, conducted 
during visits to the neghbouring States, with individuals 
having ^ '^'^ t hand experience of the human rights situation 
in the oc'^'^P'^^ territories. Another source is the articles 
appearing ' " ^^^ Israeli press and in the Arab
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published in the occupied terri tories. The territories 
considered by the Special Committee are the West bank, 
including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the 
occupied Syrian Arab Golan. 
The repor ts have documented the human rights 
situation in the occupied territories, including indecent 
linked to the intifadah, administration of justice, 
treatment of detainees, treatment of Palestinian civilians, 
measures affecting fundamental freedoms, and the 
activities of Israeli settlers violating international law. 
They have affirmed that, especially over the last 
decade, Israel continued its policy of de fact annexation 
through such measures as establishing or expanding 
settlements, confiscating property, transferring Israeli 
citizens to the occupied territories, deport ing Palestinians 
from the territories, and encouraging or compelling 
Palestinians to leave their homeland. Such actions, the 
reports stated, have violated the obligations of Israel as 
a State party to the Founth Geneva convention. 
The report of the Special Commit tee issued in 
November, 1 9 9 3 , which covers the period September 
1992 August, 1993 , strongly argues that, despite the 
ongoing peace process, there is a continued worsening 
of the human rights situation in the occupied territories, 
During the period Jnder review, the report states, the 
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civilian population has continued to suffer heavy 
casualties from measures employed by the Israeli 
authorit ies to repress the intifadah. An increased loss 
of life, especially among children, resulting in large 
measure from the continued deployment of undercover 
units, further relaxation in the rules for opening fire, and 
increased use of live ammunition, has been reported 
during the same period. 
According to the repor t , the physical and 
psychological stress that the population of the occupied 
terri tories endure has been compounded by a series of 
unprecedented repressive measures taken by the Israeli 
authorit ies during this past year. At the end of 1992. 
The army started to carry .out a new form of collective 
punishment , which consis ts of destroying entire 
neighborhoods with heavy artillery fire during searches 
for wanted persons. Scores of innocent people were left 
homeless as a result of the searches, which were aimed 
at capturing a handful of fugitives. 
The increase in violence in both the occupied 
territories and Israel led the Israeli authorities to impose 
a complete closure of the occupied territories on 31 
march 1993 . The closure created enormous hardships for 
the Palestinians, and deprived about 120,000 of them of 
their means of livelihood. It had a negative impact on 
the health situation in the occupied territories, since the 
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most important medical facilities serving Palestinians are 
located in Jerusalem. Students were prevented from 
attending classes in areas in which they do not reside 
and more than 25 per cent of the student population was 
unable to register on time in schools and universities. 
Access to both Muslim and Christian holy sites was also 
affected by the closure. 
In addition, the report notes, the Palestinian 
population of the occupied territories has systematically 
been denied access to water resources. The deliberate 
policy of economic pressure, such as the uprooting of 
trees, tax raids and administrative harassment , has 
continued. The administration of justice is characterized 
by lack of due process of law and a frequent absence 
of basic legal safeguards for the Arab populat ion. The 
practice of torture and ill-treatment during interrogation 
and after sentencing has continued. 
The report also expressed conce rn about the 
deportation by Israel, in December 1 9 9 2 , of over 400 
Palestinians, who spent the following year living in 
unsanitary and inhuman conditions be tween military lines 
in souther Lebanon, before being repatriated in 
December 1 9 9 3 . This action was strongly condemned by 
the Security Council, which reaffirmed the applicability 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied 
Palestinian territory and demanded that Israel ensure the 
safe and immediate return of all those deported. 
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In February 1993, for the first time, the United 
Nat ions Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint 
a Special Reporter on human rights violations in the 
occupied Arab territorie's, including Palestine. In 
Sep tember 1993, Mr. Rene Felber, the former President 
of the . Swiss Confederation, was appointed Special 
Rappor ter . He was invited to visit the occupied territories 
in January 1994 the first person with an official mandate 
from the Commission on Human Rights allowed to do so 
and was able to talk freely with the persons he had 
wished to see. In this January 1994 report, the Special 
Rappor tur called on both Israeli and Palestinian 
authori t ies , as a matter of 'priority, to "take measures to 
conain the violence, which may pose the most serious 
threat to the peace process". 
But violence exploded again : on 25 February 1994. 
the killing of some 30 Palestinian worshippers in the 
Mosque of Ibrahim in Heron by an Israeli settler, 
following attacks against sett lers by Palestinians, was 
universally condemned and caused great concern for the 
future of the peace process, renewing calls for some form 
of international protection for Palestinians. 
Reacting to the massacre, the Security Council on 
18 March 1994 called for measures to guarantee the 
safety and protection of Palestinian civilians throughout 
the occupied te r r i tor ies , including a temporary 
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international or foreign presence. Strongly condemning 
the massacre, the council called upon Israel to continue 
to make measures, including the confiscation of arms, to 
prevent acts of violence by Israeli sett lers. 
The water i s s u e in the Pa le s t in ian- I srae l i P e a c e 
P r o c e s s 
A significant component of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is the dispute over allocation of scarce water 
shared by the two peoples. Since the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began after the 1967 
Six Day War, Israeli military orders denied Palestinian 
involvement in the management and development of 
water resources and limited increases in water 
consumption by the Arab population for both agricultural 
and domestic use. As a result, Israelis consume a 
significantly larger amount of water per capita than 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Part of any 
permanent peace settlement between Israel and Palestine 
must include and equitable sharing of their land's water 
resources, as well as cooperation on managing existing 
and developing new water supplies. The water accords 
in the Taba-or interim -Agreement of September 1995 
represented a major step towards reconciling this dispute, 
but the questions of water rights and specific allocations 
were left to the 'final status' negotiations now set to 
resume in spring 1997 in line with the Hebron Accords 
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of January 1997 . This article examines the nature of the 
water issue, focusing particularly on the evolution of the 
negotiations since the beginning of the Madrid peace 
process in 1991 
Water R e s o u r c e s : Scarcity and Inequity 
The basis of the Israeli-Palestinian water dispute is 
scarcity. All existing water resources are in danger of 
overuse, and droughts - as in the late 1980s and summer 
1996-bring acute water shortages and hardships. With 
both populat ions growing rapidly because of a high 
Palestinian birthrate and Israeli immigration, the situation 
can only deteriorate unless new water resources are 
added to the region's water supply and if the agricultural 
sectors of the Israeli and Palestinian economies are 
curtailed, Additional water supplies and economic 
restructuring are thus a long-term necessity. 
Understanding the water dispute requires facts and 
figures, but, even in the seemingly objective area, politics 
could the issue. Although • Israel possesses . 
Alwyn R. Rouyer is Professor. Department of Political 
Science, university of Idaho. Moscow, ID. Of scientific 
assessments, including entering all wells in the West Bank 
since 1967, the information has not been made available 
to the public because water is considered a national 
security concern. Almost no data pertaining to water in 
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Israel or the West Bank is available that has not been 
specifically released by official Israeli government 
sources. As a result, Palestinian water specialists and 
therefore suspect. The Palestinians contend that the 
Israelis have an interest in falsifying the data to support 
their case. The demand independent research and 
verification. Israeli official dismiss theses charges, 
responding that the statistics available on water are 
accurate and very specific. The government, they say, 
would to dare to publish false figures, Because of these 
differentiate, estimates of he amount of water available 
in the region vary considerably. That Taba Agreement has 
endorsed the concept of sharing all data pertaining to 
water and sewage, but actual exchanges of data have net 
yet taken place. 
The region shared by Israeli and Palestinians relies 
on three main sources of water: the River Jordan basin, 
including Lake Galilee; aquifers extending from the 
mountainous central spoke of the West Bank into Israel 
and the Jordan Gaza Strip. Due to the vagaries of 
rainfall, the annual renewable freshwater supply is 
somewhat irregular. Combining this fact with the different 
estimates provided by Israeli and Arab sources, the 
figures given here are ortly approximations based on 
normal years. As Table 1 shows, the total annual 
renewable water supply for Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories in between 1,900 and 2,000 million cubic 
54 
meters (mem), of which approximately 3 0 % is surface 
water from the Jordan basin. 60% ground-water from 
aquifers and 10% from other sources, mainly recycled 
waste water. 
The River Jordan forms the axis of a basin system 
covering an area of 18,300km extending from the slopes 
of Mount Hermon in the north to the Dead Sea, the 
lowest point on earth, in the south. The main source of 
the basin 's water comes from the upper River Jordan 
which is formed from the flow of three spring fed rivers: 
the Hasbani, rising in Lebanon; the Banias from the 
occupied Golan Heights; and the dan, organization within 
Israel. The total discharge into Lake Galilee- comes to 
approximately 540 mcm/y. Another 200 mem are added 
to Lake Galilee from rainfall and run-off while 70 mem 
is diverted to the lake from the Ricer Yarmuk which 
enters the lower River Jordan 10km south of the lake. 
From this total , Israel withdraws about 500 mem/y to 
its National Water Carrier which conveys it south to 
coastal populat ion centres and the Negev Desert (see 
map); another 270 mem are lost to evaporat ion off the 
surface of the lake.Two main aquifers provide ground-
water to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. 
The richest of these is the so-called mountain aquifer 
with an annual safe yield of approximately 600 mem the 
recharge area is almost entirely inside the West Bank 
with only about S'Xi on the Israeli side of the Green Line. 
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The aquifer flows from the watershed along the crest 
of the mountainous ricge, running south-north through 
much of the West Bank and discharging into three 
dra inage basins: wes te rn ,nor thern and eastern. The 
largest and most diputed of these is the western, or 
Yorkon-Tanninim, basun which discharges toward the 
medi terranean coast in Israel. The northern basin also 
discharges mainly across the Green Line in Israel's Bet 
Shean Basin and Jezreel Valley, while the eastern basin 
flows inthe direction of the Jordan Valley (see map). 
Table 1 Water R e s o u r c e s in Israel and the 
Pa les t in ian Terr i tor i e s 
Mi l l ion cubic m e t e r s / y e a r 
(mcm/y) 
Jordan Basin 
River Hasbani (Lebanon) 125 
River Banias (Syria) 125 
River Dan (Israel) 250 
Sub-total 500 
Lage Galile Area 
Local run-off above Lake Galilee 140 
Local Galilee (rainfall/spings/run-off) 200 
River Yarmuk 70 
Evaporation over Lake Galilee -270 
Saline discharge into lower River Jordan -40 
Sub-toat 100 
Aquifers 
Mountain: Western Basin (Yarkon-Tanninim) 340 
Northern Basin 140 
Eastern Basin 600 
Sub-total 340 
Other 
Minor aquifer, streams, run-off 200 
Recycled waste water 220 
Sub-total 420 
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three drainge basins: western, northern and eastern. The 
largest and most disputed of these is the western, of 
yardon-Tanninim, basin which discharges toward the 
Mediterranean coast in israel. The nor thern basin also 
dischages mainly across the Green Line in Israel's Bet 
Shean Basin and Jezrell Valley, while the easstern basin 
flows in the direction of the Jordan Valley (see Map). 
The other major source of ground-water the coastal 
aquifer, the costal aquifer, extends over 15km of the 
Mediterranean coast from Mount Carmel in the north to 
south of the Gaza Strip; it is geologically separate from 
the western basinof dthe mountain aquifer, i Iwsrael, the 
annul safe yield from this source is estimated to be about 
280 mem; in the Gaza Strip, no more than 60 mem be 
reliably withdrawn. In contrast to the high quality of the 
ground-water from the mountain aquifer, water pumped 
from the coastal aquifer is highlyt saline from several 
decades of over-exploitation which hasf led to seawater 
intrusion. The aquifer has fbeen further damaged by 
infiltration of agricultural cheniicals and sewage. The 
damage is particularly severe in the Gaza Strip where 
yearly consumption has averaged nearly twice the safe 
yield. The deficit in the water bvalance has caused a drop 
in the water table by an average of 15-20 cm/y causing 
seawater seepage over 1.5km into the aquifer and a srise 
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in teh achlorine content of the water to levels damaging 
to agriculture and dangerous to human health.6 
Water--consumption figures fro Israel and the 
Palest inian Territories illustrate the essentially political 
nature of the idispute. In a normal year, water 
consumption for the two regions has fbeen estimated as 
2 , 1 0 0 - 2 , 2 0 0 mcm/y. The year to year amount depends 
on rainfall. From 1986 unitil the heavy rain of 1991-
92 , Israel cut agricultural cinsumption by as much as 
30%. Again, afte the dry winter of 1993-94, agricultural 
consumption of drindable • water was reduced by 10% 
Official Israeli data from Tahal. the israedli water-
planning company, show al lower consumption figure of 
about 1,900 mcm/y. but this is generaly disputed by 
Palestinian and many external experts on Middle East 
hydrology. These differences again reflect the difficulty 
in obtaining accurate data and the deep distrust between 
Israeli and Palestinians. In any case, whicever figures 
are accurate , Israel and the Palestinian territories face 
a water blance that is either precariously near even or 
one that produces an annjl dericit of 150-200 mem/ . 
Continued over-utilisation of such a water suppply will 
diminish its quality and threa tens its future agilability. 
But with projected increases in oth population and 
consumption rates over the next 25 year, the deficit in 
the water balance could become much more critical. 
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The primary consumer of water in Israel and the 
Palestinian territories isirrigated agriculture. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, Israel devoted 75-80% of its water budget 
to irrigation. This figure has dropped significantly over 
the last 15 years, due both to population growth and 
improvements in irrigation technology. By 1992, 
following several years of sevee drought and the 1990 
report of the State Comptroller attributing Israel's 
i m p e n d i n g water c r i s i s to ove rep lo i t a t ion and 
mismanagement of the resource for the agricultural 
sector, the percentage o potable water giong to 
agriculture had declined to just over 60%. At the same 
time, domestic water consumption in Israel climbed from 
15-20% of total consumption in the 1960s 'and 1970s 
to over 32% in 1993 . The 1-argest proportion of the water 
budget of the Palestinian Territiries is also devoted to 
agriculture. In 1990, just over 70% of the 217 mem 
consumed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip went on 
irrigation. 
While overexploitation and the need to find new 
sources of water are major concerns, especially in Gaza, 
the crucial political problem is not scarcity but inequity. 
From the outset of the occupation in 1967, Israeli 
military orders severely restricted Palestinian extraction, 
transfer and consumption of water resources and the 
construction of water installations in the West Bank and 
in Gaza Strip. Even with the new Palestinian Authority 
59 
(PA) Israel retains full control of water resources in the 
most of the West Banm and Gaza. In particular, strict 
controls were placed on drilling new wells and improving 
old wells without permits , few of which have been 
g ran ted . Israeli w a t e r po l ic ies have r e s t r i c t ed 
consumption by Palestinians in the West Bank to 110-
125 mem per annum. Water for agriculture has been 
frozen at 20% more than 1967 levels, of about 90-100 
mcm/y The balance (the difference between 100 -125 and 
901000) goes to domestic use. with only all fraction 
devoted to industry. Water for domestic consumption in 
the West Bank has been allowed to grow gradually since 
1967, but the population of the West Bank has more than 
doubled in the last three decades, from aroun'd 583 ,000 
to nearly 1.400,000 in 1994. As a result of these 
restrictions, Palestinian consumption has not been 
allowed to increase at a natural rate. In 1 9 9 5 , at the 
time of the Taba Agreement, Palestinians constituted 
3 1 % of the population of Israel and the Palestinian 
territories, but consumed only lO'Xi of its water. 
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Table 2 Water Consumption in Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories Circa 1 9 9 0 
Domestic Domestic Total per capita Total gross 
consumption consumption consumption consumption 
lltres/daycubic meters/year' cubic meters/years mcm/y 
Israel 
West Bank 
Gaza 
280 
76 
100 
West Bank settlers 300 
100 
31 
35 
110 
400 
125 
130 
350-1,1600 
1,900 
120 
97 
45-160 
The water gap between Israelis and Palestinians 
can best be grasped by examining per capita consumption 
figures (see Table 2 ). While the numbers provided by 
different sources vary, it is possible to approximate. Most 
sources agree that Israeli consumption is 3-4 times 
greater than that of the Palest inians. Perhaps the most 
telling statistic is domestic water consumption. Whereas 
Israeli usage is about 280 liters person per day (Ipd), 
Palestinian consumption is a meagre 70-90 Ipd.l But 
actual water delivery to Palestinian consumers in the 
towns and cities is a much lower 40-60 Ipd because of 
serious leakage problem's caused by deteriorating 
infrastructure and lake of funding for repairs. In the 
West Bank, the leakage rate has been estimated to be 
about 50%. During the summer dry season, water can be 
supplied only irregularly to many West Bank towns. The 
availability of drinking water in villages and refugee 
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camps is even worse: one estimate places drinking-water 
consumption in West Bank villages at about one-third of 
that in the towns. Over half the villages containing about 
37% of the population in the West Bank do not have 
piped drinking water and just rely on roof-top cisterns 
or water hand-carried from poor-quality community wells. 
Access to water is not much improved in refugee camps. 
A 1992 United Nations report stated that about 40% of 
refugee-camp residents in the Gaza Strip had no water 
in their homes. 
Israel's water- consumption level depends heavily on 
water resources it shares with the Palestinians. Roughly 
25-30% of Israel's total water resources come from the 
West Bank, but more important , about 50% if its drinking 
water. Many-both Palest inians and Israeli-charge that 
Israeli has been overpumping both shared aquifers and 
those within the Green Line beyond the safe yield. These 
accusations are denied by officials at Tahal and Mekorot, 
Israel 's water company responsible for supply projects 
and distribution. Yet the Israeli State Comptroller Report 
of 1990 documents serious overproduction in the 
mountain and coastal aquifers of up to 100 mem 
annually through the 1980s . The growth of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank has also aggravated the 
water problem. While data^ on settler water-consumption 
is a closely guarded secret in Israel, an estimate would 
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be want sett lers use of all the water consumed in the 
West Bank, most of it for irrigation. Settlers numbering 
around 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 consume 60-100 mem, while 1.2 m 
Palestinians consume 100-140 mem. Thus, while scarcity 
of water resources is a major technical and economic 
problem that must be addressed, inequality of access to 
these shared resources lies at the heart of the political 
dispute. 
THE PALESTINIAN EXILE 
The S t a t e of Israel after i ts Founding 
The founding of Israel had to direct consequences: 
it led to the first war between Israel and the Arab states 
and it created the problem of 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 Palestinian 
refugees. 
The first phase after the founding of Israel was no 
different the phase that preceded it. The Jewish 
underground and terror groups now formed the regular 
Israeli army and continued the war with the same means. 
The murder of the people of Deir Yassin had merely been 
signal for what was to come . 
After 15 May 1948. the Israeli army attacked 
countless defenseless Arab villages, blew up houses and 
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entire villages and indiscriminately killed men, women 
and children. The survivors were driven out of the 
villages. News of these appalling massacres spread like 
wildfire and those who did not believe the reports were 
likely to become the next victims. 
The Israelis" psychological warfare was based on 
shock tactics. Israeli radio was constantly calling on the 
Palestinians to flee ' to avoid bloodbath '. Israeli army 
vehicles with loudspeakers drove through the streets of 
towns and village pointing out escape. This happened, 
for example, at 5 .15 on 15 May 1948 in Jerusalem and 
on 21 April just before the attack on Haifa. But 
numerous and radio reports were not the only reasons 
for panic and headlong flight. The Israeli army 
deliberately and systematically destroyed village and 
drove out their inhabitants. This happened not only 
during the first middle East war in districts such as EI 
Ghazel and Jabba or village such as Anan and Kafr Bar' 
am. Even after the war. Zionist violence was continually 
and cruelly directed against Palestinians under Israeli 
control. The massacres and atrocities committed in Arab 
towns and village such as Igrith (December 1951), Al-
tirah (July 1953) , Abu Ghosh (September 1953), Akko 
(June 1956) and Kafr Kassem (October 1956) are 
perhaps the most notorious but by no means the only 
example of this wave of Israeli violence. To take the 
example of Kafr Kassem: 
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On the eve of its attack on Egypt in 1956, the Israeli 
army imposed a curfew in the village of kafr Kassem, 
which was located on the ceasefireline but within Israeli-
occupied territory, A 16.30 on 29 October 1956 Israeli 
border police units reached the village and told the mayor 
that a curfew would be imposed from 17.00 of same day 
that anyone found outside his house after this time would 
be shot. Many village were still working in the field or 
outside the village and there was no way of informing 
them that the curfew had been imposed. When they 
returned, unsuspecting, at 17.00 hours they were shot 
at the village gates. That evening. 51 people were killed 
and 13 wounded. Among the dead were 12 women and 
girls, ten boys aged between 14 and 17 and seven boys 
aged be tween 8 and 13 
Form 1 9 4 8 to 1956. Israel not only attacked towns and 
villages directly under its control, but also launched 
military attacks on neighboring areas . Israel was 
condemned for such actions by the United nations 
Security Council in 1951. 1953, 1955 and 1956. 
One of the attacks for which Israel was condemned 
was that on the village of Qibya on the West Bank on 
14 and 15 October 1953. Half a battalion of Israeli 
soldiers blew up 41 houses and a school and cold 
bloodedly murdered 42 men. women and children. Even 
before the founding of Israel, the Israelis had adopted 
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the tactic of bombing crowds of refugees to hasten their 
depar ture . In August 1954 the Israelis attacked the 
UNWRA refugee camp at Bureij in the Gaza strip, killing 
20 and injuring 62 people. 
Yitzhak Rabin former Chief of Staff and later Prime 
Minister of Israel, summed up this policy with brutal 
clarity: By razing villages to the ground and driving out 
the inhabitants we will ensure that there are no villages 
left for the Arabs to return to 
These tactics nipped resistance in the bud and 
reduced the Palestinian population to helplessness. 
The murder of the UN mediator Count Folk 
Bernadotte by members of the stern gang on 17 
September 1948 was a particularly odious crime. 
Bernadotte was killed because of his strict neutrality and 
his efforts to help Palestinian refugees to return to their 
towns and villages. He was merely implementing a UN 
resolution to this effect. The Israeli government was 
criticized by the UN Security Council in October 1948 
for blocking investigations into this murder. 
These are just a few examples. They have been 
mentioned not for superficial propagandist reasons but 
to show how the State of Israel set about the first phase 
of its consolidation The Israeli motto was; the end 
justifies the means 
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Right up to the present day, world opinion has taken 
little or no note of the atrocities Israel committed at that 
time. It would not and could not believe that the Jews. 
Who has the whole hearted sympathy of the entire world 
after their dreadful experiences under Nazism, could 
perpetra te such cruelties on another people The Israelis 
themselves sowed the seeds of armed resistance in the 
hearts of the Palestinians at this t ime. Many acts 
by the Palest inians which world opinion would later 
condemn as terrorism can be better understood in the 
light of this historical background. 
The Palest inians had seen their villages destroyed, 
they had been forced to flee with nothing but what they 
could carry. Often enough, this meant only their children. 
Yet they took with them something else as a token of 
their determinat ion to retyrn: the keys to the doors of 
their houses. These keys can still be seen hanging above 
the doors of small houses in refugee camps in Jorda, 
Syria and Lebanon, bearing silent but eloquent witness 
to the expulsion from and longing for Palestine. 
From spring 1948 to spring 1949 , streams of 
refugees left the country, with the Israeli army behind 
them and an uncertain future before them. Families would 
often walk on at night and hide from Israeli attacks by 
day. Children wept because they were hungry, their 
fathers remained silent and despondent, their mothers 
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were too helpless and we^k, too numbed by horror to 
comfort their children. They slept under trees and 
behind bushes till they came to a country which provided 
refuge against this first persecution. The tents they were 
given provided scant protection against the wind, the rain 
and the cold of winter. Their starvation rations did 
nothing to dispel their inner despair and deep sense of 
humiliation. They were a nation in exile. 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 
individuals shared this collective fate forgotten by the 
world, humiliated, insulted', despairing, silent. 
The first refuges were forced to live in fields; others 
lived in mosques, churches, monasteries, schools and 
abandoned buildings. In June 1950, 2 9 . 3 % of refugees 
recognized by UNWRA were housed in camps; this 
estimate rose to 38.6% by June 1957 and went on rising 
slightly Since 1956. tents in the 56 UNWRA camps have 
been replaced by emergency accommodation. In June 
1958 there were not . more than 4 , 9 0 0 t en t s . 
Accommodation in the camps consisted of huts with clay 
walls, a mixture of dirt and straw covered with tent 
canvas and in the more modern camps buildings made 
of cement and concrete with corrugated iron roots. Seven 
to nine people have to live in this accommodation, which 
consists of only one room. Often they have to sleep on 
the floor. There is no water and no electricity. 
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A nat ion without a land, a people without a country, 
the Pales t in ians were condemned to. vegeta te in camps. 
Within sight, across the b'order, were their houses and 
fields, to which they were forbidden to return. 
The Palest inians in the camps had no passports, no 
work and no future. Those who remained in Palestine 
were s u b j e c t e d to degrad ing and scanda lous 
discrimination. Palestinian identity in Israel was being 
crushed. 
The Palest inians in the camps had no passports, no 
work and no future. Those who remained in Palestine 
were s u b j e c t e d to degrading and scandalous 
discrimination. Palestinian identity in Israel was being 
crushed. 
The violent expulsion and uprooting of the 
Palestinian peop le by the new State of Israel, the theft 
of their homes and the refusal to allow them to return 
all this conta ined the seeds of a new confrontation. A 
new generat ion was growing up in the camps, the 
generation of resistance. 
Year after year, the Palestinians in the camps went 
on hopping to return to their homes. But the hopes they 
had pinned on UN resolutions proved vain. Israel 
humiliated the United Nations, and the world made the 
Palestinian pay for its humiliation. 
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In the loneliness and obscurity of huts and tents. The 
Palest inians learn new laws of survival. They learned 
to rely on themselves and take their fate into their own 
hands. The queue for UNWRA rations disappeared. 
The Palest inians sought work, throughout the world. 
They knew that the only chance was education. They 
wanted their children to be able to cope better with the 
future, to study and not to have to relay on others. 
Groups were formed in the camps and courses were 
started, even though the teaches themselves often had 
no school leaving certificates or training. Small schools 
were set up . Mosques and churches were soon crammed 
with s tudents and pupils studying hard, even at night, 
by the light of oil lamps. Literacy soon disappeared. 
But no real change 'in their situation could be 
expected in the near future. The radio report for which 
they had waited so long in their tents and huts, telling 
them that they could return to their homes, did not 
come, . But they were no longer resigned and hopeless. 
LAND ISSUE 
H o u s i n g and Planning P o l i c i e s in Jerusalem 
The intense settlement activity that has increased 
the number of Jews lying in Jerusalem has been 
accompanied by the government policies since 1967 to 
limit the number of Palestinians residing in Jerusalem to 
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no more than 24 per cent of the city's populat ion. This 
policy directive had been recently restated in the 1992 
report (the Kubersky committee) of the Israeli Ministry 
of the Interior that was established to investigate the 
annexation of territory east of Jerusalem 
Israel has succeeded, in this goal of 74 :24 Israeli / 
Pa l e s t i n i an p o p u l a t i o n ra t io , t h rough i n t r i c a t e 
bureaucratic restrictions for Palestinian East Jerusalem 
residents. Israeli housing' and planning policies are 
responsible for decreasing the Palestinian population 
while simultaneously increasing the Israeli population in 
East Jerusalem. These polices include. 
(i) expansion of municipal boundaries to include 
Palestinian land while excluding Palestinian population (ii) 
expropriation of Palestinian land for Jewish construction 
and the confining of Palestinian construction to build up 
areas; (iii) excluding the Palestinian from the planning 
process; (iv) keeping Palestinian land unplanned or 
declaring green areas which cannot be used for housing 
(v) demolition of unlicensed Palestinian homes to keep 
areas vacant for future confiscation. 
(i) Expansion of Jerusalem's Municipal Boundaries 
The municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, together with 
civilian law and administration, were extended following 
the 1967 war. The annexed city, including the central 
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commercial and residential districts in and around the Old 
City, was expanded from 38 to 108 square kilometers 
by the inclusion of land from the surrounding West Bank 
villages. The new extended boundaries were drawn to 
include as much land as possible from these villages, 
but to exclude concentrat ions of Palestinian population. 
Thus, the lands of Beit Hanina, Anata, Abu Dis and 
five o ther villages were absorbed into an enlarged East 
Jerusalem, but the population of the eight villages, about 
8 0 , 0 0 0 people , were excluded. Their lands became the 
prime ta rge ts of early confessions moves for the building 
of high density urban Jewish sett lement, a pattern that 
continues to this day. 
(ii) Expropriation of Palestinian Land for Jewish 
Set t lements 
Jerusalem municipal master plans set aside about half 
of the extended area of East Jerusalem for Jewish 
set t lements and Israeli institutions, including government 
depar tments , security services, hotels , hospitals and a 
university. 
Of the 73 ,000 Dunums (four Dunums one acre; ten 
dunums = onehectare) in East Jerusalem, 29 ,000 dunums 
have been expropriated, or will soon be expropriated for 
the building of Jewish sett lements. In turn only 10,000 
dunums remain on which Palestinians can build and much 
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of this land has already been built upon. The remaining 
35 ,000 dunums are unplanned or zoned as a green area. 
Palestinians are, therefore, permitted to build on only 14 
per cent of the land in East Jerusalem, and much of 
this land as already been built upon. 
Jewish sett lements that now surround the entire East 
Jerusalem area, and separate Palestinian neighborhoods 
and villages from each other, are also linked by an 
elaborate road system further isolating the Palestinian 
villages and depriving them of their lands, resulting in 
eventual emulation of their homes built without licenses. 
For example, in early November 1993, an Israeli 
Government a p p o i n t e d commit tee a p p r o v e d the 
establishment of a large settlement block called 'Gush 
Adumim' extending north, south and east of Jerusalem 
to the outskirts of Jericho. The block links settlements 
stretching from south east to north east to Jerusalem and 
extending eastward. Five thousand dunums of land 
belonging to the Jerusalem area Arab villages will be 
confiscated to implement the proposed plan, reducing the 
Palestinian villages into isolated islands and depriving 
them of land for expansion. As a direct result, 100 
families of the Arab Jahalin Bedouin tribe, who settled 
in the area over 40 years ago after being evicted from 
the Negev desert area inside Israel. are again being 
threatened with forced eviction, without compensation 
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and without provision for^an adequate alternative site. 
The homes of hundreds of other Palestinian famihes are 
th rea tened with demoHtion as a result of the planned 
road network. Thousand of villagers will eventually be 
forced to emigrate in search of al ternative housing sites 
once the planned Jewish neighborhood and roads are 
constructed. 
Israeli law supports the expropriat ion of private 
Palest inian property. The Absentee Property Law, for 
example , stipulates that any proper ty whose owner was 
absent on May 15, 1948 is liable to the confiscated. This 
law is applied in East Jerusalem despite the fact that 
Israel did not occupy it in 1948 .The law is repeatedly 
involved by Israeli settlers in the Old City of Jerusalem 
in their determined moves to infiltrate the Palestinian 
quarters of the old City and to take over both homes 
that have been sealed and many of the ships that are 
owned by Palestinians living in the Occupied Territory 
outside Jerusalem. 
(iii) Excluding Palestinians the Planning Process 
Land confiscation, sett lement activity and road 
construction inside the municipal boundaries and in the 
surrounding area are being rushed toward completion 
within three to five years, simultaneously with the 
transit ional period outlined in the Israel PLC Declaration 
of principles (DOP), with the aim of consolidating 
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Israel's hold on Greater Jerusalem and consolidating 
Israel's hold on Greater Jerusalem and precluding the 
ability of Palestinians to negotiate retention of remaining 
lands. Current plans to achieve this goal include 
A 
extensive land confiscation of Jews settlements and the 
subsidised construction of five new settlements to provide 
over 17,000 new housing units for Jews. 
Expansion of existing Jewish settlements and their 
subsidy through various means has continued as before. 
News of these plans are widely reported in the Israeli 
press, although Palestinian landowners are usually 
informed of confiscation orders only after the settlement 
and road plans are approved, precluding their 
involvement in the planning process. 
(iv) Keeping Palestinian Land Unplanned or Declaring 
Green Areas which cannot be used for Housing 
Due to the lack of zoning or the zoning of available 
land as a 'green area ' building permits in East Jerusalem 
are almost impossible to obtain. These 'green areas, that 
also occur in village property, are areas where building 
on privately owned Palestinian land is forbidden. If there 
is a need felt to build Jewish settlements, however, on 
these lands the Jerusalem municipality simply abolishes 
the 'green areas ' Sara Kaminker. a member of the 
Jewish Municpality of West Jerusalem, has referred to 
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this as the municaipality practice of 'painting in green' 
only to prevent the Palestinians from building on their 
own land. 
(v) House Demolitions and Land Confiscation 
Demolit ions of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem 
are carried out by municipal official on the premise that 
the house was built or renovated without an Israeli 
permit. Permits are exceedingly difficult for Palestinians 
to obtain. Palestinians are often informed that their own 
property, on which they want to build, has been 
classified as either a "green area ' or has not been zoned. 
This should mean that the land is to remain an 
agricultural or park zone for public use. In practice, it 
means that it will eventually be confiscated from the 
Palestinians for Israeli use in the building of exclusively 
Jewish neighborhood. The Shufat Ridge settlement 
currently being constructed on Palestinian land originally 
zoned as a 'green area" is a case in point. 
The Palestine Human Rights Information Centre 
(PHRIC) has documented over 210 Palestinian homes 
demolished by the Israeli authorit ies in East Jerusalem 
since mid 1986 for licensing reasons . Demolitions of 
Palestinian homes in asked Jerusalem are currently 
carried out at a rate of approximately 50 per year. In 
the first half of 1994, at least 14 homes were 
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demolished, and several other home owners received 
demolition orders. The Jerusalem Municipality estimated 
that over 500 Palestinian homes have been built without 
licenses, which means they could be subject to a 
demolition order at any time without warning. 
For example, Adnan Abu Nijmeh applied for a 
building permit in spring 1991 to build a house on his 
property in the Wadi Qaddoum area of Jerusalem but was 
rejected. With no place to live, he decided to build a 
house on his property without a permit. By the end of 
the year, the family moved into the house. Several days 
later, a municipality official told Abu Nijmeh to stop 
building because the area was classified as a 'green area ' . 
After receiving a demolition order in May 1993 Abu 
Nijmeh hired a lawyer, paid a hefty fine to the Israeli 
authorities and assumed his house would be safe from 
demolition. To his and his family's surprise, on November 
16, 1993 his house was demolished on the basis that 
it was unlicensed. Border guards, police and special force 
units accompanied by municipality officials raided the 
house without warning. The instuders forced Abu 
Nijmeh's wife. Nufuth, and her eleven children out of 
their house without allowing them to remove any of its 
contents before the house was demolished. The family 
still lives on an open hillside in two shipping containers, 
donated by friends, on the site of their demolished 
home. 
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The five policy prescriptions outlined above prove to 
be a significant hurdle as the Palest inians struggle for 
the basic right to a place to live in security and dignity. 
To make maters worse there are a number of residency 
restrictions applied by the Israeli authori t ies since 1967 
that continue to lead to Palestinian emigration from the 
city. 
P e r m a n e n t Res idency S ta tus of East Jerusa lem 
P a l e s t i n i a n s 
permanen t residency states for asked Jerusalem 
Palestinians is based on the Israeli census of 1967. Any 
East Jerusalem resident not recorded in the census was 
required, in order to legally reside in h is /her home, to 
submit an application for family reunification to the 
Israeli Ministry of Interior. Until today any Palestinian 
who is not classified by the Israeli Government as a 
permanent resident of East Jerusalem including spouses, 
children, and other relatives of East Jerusalem 
permanent residents must apply for family reunification 
to legally reside there. The decision to grant or to deny 
these applications is, according to Israeli law, ultimately 
at the discretion of the Interior Minister, who is not 
required by law to justify refusal of a family reunification 
request. In contrast, almost any Jew from anywhere in 
the world can enter Israel and under the law of Return, 
automatically h'ecou^e an Israeli, citizen and reside in 
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Jerusalem. Failure of Palestinian family members to be 
granted family reunification creates pressure on the rest 
of the family to emigrate outside the municipal 
boundaries, into unzoned, unserviced a reas nearby. 
PRESENT SITUATION OF LAND 
Yet, it is by means certain that the two state 
solution for this intractable conflict is ei ther feasible or 
desirables we take first the 
Question of feasibility, we see at once that thee are 
considerable logistical obstacles in the way of a 
Palestinian s ta te . A glance at the latest map of the 
occupied terr i tories explains the posit ion. This shows a 
West Bank pock marked by Jewish set t lements encircling 
Palestinian towns and separating them from each other 
crisis crossed by so called bypass roads build for the 
exclusive use of Israelis and breaking up Palestinian 
territory even more. 
Sharing the West Bank and Gaza with the 
Palestinians are 140 ,000 Jews, living in over 14 urban 
and 82 rural set t lements. In addition there are eleven 
residential a reas in and around East Jerusalem, giving 
this part of the city a Jewish populat ion of 200 ,000 . 
When the latest develqpment at Jabal Abu Ghoneim 
(Har Homa) is built to the south of Jerusalem, the 
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separat ion between Jerusalem and the West Bank will be 
complete. The map thus shows no territorial continuity 
between the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, which 
are cut off from each other, from Gaza and from 
Jerusalem. 
If the settlements remain. then any projected' 
Palestinian state would have no meaningful territory on 
which to become established. The problem is further 
complicated by the lack of natural resources in the 
Palestinian areas One of the effects of thirty years of 
Israeli occupation has been a transfer of those resources 
from Palestinian inhabitants to the settlers. Thus Meron 
Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem and 
an expert on the West Bank, calculated in 1989 that 90 
per cent of its cultivable land and 75 per cent of its water 
had been switched to the settlers and beyond them to 
Israel. 
Since the Palestinian economy is heavily dependent 
on agriculture in 1991 it accounted for 35 per cent of 
the east Bank and Gaza's GDP, compared with 2 per cent 
for Israel this depletion of land and water is extremely 
serious. To make matters worse, there was a significant 
lack of investment in the infrastructure of the West Bank 
and Gaza throughout the years of Israeli occupation. 
Unskilled laboring in Israel consequently became a 
major economic activity for Palestinians from the 
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Occupied Terri tories. In 1990, nearly 35 per cent of the 
Palestinian labour force was working in Israel. These 
factors made the already wakened Palestinian economy 
heavily . 
FUTURE OF PALESTINI/VN STATE 
Even if an Israeli consensus can be dimly perceived 
on the substance of Palestinian statehood, Palestinian 
agreement is not necessarily guaranteed. This fact is 
clear from responses to the Beilin Abu Mazen agreement . 
For about 18 months during 1994 and 1995 . Israel and 
Palestinian teams led by Beilin and PLO Executive 
Committee member Manhood Abbas (Abu Mazen) mid 
secretly in Stockman and elsewhere and agreed on the 
outline of a permanent status agreement that broadly 
conformed to the requirements of Palestinian state 
described here. The agreement demonstrate that the 
territorial question an be resolved while leaving the bulk 
of Jewish settlers under Israeli sovereignty; there were 
even reports of a provision to transfer some Israeli land 
within the Green Line to Palestinian rule in order to 
enhance its acceptability to the Palestinian side. The 
kinds of sovereignty constraints envisaged, especially 
demilitarization, can be grounded both in precedent and 
the evolving nature of state sovereignty elsewhere. Even 
the issue of Jerusalem can be finessed through expanding 
municipal boundaries and creating a Palestinian political 
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capital {'al Quds') in the outlying Arab suburbs. 
Nevertheless, the Beilin Abu Mazen agreement has not 
been officially endorsed by ei ther side. 
If the Belin Ab Mazen agreement should turn out to 
be non starter, the fragile embryonic Israeli consensus 
would probably shatter, -prom Israeili's perspective. It is 
preferable to discover the authoritative Palestinian 
position as early as possible by entering into serious 
pe rmanen t status negotiat ions. The alternative is 
cont inuous piecemeal implementation of the Interim 
Agreement , which has become a kind of Chinese water 
torture for Israel, involving recurring and highly divisive 
mini concessions without any immediate quid pro quo or 
any assurance that the process will culminate in a 
definitive peace agreement. For this reason, Netanyahu 
proposed in March 1997 to accelerate the negotiations 
with the aim of concluding them within six months. 
For the same reason, the Palestinian side rejected 
Netanyahu 's suggestion. One part of Arafat's calculus 
logically leads him to prefer pe rmanen t status 
negotiations only after August 1998 . when the third 
Israeli redeployment is scheduled to be completed. At the 
same time, the absence of an agreed framework for final 
status exposes the interim agreement to acrimony on 
both sides about the manner in which it is being carried 
out, leaving a highly explosive process exposed to the 
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risk of collapse. The most dramatic challenge to the 
susceptibility of the present course would be an upsurge 
of terrorism against Israelis so destructive that the Israeli 
government would be compelled, not only to freeze any 
further political movement, but perhaps even to move 
militarily against targets in areas of PA control. 
It is also possible that Israeli measures to implement 
the Interim Agrccnacnt, even without terrorism, would 
create a downward spiral. The Palestinian public 
discourse has led to exaggerated expectations. Despite 
the fact that there is no explicit reference in the 1995 
Interim Agreement either to a ban on settlement 
construction or to the size of further redeployments in 
the West Bank, it is widely believed among Palestinians 
that Israel is oblige to refrain from new settlement 
activity and to move in significant stages towards 
withdrawal from 90% of the West Bank after the third 
redeployment. If Israel fails to meet these expectations, 
and particularly if it does so in a provocative manner, 
the result is likely to be serious Palestinian unrest, which 
might be directed, at least ' in part, against the PA itself; 
events following the decisions to limit the first further 
redeployment to 20% of Area C and to begin construction 
of a housing development in Har Homa in Jerusalem 
indicate that this is already happening. 
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Rather than endorse the territorial and functional 
constraints upon which Israel will insist in permanent 
status negotiations or acquiesce in unilateral Israeli 
interpretat ions of the Interim Agreements ' s requirements. 
Arafat might prefer to ask a unilateral direction of 
independence. Such a declaration, it is argued, would 
transform the present negotiat ion from that of an 
occupied people with their occupiers into one between 
sovereign states to define a common border and the 
status of forces and citizens. 
PEACE ACHIEVEMENTS 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, efforts 
were made within and without the United ' nations to 
resume and conclude the peace negotiating process sin 
order to resolve the diplomatic deadlock in the Middle 
East and achieve a comprehensive peace in the wake of 
the 1 9 7 3 Arab-Israeli war. Immediately upon the outbreak 
of hostilities in October 1 9 7 3 . the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 338 (1973), calling for 
an immediate truce and cessation of all military activity. 
The resolution asked the parties to being implementation 
of resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts" immediately 
after a cases-fire. It also called on the parties to being, 
immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, 
negotiations under appropriate auspices for establishing 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
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In D e c e m b e r 1973 t an In t e rna t iona l Peace 
Conference was convened in Geneva under United 
National auspices and the joint chairmanship of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Egypt, Israel and 
Jordan were represented in the conference, but Syria 
refused to take par t . After three meetings, the conference 
adjourned indefinitely but it agreed that work would 
continue through a Military Working Group. 
The Working Group played an important role in 
reaching agreements on the disengagement of forces 
between Egypt and Israel in Janurary 1974 and October 
1975 . It was also involved in the conclusion of a 
disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel in 
may 1974 . These agreements were carried out the 
assistance of the United Nations peacekeeping forces: 
UNEF II in the Egypt-Israel sector and the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Israel-
Syria sector. 
From 197 to 1977 . efforts were made at various 
levels to promote a resumption of the negotiating 
process. The Security Council repeatedly requested the 
parties to implement resolution 338(1973) . Calls for 
resuming the Geneva Peace Conference were made at 
various times by the General Assembly. In early 1977, 
after a visit to the Middle East, the Secretary-General 
reported to the Security Council that fundamental 
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differences between the parties had prevented agreement 
on the resumption of the Conference. The most 
immediate difficult had been the question of the 
part icipation by the PLO,, rejected by Israel. 
A new element in the Middle East situation was 
introduced in November 1977, when Egyptian President 
Anwar al-Sadat visited Jerusalem frequently. Direct 
negotiat ions between Egypt and Israel. With the United 
States as intermediary. Led in September 1978 to the 
signing of two frameworks for peace agreements, known 
as the Camp David accords. Despite strong opposition 
from most to other Arab States as not the PLO, the 
accords resulted in the signing of a peace treaty between 
the two countries in March 1979 . The treaty led to the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces form the Sinai in April 1982. 
On I September 1982. following the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon and the evacuation of PLO fighters from 
Beirut, United States President Ronald Reagan called for 
self Government by the Palestinians of the occupied 
territories in association with Jordan, saying that such 
as an association offered ' the best opportunity for "a 
durable, just and lasting peace". He also called for a 
freeze in the establishment of Israeli settlements. His 
peace initiative was based on the "land for peace" 
formula reflected in security Council resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1073). 
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That same month , the Twelfth Summit conference of 
the League of Arab States at Fez. Morocco, adopted a 
declaration calling for the withdrawal of Israel from 
territories occupied in 1967, dismantling of Israeli 
settlement in the occupied territories, reaffirmation of 
the Pales t in ian right of se l f -de terminat ion , and 
establishment of an independent Palestinian State after 
a transitional period under the control of the United 
Nations. The Fez Declaration also called for the Security 
Council to guarantee peace " amount all States of the 
region, including the independent Palestinian State" 
Later that year, the General Assembly welcomed the 
Arab peace plan. 
Meanwhile, the General Assembly, concerned that a 
just solution to the question of Palestine had not been 
achieved, decided in 1981' to convene an international 
conference on the subject. The international Conference 
on the Question of Palestine took place at the United 
Nations Office in Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 
1983 . It was a t tended by representatives of 137 States-
117 as full par t ic ipants and 20 as observers-as well as 
by the PLO. This initiative did not receive the support 
of all parties: Israel, the United States and some other 
countries expressed their opposition to the holding of the 
conference. 
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T h e Confe rence adop ted by acc lamat ion a 
Declaration on Palestine, and approved a Programme of 
Action for the Achievement of Palestinian right. The 
Programme recommended measures to be taken by 
States, United Nations organs and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations. The Conference 
considered it essential that an international peace 
conference on the Middle East be convey need under 
United Nations auspices, with participation on an equal 
footing of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Later in 1983 . the General Assembly endorsed the 
Declarations welcomed the Geneva conference's call for 
an international peace conference on the Middle East. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Assembly reaffirmed, with 
increasing support, the call for convening the proposed 
conference. 
In December 1988. the General Assembly, meeting 
at Geneva to hear a statement by PLO Chairman Yasser 
i. 
Arafat, expressed unprecedented support for the 
convening of the proposed peace conference. General 
Assembly resolution 4 3 / 1 7 6 . iodated vt a vite if 138 in 
favour to two against, with two abstentions, called for 
the convening of the international Peace Conference on 
the Middle East, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, with the participation of all parties to the 
conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
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on an equal footing, and the five permanent members 
of the Security Council, based on Security Council 
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the legitimate 
national rights of the Palestinian people , primarily the 
right to self-determination^ 
The General Assembly meeting followed on the heels 
of a significant meeting, in November 1988, of the 
Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers. Motivated in 
part by Jo rdan ' s disengagement in July 1988 of all legal 
and administrative ties with the West Bank, the PNC 
issued two ground-breading documents. The first was a 
Political communique which affirmed the determination of 
the PNC to reach a comprehensive political- settlement 
on the question of Palestine within the framework of the 
Charter and the resolutions of the United nations; the 
second was the Proclamation of the Independence of the 
State of Palestine, in which the PNC announced the 
establishment of the State of Palestine, with Jerusalem 
as its capital, under the provisions of international law, 
including General Assembly resolution 181 (11) of 1947, 
which had provided for the partition of Palestine into 
an Arab and a Jewish State. The PLO had, with these 
town documents, in effect recognized the State of Israel. 
Mr. Arafat affirmed this explicitly during the December 
General Assembly in Genava. recognizing "the right of 
all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist 
in peace and security... including the States of Palestine, 
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Israel and other neighbours , according to resolution 
242" . 
Several proposals were made in 1989: Israel adopted 
a peace initiative, which included elections, based on its 
previous posi t ions; Egypt proposed principles in 
connection with a possible peace process and any 
resulting elections in the occupied Palestinian territory; 
and United States Secretary of State James Baker laid 
out his own response to the Israeli plan, which contained 
four principles for advancing the Middle East peace 
process , principles based on Security Council resolution 
242 and 338 . which did not admit either to Israeli 
retention of permanent control of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip or to an independent Palestinian entity, for 
its part the Security Council agreed, in a statement made 
by its president on 20 December 1990. that an 
international conference. a.t an appropriate time, should 
facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and 
a lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
By 1 9 9 1 . global changes such as the end of the cold 
war, the adjustments in the foreign policy of the major 
Powers, and the gulf war and its aftermath, also affected 
the Middle East s i tuat ion. The negotiation process 
resumed in earnest in October 1991 , with the convening 
of the historic Peace conference on the Middle East ion 
Madrid under the twin chairmanship of the United 
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Nations Secretary-General a t tended the Conference as an 
observer. 
The formula for the modalit ies of the peace process 
was both complicated and transparent , allowing for 
Israel 's requirement for one with the appearance of an 
internat ional conference. It created a bilateral 
negotiation track for Israel and neighboring Arab States 
(Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) and the Palestinians, who 
were included in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
In addition, simultaneous multilateral negotiations began 
in January 1992 on regional aspect of a variety of issues 
for all participants and other interested States. And, 
while the United Nations was not a participant, the 
underpinnings of the conference were Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338 . 
In 1992, the United Nations was invited by the 
cosponsors, the United States and the Russian Federation 
(formerly the Soviet Union), to take part in the 
multilateral negotiations as a full participant, the 
Secretary-General in 1993 appointed Mr. Chinmaya 
Gharekhan as his special representative at the Middle 
East multilateral talks, whose task is to coordinate the 
role of the United Nations in the Working Groups on 
Arms Control and Regional Security, Water, Environment, 
Economic and regional Development, and Refugees. 
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By mid-1993 , it appeared that the bilateral talks had 
stalled on variety of political and security issues. There 
seemed to be no progress in solving significant questions 
between the Israelis and. respectively, the Palestinians, 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Unknown to all but a 
handful of individuals, however, secre t talks between 
Israel and the PLO were 'taking place in Norway. 
The secret "Oslo connection", originally instigated by 
a private Norwegian citizen together with a senior PLO 
official and an Israeli academic in late 1992 , progressed 
under the guidance of the late Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Johan Joergen Joist. The Oslo talks were 
brought to conclusion in late August 1 9 9 3 , an.d the news 
of an Israeli PLO agreement was broken to a startled and 
hopeful world. 
On 10 September 1993, Israel and the PLO 
exchanged letters of mutual recognit ion. The PLO 
recognized Israel's right to exist, and Israel recognized 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
Three days later, on 13 September 1993 , at a 
ceremony at the White House in Washington. D.C., in 
the presence of US President Bill Clinton and Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev. Israeli and PLO 
representatives signed the Declaration Principles on 
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Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Following the 
Signing. Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin and PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat shook hands. 
The historic agreement opened the way for eventual 
Palestinian self-rule, providing for Israeli withdrawal and 
the establishment of a interim Palestinian self-
government, first in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank 
town of Lericho, and later in the rest of the West Bank 
Other sensitive issues, .such as Israeli sett lements, 
Jerusalem. The return of Palestinian refugees future 
boundries and the status of Palestine are envisaged for 
further negotiations, which are to begin no later than two 
years after Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho area. This withdrawal marks the beginning 
of a five- year interim period at the end of which it 
is expected that the negotiations will have led to a 
permanent settlement implementing Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 3 3 8 . 
The signing of the Declaration of Principles was 
welcomed by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali. One of the practical effects of the 
agreement was to intensify the operational role of the 
United Nations in providing assistance to the Palestinian 
people . 
While the full extent of United nations involvement 
in contributing to implenient the peace will become 
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clearer as this decade progresses, the re is no doubt that 
the international community, as expressed in the world 
body, has shown great eagerness to support and 
participate in the new era of Palestinian-Israeli relations. 
This is seen not only in the world 's response to 
Palestinian economic and developmental needs, but also 
in the body politic which is the General Assembly. 
At the 1993 session of the General Assembly, the 
resolution passed for several years calling, in one way 
or another, for the convening of an international peace 
conference under United Nations auspices was replaced 
by one entitled "Peaceful Settlement of the Question of 
Palestine", which expressed support for the 'Declaration 
of Principles, while reaffirming a number of principles 
that should guide a final set t lement. The resolution 
reaffirms the United Nations" abiding-General to continue 
his efforts with the parties, in consultation with the 
Security Council, for the promotion of peace in the 
region. A resolution entitled "Middle East Peace Process", 
welcoming the new developments, was sponsored by 
more than 100 countries and received an unprecedented 
majority. At the same time, the resolution on the 
intifadah, which the General Assembly had adopted 
every year since 1988, was deferred. 
Following lengthy and difficult negotiations on the 
implementation of the Declaration of Principles, Israel 
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and the PLO took a first major step on 4 May 1994 in 
Cairo, by concluding an accord on Palestinian self-rule 
in gaza and Jer icho. The accord provided for llsrael's 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and 
Grand Palestinians a measure of self-government for the 
first item. Palest inians were given control over their 
internal political a r rangements and daily affairs, including 
elections, tax collection and the passing and enforcement 
of legislation; a 24-member Palestinian authority was 
established, with legislative and executive powers. 
Palestinians were also to establish their own police force 
of up to 9 .000 officers. 
The accord marked the beginning of the five-year 
interim period for negotiating a settlement of the 
permanent status of the occupied Palestinian territory. 
ROLE OF PLO 
On 1 June 1964 the 1st Palestinian national Council 
met. This assembly then founded the Palestine 
Liberation Organisat ion (PLO). 
The PLO's official aim was to liberate Palestine. A 
national fund consisting of donations and contributions 
was set up. The Palest ine Liberation Army (PLA) was 
to be the military arm of the PLO. 
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The central feature of this first conference was the 
passing of the Palestinian National Char ter and of the 
I. 
Basic Law, a kind of constitution. Both were drafted by 
Ahmad Shukairy. 
Ahmad Shukairy, a diplomat and lawyer, became the 
first chairman of the 15-man POL executive committee. 
The members of the first Palestinian National Council 
and been nominated by Shukairy and invited to the 
inaugural congress as individuals. They were for the most 
part leading public figures, polit icians, businessmen, 
industrialists, clerics, doctors, banker and even some 
members of the Jordanian Parl iament. Only a few 
representat ives of farmers, trade unions , or students and 
women's organisations were present . Guerrilla 
organisations were not admitted. The first Palestinian 
national Council had a total of 4 2 2 members. 
The found of the PLO was not unexpected. In 
September 1963 Shukairy had been accepted as the 
Palestinian representative b^y the Arab League. 
On Nasser ' s initiative, the first conference of Arab 
heads of s tate , on 16 January 1964 in Cairo, had passed 
a resolution calling for the founding of an organization 
to 'embody Palestinian existence". Nasser had entrusted 
Shukairy with the task of making the necessary 
preparat ions . 
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The PLO had been founded by the Arab states and 
in the first years of its existence it was also controlled 
by them. The move had been made for very specific 
reasons . The Palest inians in the refugee camps were 
growing more and more discontented and restless about 
the waiting tactics of the Arab states in the Palestinian 
conflict. They were tired of hearing nothing but speeches 
which did not change their situation in the least. 
The break-up of the United Arab Republic, the 
inability of the Arab heads of state to prevent the 
diversion of the Jordan waters by Israel and petty 
internal political disputes in the Arab camp had all 
fanned the flames of discontent even higher. The idea 
of an independent . separate Palestinian resistance 
movement gained ground. 
This idea now threa tened to evade the control of the 
Arab states and to reveal the ineffectiveness of official 
Arab policy. Gamal Abdul Nasser tried to prevent this 
He hoped that the founding of a Palestinian organisation 
would not only provide an outlet and forum for 
Palestinian political ambitions but also be useful as an 
instrument for influencing pan-Arab policies. As long as 
Shukairy, a confidant of 'Nasser 's, was head of the 
POLO, continued Arab influence was guaranteed. 
Shukairy made no important decisions in the PLO without 
first consulting Nasser 
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Ahmad Shukairy was first the Syrian and later the 
Saudi Arabian representative at the United Nations. The 
Saudis dismissed him for refusing to bring a Saudi 
government complaint before the United Nations. But 
this won him the support of Nasser. 
In the Western world. Shukairy was generally known 
as the man who 'wanted to drive Israel into the sea' . 
In fact, Shukairy was just a typical Arab politician of his 
time. He compensated for his inability to make any 
political impact on a superior enemy by a verbal strong-
man act. His political impact on a superior enemy by 
a verbal strong-man act. His militant rhetoric must also 
be seen against the background of increasing military 
activity by the al-Fatah groups. Under Shukairy. the PLO 
had nothing comparable to offer. 
None the less, Shukairy must be credited with 
drafting the Palestinian National Char ter and thereby 
presenting a manifesto which for the first time 
formulated the ideas of a Palestinian identity. And in 
the so-called Basic Law he also created a provisional 
organizational framework for this identity. 
However, the traditional Palestinians elite was unable 
to cope with the challenges and demands of a war of 
national liberation. On 24 December 1967 Shukairy had 
to resign. 
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As early as 1966, political and military developments 
emerged which prefigured the release of the PLO from 
the chains of Arab control tow years later. Under the 
pressure of guerrilla activities, the third Palestinian year 
later. Under the pressure of guerrilla activities, the third 
Palestinian National Council called for the unity of 
revolutionary organizations within the framework of the 
PLO. The credibility of this call can be judged by the 
fact that the PIA had not undertaken any military 
action against Israel. It was integrated into the Arab 
armies . And the Arab armies agreed with the traditional 
Palestinian elite in condemning fedayeen operations. The 
renaming of the PLO executive committee in December 
1966 - it was now called the Revolutionary Council - was 
merely cosmetic. 
The Arab defeat in the 1967 June war completely 
discredited the traditional leadership. Finally the Arab 
states were forced to withdraw their support for Shukairy. 
Yahya Hammouda, a lawyer, now succeeded Shukairy as 
PLO chairman. Under Hammouda's under Hammouda's 
interim leadership - he had not been officially confirmed 
in office by the National Council - the POLO made 
cautious approaches to the guerrilla groups. A special 
committee was set up to make contact with these groups. 
But Hammouda, too. was a member of the traditional 
Palestinian elite whose policies had clearly failed by 
1048 . He was unable to develop new initiatives for the 
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Palestinian liberation struggle. The age of the traditional 
elite was irrevocably finished, and it was soon overtaken 
by events. 
The fourth congress of the Palestinian national 
Council, on 17 and 18 July 1968 in Cairo, again 
extended the existing executive committee 's mandate . But 
now the resistance organisations claimed half the seats 
in the national Council . Al-Fatah and the Popular Front 
had 48 of the 100 seats. The Palestinian Workers', 
Students and Women 's Organisations had one seat each. 
This practically guaranteed a majority - fact which was 
reflected in the resolutions. The national Council called 
for freedom of movement for the commandos in the 
states bordering Israel, an end to Arab control and 
support for military operations against Israel. It also 
rejected UN Security Council Resolution 2 4 2 , in which 
the Palestinians and their rights were not mentioned . 
The Palestinians were referred to only indirectly as a 
'refugee problem' . The word 'Palestinian' was not used, 
nor was 'self-determination ' . 
On the organizationally level, the National council 
was democratized in particular the election of the 
executive commit tee and the powers of the PLO 
chairman. 
The PLO now set out on a new path - the path of 
armed struggle and of a separate, independent Palestin-
ian resistance movement . 
100 
AL-FATAH AND THE PLO: 
The founding of the PLO by the Arab states in 1964 
confronted al-Fatah with a new situation. It had every 
reason to beHeve that the P L C s primary aim was to keep 
the Palestinians under Arab control and to isolate the 
independent resistance groups from the Palestinian 
people- even to denounce them as 'adventurers' and 
' enemies of Arab unity': 
Al-Fatah had to set or else lose the influence it had 
gained in the rising Palestinian national movement. The 
Political Office for the United Action of Palestinian 
Revolutionary Forces was founded, comprising a number 
of Palestinian residence groups. In fact there were about 
40 such groups in 1965 - which is not as surprising 
as it seems. Many Arab states were using 'their own' 
Palestinian resistance groups to gain influence on the 
movement as a whole. As soon as al-Fatah took up the 
armed struggle, many of these groups either joined al-
Fatah or disappeared. 
In may 1964, shortly before the PLO was found, the 
Political Office issued as statement expressing double 
about the success of an organisation which dissociated 
itself from the revolutionary organisations. The Office 
offered its help in transforming the Palestinian National 
Council into a revolutionary force. 
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Even before this, Arafat, Abu Jihad and others had 
been in contact with Shukairy, whom they knew from 
their student years in Cairo, to explain the al-Fatah 
position to him. They, wanted the activities of the PLO 
and the work of al-Fatah to be coordinated and this 
coordination to be kept se'cret. Because of his commit-
ments to the Arab states, Shukairy refused. In spite of 
this, al-Fatah sent a number of its leaders (Abu Jihad, 
Abu Youssef El-Najjar. Kamal Adwan, etc.) to the 
inaugural PLO conference to put the al-Fatah viewepoint. 
The main feature of the al-Fatah argument was the need 
for armed struggle. 
The B e g i n n i n g of the Armed S t r u g g l e 
Al-Fatah carried out its first military opeations on 
31 December 1 9 6 4 . Three commando groups were to 
operate independently from Lebanon. Jo rdan and the 
Gaza strip. The first successful operat ions included the 
blowing-up of bridges, mine laying and attacks on 
kibbutzim. 
On 1 January 1964 al-Assifa (the Storm), the military 
arm of al-Fatah, issued its first military communique. The 
name at Assifa had been chosen to avoid compromising 
al-Fatah if the operation failed. 
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Initially, the commandos had to fight not only against 
Israel by against harassment from the Arab side. The 
group operating in the Gaza strip was discovered by the 
Egyptian secret service on 15 February. By 20 February, 
all its leaders had either been imprisoned or placed 
under house arrest. 
The decision to take up the armed struggle had been 
preceded by fierce and controversial discussions within 
al-Fatah itself. There were' two camps. One argued that 
it was too early to start guerrilla warfare and that they 
whould wait until al-Fatah was a mass movement with 
substantial support and membership. 
To this Arafat. Abu Jiha, Abu Youssef El-'Najjar. Abu 
Lutf, Abu lyyad and others replied that only through 
armed struggle could al-Fatah make itself a mass 
movement . The hopes that al-Fatah had aroused in the 
Palestinian people should not be disappointed. A 
decision was postponed. The adoption of military 
operat ions was not finally approved until another meeting 
of the entire al-Fatah leadership in Damascus in October 
1964 . 
The spectacular operations of 31 December 1964 
achieved the desired effect. After a few days of silent 
consternation, a storm of outrage and indignation broke 
out over al-Assifa. Almost all the Arab newspapers 
condemned the operations, describing them as the deeds 
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of 'Muslim b ro the r s , ' CIA agents ' or 'agents of 
international communism' . Press organs in various Arab 
countries were even forbidden to mention the name of 
al-Assifa. A resolut ion of Arab League defence ministers 
called on all Arab countries to prevent al-Assifa 
operations so as not to give Israel a pretext for an attack. 
The first Palest inian revolutionary killed in action 
was shot by Jordan ian army bullets. Ahmad Mussa was 
killed by King Hussein 's troops when he returned to 
Jordan, where the thought he was safe. 
Palestinians were now kept under surveillance, 
persecuted and imprisoned. In 1967. there were 250 
Palestinians in Jordanian prisons on suspicion of 
membership of al-Assifa. Some al-Fatah leaders were also 
arrested. 
In spring 1966 Yasser Arafat. Abu J ihad, Abu AH 
lyyad and others were arrested in Damascus. It was only 
after a one-month hunger strike and the intervention of 
other al-Fatah leaders such as Farouk Kaddoumi and Abu 
lyyad that they were released. 
Shortly afterwards Yasser Arafat was arrested by 
Lebanese security forces on suspicion of being an Israeli 
agent. Al-Fatah again managed to get him released. The 
Lebanese authori t ies had been unable to establish his 
identity. 
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Al-Fatah did not wish and could not afford to 
jeopardize the effective organization of the Palestinian 
people and the contination of the armed struggle. It had 
to normalize its relations with the other Arab countries. 
The al-Fatah leadership visited Cairo to discuss 
political co-operation with Nasser. They hoped that 
Nasser would be able to use his influence in the Arab 
world to win support for Palestinian resistance. But in 
fact no meeting with Nasser took place. The Egyptian 
government was interested only in finding out as much 
as possible about the structure and leaders of al-Fatah. 
Al-Fatah had to get by without such support until 
after the June war in 1967. But the military as well as 
the political struggle continued just the same. In the two 
years from 1965 to 1967 ihe fedayeen carried out more 
than 200 operations. 
ROLE OF UNITED STATES 
It has long been held that the search for a 
comprehensive, just and lasting settlement in the Middle 
East should be accompanied by an effective role by the 
international community in promoting economic and 
social development in the occupied Palestinian territory. 
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While UNRAWA has been deHvering invaluable 
primary services to the Pal'estinian people for almost 45 
years, many other United Nations organizat ions and 
bodies have contributed their expertise to improve the 
economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people. 
They have sent missions, carried out studies and provided 
assistance in 1 9 9 3 . In 1993 . the United Nations 
provided services and implemented special projects in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip amounting to nearly $250 
million. 
UNRWA, the Uni ted Na t ions D e v e l o p m e n t 
Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) have an operational presence in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, providing humanitarian 
relief and development assistance. Other organizations 
include the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United 
Nat ions con fe r ence on. Trade and Deve lopment 
(UNCTAD), and the United Nations Educational . 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).. 
Assistance to the Palestinian people became all the 
more important in the light of the Palestinian intifadah, 
which began in December 1987. The Israeli authorities 
imposed harsh restrictive measures, which led to further 
disruption of economic and social life in the occupied 
territory. 
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Recent developments in the region had a similar 
devastat ing impact on Palestinian economic activity. The 
expulsion of Palestinian workers from the Persian Gulf 
Arab countries in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War 
resulted in a new, major inflow of Palestinian refugees 
into Jo rdan , and to a lesser extent into the West Bank 
and Gaza, and nearly eliminated to financial remittances 
sent by those workers which helped support so many 
families in the territory. Finally, the closure of the 
occupied territory instituted by Israel in March 1993 
resulted in a 40 percent rate of unemployment in the 
Palest inian workforce. 
Underscoring the United Nations em,phasis on 
ass is tance as a vital component in the search for peace 
and wishing to galvanize even greater and more 
coordinated efforts on the pat of the United Nations 
system, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
donor countries, the Committee on the Exercise of the 
Insalieable Rights of the Palestinian People convened, in 
April 1 9 9 3 at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, the United 
Nations Seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People. 
The Seminar provided .a framework for an exchange 
of views on the various aspects of assistance, and was 
at tended by representatives of 17 United Nations bodies, 
67 Governments and 19 NGOs. The situation in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, as described by numerous 
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experts , was grim. International assistance was especially 
needed for developing the industrial sector, for creating 
and enhancing institutions to support private-sector 
development, for employment and income generating 
projects, for building infrastructure and for training 
middle and top management. 
Among the conclusions reached by the seminar's 
part icipants was that "Israeli economic policy toward the 
occupied Palestinian territory had resulted in its 
development [and that] Israel had used its control. To 
prevent or put obstacles in the ways of assistance 
projects". But another conclusion stated that the 
international community had a growing excitation that a 
"threshold had been reached and that the Palestinian 
people would soon be able to take charge of its own 
future and to excersie its economic, as well as political, 
decision-making. 
On 13 September 1993, with the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles, and in the immediate 
excitement surrounding the event the conclusion of the 
Paris seminar could have seemed prophet ic . The signing 
did, in fact, trigger renewal of major international efforts 
to identify and raise the funds necessary for development 
and reconstruct ion needs in the West Bank and Gaza. A 
major donor conference was held in Washington. DC. on 
1 October, 1 9 9 3 . at which various Governments pledged 
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a total of $2 .5 million in support of the Palestinian 
peop le . United Nations Secretary General Boutros Ghali 
established a high level Task Force for Economic and 
Social Development of Gaza and Jericho, and shortly 
thereafter presented an action plan called "Supporting 
the transit ion: An Immediate Response of the United 
Nat ions to the Interim Period in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip". The overriding goal of the United Nations 
response was to provide the kind of assistance which 
would afford Palestinians a new sense of opportunity and 
would concretely bolster the peace process. 
The Task Force was coinprised of the senior officials 
of the three United Nations agencies that have 
opera t iona l capacities in the occupied territories 
UNRWA, UNDP and UNICEF. The assistance to be 
coordinated by these agencies during the first year of the 
interim period would aim at two primary achievements-, 
to support the capacity of the incoming Palestinian 
authority to assume responsibilities for services in 
educat ion, health, sbcial services, income generation, 
hospital care etc., and to ' improve the infrastructure of 
basic physical and social services. 
These three agencies have in the past worked, and 
will continue to work, in close collaboration, developing 
delineated but complementary spheres of action during 
the transition period UNDP will strengthen its support 
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to the expansion of the economic base, public and civil 
administration, institution building, human resources 
management, and the role of women in future Palestinian 
institutions and governance. UNICEF will continue to 
support improving services for children and women in 
health and education. It will also encourage community 
based activities and mobilize decision makers and opinion 
leaders, service providers and NGOs for improving the 
condition of children and women. UNRWA will strengthen 
its extensive carry of health, relief and social services, 
as well as its environmental health and income generation 
programes. 
In march 1994 . the General Assembly established the 
post of Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, 
as recommended by the Secretary-General, to save as a 
focal point for all United Nations economic, social and 
other assistance to the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. The Coordinator will work to ensure a unified 
approach to economic, social and other ass is tance to the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Coordinator 
will work to ensure a unified approach to economic and 
social development, and will be in constant contact with 
the United Nations specialized agencies, the World Bank. 
NGOs and the donor community. 
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PALESTINIANS RESISTANCE 
Int i fadah: 
Since its eruption on 8 December 1987, the 
sustained popular uprising in the Israeh occupied 
Palest inian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
has shaken the status quo and opened new prospects for 
both peace and conflict in the region. Within its first year 
the intifadah provoked radical shifts in policy by most 
principal actors. Jordan severed its administrative and 
financial ties with the Occupied Territories (OT) on 31 
July 1988 , all but ending a forty year association on 15 
November 1988 the Palestine national Council (the PLO 
parl iament in exile)declared an independent State of 
Pales t ine . It also affirmed its acceptance of UN 
resolutions 181 , 242 and 3 3 8 as the basis for peace 
talks and of a two state solution to the Palestinian Israeli 
conflict. A month later, PLO chairman. Yasser Arafat, 
recognised Israel's right to exist in peace and security 
during his address to the UN General Assembly and at 
a subsequent press conference. And the USA conse-
quently initiated a substantive dialogue with the PLO. 
The Palestinians have undeniably come a long way 
towards achieving their goal of self determination, in the 
form of an independent s ta te . The role of the intifidah 
is equally evident, whether in transforming international 
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opinion or in providing the PLO with both the incentive 
and the opportunity to undertake a basic shift in declared 
strategy. This article studies the features that have made 
the Palestinian uprising so remarkable, with a review of 
its historical legacy, its impact, and the challenges facing 
its future development . 
A review of the historical legacy of Palestinian 
national resistance is crucial not only because it has 
contributed practical experience and psychological prepa-
ration to the Intifadah, but also because it treats the 
Palestinians as active participants able to affect their 
destiny, rather than as the passive victims of policies 
dictated by other, stressing continuity with past traditions 
of resistance is particularly important in view of recurrent 
commentary in Western media that portrays the Intifadah 
as both unprecedented and owing nothing to the past 
experiences of armed struggle. 
Reflecting the sense of historical continuity, the first 
appeal issued by the National Unified command (NUC) 
of the Intifadah addressed itself to the people of martyrs, 
grandchildren of Qassam. people of the uprising that 
has sprouted from the roots of the homeland since 1936. 
Izzedin al Qassam was a Muslim preacher who attempted 
to organise a mass based armed rebellion against the 
British mandate in 1935, and 1936 was the starting date 
of the three year long "Great Revolt' in Palestine. The 
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latter commenced with a six month general strike one 
of the longest in modern world history. At their peak, 
nationalist guerillas held control over sizeable areas 
thanks to popular support in the towns and self 
mobilisation in the villages. British might eventually 
prevailed, . but only after some 50,000 Palestinians (out 
of one million) had been detained of whom 2,000 were 
given life sentences and 146 hanged, and 5,000 homes 
had been demolished in reprisal. 
The memory of the Great Revolt was to be invoked 
thirty years later when the contemporary Palestinian 
guerrilla movement soon to take over the PLO sought to 
respond to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza in the weeks immediately following the 1967 war. 
Asserting that the Palestinian revolutionary tradition is 
best represented in the 1936 revolt, the guerrillas 
a t tempted to emulate it 'by organising a widespread 
insurrection that would drive the Israeli army out of the 
newly occupied territories. Over 1,000 men among whom 
were Arafat and many other members of the current 
Palestinian leadership entered the West bank secretly, to 
form mobile guerrilla bands and civilian support networks 
and to mobilise a campaign of civil disobedience. Flaws 
in conception and poor security defeated this strategy in 
the West Bank by the year 's end. 
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However, the situation in Gaza was very different. 
The Strip was under Egyptian administration in 1948-
67, and with the advent of Nasser in 1952 some 
Palestinian groups were allowed to ope ra t e poHtically. 
After the founding of the PLO in 1964 , the Egyptians 
helped from its military arm, the Palest ine Liberation 
Army (PLA), which trained and partially armed some 
30 ,000 . Thus, despite the collapse of the PLA in the 
Six-Day War, there was a large pool of military manpower 
and considerable arms caches, which fuelled an active 
insurgency for the next four years despite Gaza's 
geographical isolation. Due to the extreme crowding of 
the Strip, there was no lack of sea for the fish to swim 
in and the guerrillas could operate a shadow authority 
that even ran its own courts. It took a massive operation 
accompanied by the demolition of nearly 14 ,000 houses, 
the relocation of 25,000 civilians and the uprooting of 
hundreds of citrus groves before the Israeli army could 
gains control in 1971 . 
A final additional spur to activism in the OT was 
the battles waged in the Palestinian diaspora in the 
1980s. The PLC's ability to withstand the Israeli siege 
of Beirut for seventy days in the summer of 1982 
impressed the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, while their anger was fuelled by the Israeli role 
in the massacres subsequently perpetrated in the Sabra / 
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Shatila refugee camp. Similarly, the despera te defence of 
the refugee camps in Lebanon during the three year 
'camps war ' waged against them by the Shi'ite Amal 
militia evoked both pride and bit terness in the Territories. 
Reflecting these feelings and responding instinctively to 
the plight of the diaspora, and after a short period of 
decline following the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, 
the number of Palestinian military operat ions launched 
within the OT rose from 180 in 1982 to 351 the 
following year, and then steadily upwards to 870 in 
1986. Noticeably, a growing proport ion of attacks were 
carried out by individuals or cells acting on their own 
initiative and involved such rudimentary weapons as 
knives and molotov cocktails. Reflecting . t he mass 
character of millitary resistance was the number of 
sentences passed on Palestinians by Israeli military courts 
for various security offences. 
The major change in the picture, though, was the 
emergence of a new and dynamic mass movement. This 
was not a single body, but a wide spread phenomenon 
actively encouraged by the need to circumvent Israeli 
restrictions on the unions, and at the same time to 
responds to specific local and national needs. The mass 
movement was characterized by its voluntary, grassroots 
nature that attracted youthful recruits and encouraged 
new ideas, and by the formation of a large number of 
loosely knit committees. By avoiding explicitly political 
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programme and eschewing .violence, the latter enjoyed a 
quasi legal status despite harassment by the military 
authorities. 
In the late 1960 the Ikhwan decided to mend its 
ways and cooperate with the Fatah. But its Palestinian 
members continued to oppose the Fatah group. They 
refused to join guerrilla training camp, especially set up 
for them in 1968. 
The death of nasser and the routing of PLO in 1970 
in Jordan gave the much needed breathing space for the 
persecuted Ikhwans to Egypt. Sadat 's soft attitude 
towards the Brotherhood encouraged its youth to 
organize their activities. Meanwhile King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia emerged strongly on the Arab political scene. His 
insistence on Islamic solidarity rather then pan- Arabism 
made Islam the main point of the Arab agenda for the 
liberation of Palestine. 
Fed up with endless disputes of the top leadership 
of the Ikhwan, some younger members parted ways in 
the mid 1970's and began to train themselves on the 
pattern prescribed by Hasan -al- Banna. It is. infect, 
these elements of the mainstream Ikhwan which have 
organized themselves under the banner of the Hamas. 
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HAMAS 
When the Intifada, as ment ioned already, started on 
December 9, 1987, the Hamas became active all across 
Gaza and organized protests. The centers of anti -Israeli 
activism were the mosques and the leadership of the 
uprising was underground. The Israelis, with the help of 
their agen t s among the Palestinian population, arrested 
many members of the underground leadership including 
Ahmad Yasin. But this did not dampen the spirit of 
common people, they continued to fight Israel's 
repressive tactics and policies well upto the second Gulf 
crisis. 
The Hamas is opposed to PLO's policy of continuous 
concessions and its participation in the peace process. 
At the moment majority of Palest inians are either in 
favour of peace with Israel or simply have become 
disillusioned after the defeat of Saddam Husain and 
betrayal of faith by some Arab regimes. However, it is 
clear that the Islamists have gained unassailable ground 
in the occupied territories. It is also understandable the 
PLO will lose further ground to the Hamas if the ongoing 
peace talks fail in achieving a just and durable solution 
to the long -standing Palestinian problem. 
Torture in Israeli P r i s o n s 
A Palestinian study documenting the use of psycho-
117 
logical and physical torture on Gaza prisoners has shown 
that Israel is using violence and torture to subdue the 
resistance fighters. The study was conducted by the 
Ghazzah Community Mental Health Program (GCMHP) 
Director Eyad Sarraj on the Symptoms of traumatic stress 
following imprisonn^eht 
A number of repor ts have been prepared earlier by 
local and international organisations regarding torture 
and the treatment of prisoners, but no psychological 
study has ever been done. For this reason the GCMHP 
sought to estimate the size of the problem. 
The size of the sample was 500 ex-prisoners. The 
prisoners participating in the study were all from Gaza 
and have spent between six months and 10 years in 
prison Results are found horrifying and staggering . 
Physical Methods of Torture 
Type Percentage Reported 
Beating 96 .5 
Extreme cold (Thallaga, refrigerator) 92 
Long periods of standing 91 .3 
Stretching 79 .5 
Striking with canes, cables 77 .8 
Extreme hear (Furun, oven) 75 .8 
Suffocation 69 .3 
Pricking 62 .3 
Skin cut 54 .5 
Suspension (Shabeh, ghost) 50 .3 
Drowning 16.3 
Irritant gas (mace) 15 
Instrument up the penis or rectum 7.8 
Electric shock 5.3 
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PALESTINE, ARAB-JEWISH, RELATIONSHIP 
1. SAID (Edward W). Arab and Jews : Each is the other. 
Palestine Digest. 1974. Oct; 15 . 
The Jews are not chosen people , but Arabs and Jews 
together have chosen each other for a struggle whose 
roots seems to go deeper with each year, and whose 
future seems less thinkable and resolvable each year. 
Neither people can develop without the other there, 
harassing, taunting, fighting, no Arab today has an 
identity that can be unconscious of the Jews, that can 
rule out the Jew as a psychic factor in the Arab identity; 
conversely no Jews can ignore the Arab in, general , nor 
can be immerse himself in his anc ien t tradit ion and so 
lose the Palestinian Arab in particular and what Zionism 
has done to him. The more in tense these modern 
struggles for identity become, the m o r e a t tent ion is paid 
by the Arab or the Jews to his c h o s e n opponent or 
partner. Each is the other. 
CITIZENSHIP. RIGHTS. 
2. SAID (Edward W). Israel and Pales t ine : a third way. Le 
Monde Diplomatique. 1998, Sep; 6 -7 . 
The decision by the Israeli gove rnmen t to accelerate 
sett lement of occupied territories and judaise East 
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Jerusalem, confirms the failure of the Oslo accords. The 
impasse has revived the debate among Arab intellectuals 
concerning their responsibilities regarding the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict. Author discussing that the third 
way, of Isratli Palestinian solution, avoids both the 
bankrupcy of Oslo and the retrograde politics of total 
boycotts. It must begin in terms of the idea of 
citizenship . not nationalism, since the notion of 
separation (Oslo) and triumphalist unilateral theoretic 
nationalism whether Jewish or Muslim simply does not 
deal with the realities. Therefore a concept of citizenship 
whereby every individual has the same citizen's rights, 
based not on religion or race, but on equal justice for 
each person guaranteed by a constitution. 
, CONFLICT, HISTORY. 
3 . CORM (Georges). Thoughts on the roots of the Arab-
Isralli conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies. 21 . 3; 1992, 
Spr; 71-9. 
The roots from where the Arab-Israili conflict taking 
birth. The Zionist movement established by Theodore 
Herle in 1897 and consequently by its activities the 
need to build a state .specifically for the Jews, finally 
to give Jewish citizenship to Jews as a complete 
identity. Unsuccessful overtures were made to Ottoman 
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sultan aim at securing Palestinian land, these were 
among many efforts to locate a territory. Balfour's 
declaration of 1917 and enunciation on the Palestinian 
land, the ostensible aim of merely the establishment 
of a "national home", but indeed with the Zionist focus. 
Consequently Arab-Israili conflict emerged and takes the 
steps for the peace talks or the peace process. 
, , NUCLEAR, ACTIVITY, ISRAEL, 1960-67, 
VIEWPOINT, ARAB. 
LEVITE (Ariel E) and LANDAU (Emily B). Arab 
perceptions of Israel's nuclear posture, 1960-1967. 
Israel studies, 1,1; 1996. Spr; 34-59. 
Focusing on the Arab reactions and perceptions of, 
Israel's nucellar activity in the wake of the first public 
reports regarding the establishment of a nuclear reactor 
in Dimone in December 1960 and upto six-days war 
in 1967. After first placing the Arab debate in this 
period into a broader historical perspective, the article 
traces these perceptions and reactions in the formative 
years. The general nature of Arab perceptions of 
Israel's nuclear activity, especially in light of inter-Arab 
relations is discussed, with particular focus on Egypt, as 
the leading Arab country and advocate to this issue in 
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the early years. The significant inter-relationship between 
Israeli's nuclear image and the overall attitude towards 
the Arab-Israel conflict is evaluated both in terms of 
possible impact that Israel's nuclear image has had on 
the course of conflict, and the impact of the conflict 
on Israel's nuclear image. 
NEGOTIATIONS. MULTILATERAL. 
5. DE MESQUITA (Bruce Bueno). Multilateral negotiations: 
A special analysis of the Arab-Israili dispute. International 
Orqnisation. 44. 3; 1990, Sum; 317-40. 
A model for forecasting political choices and for 
explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those 
choices is delineated. The model, based on the median 
voter, theorem and on the axioms of expected utility 
maximization, is applied to the prospects for a 
multilateral peace conference in the Middle East. The 
analysis helps provide insights into the motivations 
behind recent actions by leaders in the USSR the US 
Jordan, the Palestine Libration Organisation, and Israel. 
By viewing multilateral ;negotiations in a rational choice 
context, it is possible to elucidate the contents of 
calculations that reflect decision makers' considerations 
if they are trying to do what they believe is in their 
best interest. By modeling the decision process and than 
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using comparative statics simulations, it is also possible 
to discern when perceptions and reality are likely to 
deviate from each other. 
, , , THREATS and CHALLENGES. 
ARAFAT. 
6. BEYER (Lisa). Out of the shadows: Israel moves 
towards direct talks with the leadership of the PLO in 
an effort to prod the peace negotiation. Time. 142, 34; 
1993, Aug, 23; 28. 
Efforts of the peace negotiations for Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Arafat threatened and challenged, by 
Palestinian delegates to the Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations, to take action step or otherwise his 
resignation. The showdown in Tuwis came at a crucial 
point in the Arab-Israeli talks. Having treated the PLO's 
leaders like pariah for 29 years - they were inevitably 
described as terrorists - the Israel government took 
significant step toward recognition. Prim Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin shown the willingness to any cabinet member to 
dealing directly with PLO leaders, but he was not 
prepared to do so himself. The Palestinian delegates 
to the negotiations were worried about the reaction of 
residents of the territories to the concessions Arafat was 
willing to make. Commenting on a recent shooting in 
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which Palestinian miHtants killed two Israeli soldiers, a 
delegate asked about, stopping these types of things if 
it happened with himself. That kind of concern has 
paralyzed the Palestinian delegates whenever it has come 
to making key compromises necessary to achieve peace. 
^ , SOLUTION, ISRAEL-ARAB. VIEW POINT. 
INBAR (Michael) and YUCHTMAN-YAAR (Ephraim). 
People's image of conflict resolution: Israelis and 
Palestinians. Journal of conflict resolution. 33 , 1; 1989, 
March; 37-66. 
Presenting a comparison of political preferences for 
solutions to the Israili-Arab conflict of three samples 
of respondents synchronously interviewed: Israili Jews, 
Israeli Arabs, and West Bank Arabs. The result indicate 
no solution is simultaneously endorsed at the grass roots 
by a plurality of Israeli Jews on the one hand, and Israeli 
Arabs or West Bank Arabs on the other. Nonetheless, 
both Jews and Arabs di^stinguish between ideal (coveted) 
solutions, and reality bound ones they could live with 
and would accept. Within nationalities, attitudes vary to 
a limited extent according to social characteristics such 
as education and religiosity. Additionally, among Israeli 
Arabs attitudes are significantly affected by locality of 
residence, especially among rural dwellers, which is a 
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remainder of the enduring relevance of the traditional-
modern dimension of analysis for this population. 
, , WATER, RESOURCES, JORDAN RIVER 
BASIN, 1950-80. 
8. REGUER (Sara). Controversial waters: Exploitation of 
the Jordan river. 1950-80. Middle Eastern Studies. 29, 
1; 1993. Jan; 53-90. 
Proposing to examine the growing importance of 
Jordan water to both Israel and Kingdom of Jordan as 
the two countries in the three decades following the end 
of the British mandate over Palestine. Describing that 
what happened when politics infringed on the 
realization of the development plans and how these two 
countries had to contend with political barriers in order 
to exploit the Jordan River. Which is also the cause 
of Arab-Israili conflict. 
, , , ^ . . WEST BANK. 
9. DADWAL (Shebonti Ray). Politics of Water in West Asia. 
Strategic Analysis. 19, 3; 1996. June; 467-82. 
Describes the water issues and the water Politics of West 
Asia and an assessment to the Jordan river basin, the 
Euphrates basin and the Nile river basin. Also sugges 
the Prospects for solution of those issues. Especially 
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discussing the water politics in the Jordan basin. The 
Jordan basin includes Israel and occupied territories of 
the West Bank. Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, 
Jordan and Syria. The Litani River is also included in 
this region, and flows through Lebanon, including the 
portion of south-west Lebanon which Israel controls. 
Dividing these waters, has been source of conflict ever 
since Jews began setling in erstwhile Palestine and 
especially after the founding of the Jewish state in 1948. 
Control over ground water resources in the Basin is also 
a source of conflict. Israel relies on the ground water 
flowing from the West Bank and Placed restriction on 
Palestinians use of this water. The Western and 
Northern acquifires protrude a little way into Israel, 
which takes 80-90 percent of their water into its 
national Water Carrier, leaving almost nothing for the 
Palestinians. 
. DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS. 
10. ANDONI (Lamis). Palestinian elections; moving towards 
democracy or one-party rule? Journal of Palestine 
Studies. 25, 3; 1996. Spr; 5-16. 
The Palestinian elections and the Shimon Pares 
declaration of an independent Palestine state with 
Jerusalem as its capital to be a dream. The Israeli Prime 
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Minister's statements and warnings to modify the 
Palestinian covenant, to continue the peace process. The 
Palestinian elections and the matter of Palestinian 
democratic rights, and the perpitualism of Israeli control. 
Arafat's position and his seeking to reach a 
compromise on final status of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and same time his legitimacy continues to 
hinge on his ability to symbolise the national aspirations 
of his people to fulfill his pledges to end Israeli 
occupation and to bring about independence. Arafat's 
victory and Fatah's sweep of the Palestinian legislative 
council, Arafat's seeking to establish a one - party 
rule. Formulation of electoral lists, electoral process, act 
of international observers and the election results. 
, . ISRAEL-ARAB. STATES, PROBLEMS. 
11. KHALDI(S. Ahmad). Palestinians' first excusion into 
democracy. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 4; 1996, 
Sum; 20-8. 
The Middle East eastern democracy is something of an 
xymoron. The democractic credentials of any of the 
regimes of states in that great are from the Atlantic 
to Gulf are far from impaccable. Even the democratic 
nature of the much vaunted only democracy in the 
region is circumscribed by the inherent tension between 
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its Jewishness on one hand and it self - proclaimed 
democratic ethos on the other. In the gap between what 
is acceptable democractic practice in the West and what 
the limits of reality and history have imposed on the 
Palestinians some have seen cause for shock and 
depaire. Exagration of the elections has less to do with 
the presence or absence of the requisite democratic 
trapping of such electioin as respected for human being, 
a free press, secret balloting etc. and more to do with 
the nature of Middle Eastern societies. It might be 
possible to forsee emergence in years to come of a move 
truely institutionalized modern system of governance 
with competing parties and elites and ' meaningfull 
ideological and political differences. 
12. SADIKI (Larbi). Towards Arab liberal governance: From 
the democracy of bread to the democracy of the vote. 
Third World Quarterly. 18, 1; 1997. March; 127-48. 
Neither Israel, nor the Arab states, which were both 
confronted by series of bread riots in the 1970s and 1980s, 
strictly quality as totalitarian or democratic. The Jewish state's 
"garrison democracy" has been exclusionary by dint of its 
draconian delaings with the Palestinians in both the West 
Bank and Gaza. The Arab states have, since independence, 
been lees inclined than Israel to adopt democratic rule and 
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not until recently have a rtumber of them initiated democratic 
openings in their authoritarian structures if citizen based 
violence or the threat of it can be assumed to induce further 
democratizing of already democratic systems, it can be 
similarly assumed to engender positive sanctions, such as 
political reforms and acompdation of the aggrived parties, 
interests and preferences, given the limitation and cost of 
state coercion and the potnetial for uncontrollable and 
"rational" violence to turn into incontrollable violence that 
can precipitate that fall of even the most unbending regimes. 
^DEVELOPMENT and CONTROL, WEST BANK. 
13. DAKKAK (Ibrahim). Development and control in the 
West Bank. Arab Studies Quarterly;. 7, 2-3; 1985. Spr-
Sum; 74-87. 
Examining the causes of the deterioration in the 
socioeconomic conditions of the Palestinians in the West 
Bank area of Palestine. The geographical separation 
between he two entities, on the one hand, and the 
divergent juridical status in each on the other, 
contributed effectively in promoting alienation between 
West Bank and Gaza strip. 
,DEMILITARIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ISRAEL. 
14. BERES {Rene louis). Israili Palestinian demilitarization 
129 
and international law. Midstream. 38 , 5; 1997, Jun-July; 
7-9. 
The Beilin or Israeli version call for an independent 
Palestinian state that will be demilitrilized. The Palestinian 
or Mazan version calls for a fully sovereign Palestinian 
state with the right of self defence but with certain as 
yet unasticulated restrictions an armaments. Both Israeli 
and Arab supporters of such a state argue confidently 
tat Israel's security could be entirely safeguard by 
demilitarization. The authoritative expectations of 
interrelational law will be able to protect Israel. The 
another method by which a treaty like arrange meet 
obligating a new Palestinian state to accept demilitarization 
could quickly and legally be invalidated after independence. 
The usual grounds that may be invoked under domestic 
low to invalidate contracts also apply under international 
law to treaties. Historically demilitarization is a principal 
applied to versus zones not to the entirely of emergent 
states. Hence a new Palestinian state might have yet 
another legal ground upon which to evade compliance 
with preindependence commitments to demilitarization. 
,EXICES., REFUGEE CAMPS. 
15. CHIPAUX (Francoise). Palestinian exiles cast their eyes 
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on home Guardian Weekly. 154, 5; 1996, Feb. 4; 19. 
Whether exited Palestinians live in muddy refugee 
camps or pos flats in the Jordanian capital , Amman, 
Palestinian exile in their teens and twenties are obssesed 
by one idea: going home. But they are all to some degree 
critical of the policies pursued by their parents 
generation. They all want peace, but few of them can 
imagine living alongside Israelis, home they see as 
usurpers and therefore eminies. The very few Jordan 
based Palestinians who have gone on a trip 'home' 
usually come back disappointed. Most young Palestinians 
feel that peace will come only if all exiles are allowed 
to return and live normally in their country. Many of 
Palestinians whose parents have been refugees since 
1948 see a return solely in terms of going back to 
villaged which are now in Israeli hands. This feeling is 
particularly strong among inhabitants of the refugee 
camps. Like all Palestinians, young people hope that 
their times of unhappiness will soon be over. 
, , .LEBANON, BEIRUT. 
16. MARIAM SHAHEEN. Those left behind. Middle East. 
252; 1996. Jan; 17-18. 
For almost half a century Beirut has been home to 
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growing numbers of Palestinians refugees. A few, the 
lucky ones, got out to make new lives in the US or 
Europe. Plans are there to flatten refugee camps , such 
as the infamous Shatila, to make way for a new 
reconstructed city. And while no one begrudges the war 
weary Lebanese their new ?Beirut, where will upto 
800 ,000 Palestinian refugees find shelter next. The fate 
of Lebanon's Palestinians is one of the most precarious 
of any in the region. The future of Palestinians in 
Lebanon has not even been touched upon in the five 
year old peace talks between Arabs and Israelis. Neither 
hosts Lebanese, nor the hosted, the Palestinians, feel 
comfortable about the vague futuristic , 'non descript 
nature of the delay. Many politicians in Lebanon suggest 
the only solution is settlements of these Palestinians. 
^ , .ROLE. UNRWA. 
17. MARK (Emanuel). Palestinian refugee camps in the West 
Bank an the Gaze Strip. Middle Eastern Studies. 28.2; 
1992, Apr; 281-94. 
In the wake of the establishment of Israel in 1948 
between 600,000 and 760.000 Arabs of Palestine fled 
or expelled to neighboring Arab countries. Many of them 
had lost everything and set up temporary encampments 
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of the outskirts of towns. The international community 
rushed in assistance and soon set up tent camps, 
distributed food and provide medical services to the 
refugees. This emergency aid alleviated their sufferings 
and probably saved many lives. In 1950 a new United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (UNRWA) took over. It gradually 
extended its range of services to other areas of life, such 
as education, social welfare, water and sanitation. By 
taking a long term view of refugees living in the refugee 
camps in West Bank and Gaza strip, article described 
that how the camps and UNRWA reached their present 
state. Arging that camps have gradually become similar 
to other urban neighborhood and that their inhabitants 
are fully integrated in th'e region's economy. It explaining 
that why the number of refugees has grown over the 
years and why to many people live in "refugee camps," 
and to what extent they are still refugees. 
, ^ .SHATILA, KILLINGS. 
18. SHATILA: 15 Years on Middle East. 270: 1997. Sep: 
16-17. 
On the periphery of the newly rebuilt Camille Chamoun 
Sport stadium, lies one 'of the most infamous Palestinian 
refuge camps in history Shatila. Known as the site of 
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the Sabra and Shatila massaeses of September 1982, the 
camp mourns its dead for 15 years. Slatila's sister camp, 
Sabra, no longer exists as such. It analgamated into 
the slums of West Beirut and is now inhabited by mostly 
southern lebanese. displaced during the 17 year civil war, 
Today, Slaatila's continuing status as a refugee camp is 
also in serious doubt. It is likely to be dismantled 
altogether so as not to mar the glamorous image of the 
rebuilt sports stadium which the Lebenese govt, recently 
used as a showcase during the Inter -Arab Sports Games, 
to send the message to the region and the world: 
'Lebanon is back'. Such accomplishments have how ever, 
done little for the estimated 350,000 ' Palestinian 
refugees that still reside in the hovels and shacks of the 
camps spread across Lebanon. For the time being the 
refugees still languish in their sorded camps. But as the 
days pass and the Arab Israili conflict drags on into its 
sixth decade, the progeny of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon are now into their third generation-enough for 
many to call and to consider Lebanon to be their home. 
, ,REFUGEES. HOSTORY ROLE, LITERATURE. 
19, ISMAT MEHDl. Resistence liteatue in Palstine. asian 
Studies. 14,1; 1996. Jan-June; 72-82. 
Having historical evaluation of the stablishment of 
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Palestine and the Palestinian exodus, how the 
Palestinians become the refugees and their homeland 
has evacuated by the illegal occupation on palestine by 
the Israel. It settled Jews in Palestine and Palestinians 
became the peole without a country living in camps in 
Jordan. Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Tumisia. As 
governments and alliances changed they were further 
displaced. After 1967 invasion of the West Bank, Sinai 
and Golan Heights, the Palestinians of West Bank and 
Gaza have been living under Israeli occupation, subject 
to policy of establishing fortified Jewis settlements 
among them. Main aim of the article is to lighten that 
how Palestine litrature'have a role in resistence for 
Palestinian problem. Also lightened the prominent 
writers and poets and also their prominent works. 
, . , PROBLEM, 1948-52, ISRAEL 
POLICY. 
20. BLIGH (Alexander) Israel and refugee problem: From 
exodus to resettlement, 1948-52. Middle Eastern 
Studies. 34, 1; 1998, Jan; 123-47. 
Governing the main processes and evens between 
1948-1952. The number of Arab refugees involved, 
provides the necessary framework by which to gain 
a full understanding of the seriousness of the problem 
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facing Israel and her neighbours at the end of 1948. 
Israels official policy towards the question of Arab 
refugees never materialized into one comprehenisve 
policy; rather, it contained certain elements of policy. 
The ability of Israel, which it has, to impliment a 
policy and eventually reach a viable solution to the 
Arab refugee problem within her borders. 
, , ,RETURN, 1994. 
2 1 . HASAN KHADER. Confessions of a Palestinian return. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 27 ,1 ; 1997, Aug; 85-95. 
A Palestinian refugee and resistance fighter recounts his 
thoughts and feelings upon returning to Gaza with the 
Palestine Authority in 1994. Shifting between memories 
of exile and the present, author finds the dream of the 
houseland nustured during twenty years of exile does 
not match the reality and moves from bitterness to 
resignation to a note of cautions optimism. 
, , ,RIGHTS, ROLE, UNRWA. 
22. DABBAGH (Selma). Struggle for Palestinians refugee 
right. Middle East International. 580; 1998, July 31 , 31 ; 
18-19. 
The expulsion nearly a million palistinians in 
1948 enabled Israel to increase its land ownership from 
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3-5 million to 20 million dunums.. While the military 
captured the land and .expelled the people. The Israel 
legislature devised methods to justify its acquisation a 
process that continue in areas under Israeli control to 
this day. At the some time as the enactment of law 
of return in 1952 proposals were put into affect to 
destroy Palestinians villages. Present cultivation of land 
and settle Jews in vacated areas. Since Netanyahu came 
to power even the mast routine mention of the 
applicability of general assembly. Resolution 194, which 
affirms the right of Palestinians refuges to return and 
compensation is enough to make the Israeli delegation 
leave the proceeding. Diaspor a Palestinians* living in the 
Gulf or the west are no longer on UNRWA register non 
governmental organizations and human rights groups 
have failed to tackle the process of dispossession. 
^ . .SONGS, RETURN, 1997 
23. AL-BARGHOUTI(Mureed). Songs for a country no longer 
Known. Journal of Palestine studies. 27, 2; 1988, Wint; 
59-67. 
A Palestine refuges writes of his return after thirty years 
to the village where to was born and from which his 
family was traced to flue in 1967, when he was a child. 
Article addresses that how exile effects the individual's 
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relationship to place for refuges, as well as for those 
who remain and those born in diaspore. 
^ , .STATUS, CIVIL RIGHTS, ARAB 
STATES. 
24. SHIBLAK ABBAS. Residency status and civil rights of 
Palestinians refugees in Arab countries. Journal of 
Palestine studies. 25 ,3 ; 1996, Spr; 36-45. 
Conditions of Palestinian refuges in their Arab environ-
ment with particular focus on their residency status and 
civil rights in Arab environment. The legal framework 
which, by determining to a large extent the degree of 
integration or exclusion of the refugees' in the host 
societies, has profound. Policy implications on any future 
settlement Describing they role of United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA), to provide the settlem.ent. 
Accession of the govt. Services to the Palestinians in the 
Gulf states. Matter of property ownership for Palestinians 
in the Gulf. 
,- , .RIGHT OF RETURN. 
25 . KHALIDl (Rashid I). Observations on the right of return. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 21,2; 1992, wint; 29-40. 
Few issues in the Arab -Israeli conflict are as contencious 
as that of the Palestinian right of return. Idea of return 
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of significant numbers of Palestinians to their villages 
and towns, or to any part of the Palestine, touches on 
deep seated fears among Israelis regarding the legitimacy 
and permanence of the entire Zionist enterprise, as well 
as the Arab-Jewish demographic balance within Pales-
tine. In light of current Palestinian thinking on returning 
subject, it is finally possible to explore the concept of 
the return of the palestininans in terms of who might 
return, to where when, and under what circumstances. 
,FUTURE, ROLE, ARAB UNITY. 
26. CHAKRAVARTTY (Sumit). Future of Palestine: Depends 
on Arab unity. World Focus. 9.9; 1988 , Sep; 12-15. 
Announcement by Yasser Arafat at the end of a three 
day meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) 
about the formation of an independent state of Palestine 
in Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip with East 
Jerusalem as its capital, has changed the entire 
complexion of the Palestinaians' struggle for a homeland 
of their own that the Zionist in Israel, enjoying the 
generous backing of their highly influential western 
partners, had denied them for more than 40 years. The 
declaration instantly altered the scenario in the Arab 
world as well. The Algeria which has all along played 
a vital role in strengthening unity in the Palestinian 
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ranks, was the first to grant recognition. Syria, Libya, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, North 
femen, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Malaysia and 
Indonesia are included which have shown their willing-
ness in recognizing the independent Palestinian state. 
Among these Turkey is the country which had diplomatic 
ties with Israel. Such a counrty,s recognition of 
Palestinian state has been quite a heavy blow to the 
diehard Zioniss in Israel who still can not countenance 
a sovereign Palestinian nation state as their neighbor. 
, , .US. 
27. BERGER (Elmer). Tangled web: Israel and the Gulf. Arab 
Studies Quarterly. 13. 1 - 2; 1991, wind-spr; 83-99. 
There is a "tangled web" which confronts the already 
faltering United States initiative-or "peace process" -in 
the Middle East. The United States Commitment to 
security of the Israel may still be as strong as ever. 
United States responsibility to remove from this 
commitment any potential for further Israeli mischievous 
ventures into the affairs of Gulf. The limits of American 
support for Israeli security may produce what has long 
been obviously necessary: the diminishment of Israeli 
power to its lawful right to legitimate self defense. This 
will require that Israel face squarely its historic defiance 
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of relevant United Nations' resolutions, a settlement 
with the Palestininas which is predicated on the 
displaced, occupied and scattered nation's internationally 
recognized right to national self-determination including 
the justifiable demands for a territory in which to 
exercise its sovereignty. The one, most potentially 
disruptive element missing from the ingredients is the 
future of Palestinians, both within Israel's Green line, 
those under occupation and now the still undertimined 
number again homeless and displaced throughout the 
Arab world or in the misery of baresubsistance camps 
throughout the area. 
,GAZA. KHAN YUNIS CAMP, EFFECT, CLOSURE, 
DAILY LIFE. 
28 . DOUGHTY (Dick). Listening in Gaza. Journal of 
Palestinian Studies. 25 , 4; 1996, Sum; 69-86. 
As final status negotaitions prepare to convene, what 
have become the terms of daily life in Gaza strip? Author 
explored this question with is friend. Article is a 
personal account of a week's visit in early April 1996. 
Author spent most of his time in Khan Yunis Camp 
when Israeli security forces redeployed, Palestinian 
Authority (PA) has been established and Israel has 
applied a policy of closure that has affected more than 
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three hundred days out of the PA's first two years and 
caused financial losses to the Gazan economy that 
outstrip the value of post Oslo international aid; the 
social cost rpay prove greater still. Author explains the 
condition of people of Gaza in closure which they have 
suffered in daily life. Including the deaths of children 
also, due to the closure of the border by Israel and 
difficultuies to get the medical services at right time and 
food crisis.. Author met, as a journalist to the many 
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peoples of the Camp i.e. social workers , young girls 
and other people also, to find out the conditions faced 
in the closure period. 
-—-, IDEQUOGY, ROLE, HAMAS. 
29. LITVAK (Meir). Islamigation of the Palestinian Israeli 
conflict: The case of Hamas. Middle Eastern Studies. 
34 ,1 ; 199S, Jan; 148-63. 
The Arab bi-aeli conflict has an important development 
in its, as re|l.ected by the statement of Islam Resistance 
Movement or Hamas which denotes the Palestinian 
cause about, the faith and belief instead of about land 
in soil. It sees the conflict's causes and sources through 
the religious Islamic lenses. Through Hamas the Muslim 
Brethren hoped to play a major role in Palestinian 
politics during the crucial period. Thus Hamas 
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formulated its ideology in rivalry with the secular national 
Palestinian forces within the PLO, and in order to refute 
Zionist Israeli claims to the land. At the heart of Hamas' 
ideology is the emphasis on the Islamic essence of the 
Palestinian cause and Palestine-Israeli conflict. Hamas, 
therefore, criticizes the PLO for portraying the conflict 
as one between Palestinian nationalism and Zionism. 
Hamas ' thought was that the libration of Palestinian can 
only be accomplished from a religious Islamic point of 
departure, since Islam is the only ideology that can 
mobilize the full potential of the people and only Islam 
will break the Jews. 
INDEPENDENT STATE, ROLE LEADERSHIP 
ARAFAT.30. 
30. DAR (AN). Uneasey road to peace. World Focus. 15, 6; 
1994, June; 19-21. 
Yassar Araft and PLO had been living as refugees in 
Tunis. Driven by distance and short of means, he carried 
on the for independent Palestine. Yasser Arafat is in 
a way an ally of Israel, which Palestinians all over had 
been taught to consider as a racist, colonial power. At 
the time when peace, agreement was signed various 
partners in the negotiations gave out their views. These 
were well meaning thoughts, justifying what had driven 
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these men to peace. For a time Arafat appeared to stand 
alone. If he failed he would be thrown into dustbin of 
West Asian History. But he had also acquired new 
friends. But Arafat was not sure what those on his own 
side would say. He knew that if things went wrong, he 
would have few friends to see him through. He had only 
one alternative: to struggle on for a permanent peace. 
That would be his strategy in many years ahead despite 
the difficulties he would face. The Palestinian adminis-
tration, Major problem would also be to find funds for 
working the system of government. 
, INTERNATIONAL NGOs, MEETING, NEW 
YORK. 1 9 8 5 . 
31 ATAOV (Turkkaya). UN action on Palestine. 
Democretic Word. 14, 49; 1985, Dec, 8; 9-10. 
The international Non-Government Organizations 
meeting on the question of Palestine took place, 
at the United Nations office in Geneva in 1985. 
It was an important counference streanthening the 
interaction between the UN and the international 
NGO. Community. All the participants hoped that 
this conference held at a very critical time. All 
s tatements, resolutionand the final declarations 
were action oriented statements of Yassar Arafat 
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the chairman of executive council of the PLO 
underlined that this meet ing was being held at a 
time when the Pales.tinian Arab people were facing 
increasinly serious chal lenges and diffeculties both 
in and outside the occupied palestive. A document 
presented by the PLO deligation demonstrated with 
facts and figures. Saverai democratic. Israeli 
organizations agreed with Palestine form of analysis 
and suggestion. This conference was another clear 
indication that the NGOs, had perceived the unique 
role which the NGOs could paly in assisting the 
UN of realised t he , goals of the resolution. 
, IRAQI OCCUPATION. KUWAIT, EFFECT, 
PALESTINIANS. 
32 DUMPER (Michael). End of an era. Journal of 
Palestine studies. 2 1 . 1; 1 9 9 1 , Aut; 120-23. 
A walk through the palestiniain district of Hawalli 
in Kuwait City brings on sadness tinges with 
disbelief. Palestinins' left out to the Kuwait prewar 
days about 400,000,, 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 reduced by the end 
of the Iraqi occupation. By the everyday leaving to 
Kuwait by Palestiniaus flights to Jordan, Amman 
and making their way to Abdaly. By the end of 
1 9 9 1 . there will be only 30 ,000 - 40 ,000 
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Palestinians left ' in Kuwait. Iraqi occupation 
collapsed the Palestinians' community. Separation 
of the Palestinian families by borders took place 
once again. Their net works of friendship and 
support irrevocably fractured, dreams have crashed 
and have been replaced by memories too hot and 
painful of remember. 
, ISRAEL, ARMY. CRUELITY, RAXING 
HOMES. 
3 3 . BEYER (Lisa). Lethal house Calls: The Israeli army 
has a new anti-guerrilla tactic of razing homes that 
is also raising hatreds.Time: 142, 29; 1993, July; 
19; 25 . 
Happenings in Israel with the Palestinians, so cruel 
behaviour in the occupied turritory especially in 
Gaza. Things which were happened with the Olwans 
are the proof of this cruelity. The soldiers forced 
the Olwans and hundreds of their neighbours out 
of their homes, handcuffed and blindfolded the 
men. and packed them into a nearby mechanic's 
shop. Then the troops, who had been tipped off 
that a Patestinian gunman was in the area 
systematically reduced the neighbourhood to rubble. 
They got their man-he was shot and then blow to 
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pieces by a granaderbut in the process, the Israeli 
created new enimies. M.M.Olwan said that he is 
going to carry this in his stomach for ever, and pass 
it on to his future son and then on to his son,who 
was stood in the ruins of his home.The Olwans are 
among hundreds of Palestinians who have been 
rendered homeless by the Israeli army's latest 
weapon against the uprising in the occupied 
territories. To eliminate or capture hard-core 
resistance fighters, security forces, having cornered 
a fugitive in a neighbourhood, surround the area, 
evacuate residents and give the wanted man a 
chance to surrender. 
, . ATTACK. LEBANON, EVACUATION 
34. ISRAELI ATTACK on South Lebanon. Muslim and 
Arab perspective 1, 4-6; 1994, Jan.-March; 217-
20 . 
The attack was aime.d primarily to punish the whole 
population and to depopulate a large area where 
resistance fighters opera te . About 500 .000 people 
fled the region as a result of Israeli shelling on 90 
towns and villages including Palestinian refugee 
camps and Syrian and Lebanese army positions. 
Lebanon, as a result of Israeli attacks at the time, 
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had tried unsuccessfully to disarm the Palestinian 
' fedayeen ' . South Lebanon has ben a target of 
Israeli raids and invasions since early 1970s when 
Palestinian guerrillas moved these from Jordan. In 
May 1992 Israel launched a similar attack against 
Hizbullah force in the area, killing at least 25 
people and wounding 63 within two weeks of 
aggression. The Israelis have, however, failed in 
their favourite game of turning the Arab-Israeli 
conflict into an Arab-Arab conflict. 
^ ^ ELECTION. KNESSET, EQUALITY 
3 5 . EQUALITY NOW. Middle East. 2 6 4 ; .1997, Feb.; 
12-3 . 
One of less reported upshots of last year 's (1996) 
Israeli election was the unprecedented number of 
Arab members entering the Knesset. These now 
number 11 plus one honorary Arab, the Jewish 
Tamara Gojansky. who had the community Hadash, 
which has over the year turned into an essentially 
Arab list. They represent 8 5 0 , 0 0 0 Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, 18'Ki of the country's total 
population, 1992 elections left the Arab population 
free to vote for their sectoral interests in the 
separate Knesset elections. They gave 60% of their 
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votes to the two Arabs or non-Zionist coalitions 
(nearly double of 1992) and only 24 percent to 
Zionist par t ies . It was a react ion to the 
Government 's crackdown on the Islamists in the 
Palestinian territories followed the ferocious suicide 
bombing of a year ago carried out by Hamas and 
the Islamic Jihad. The election of 1996 marked the 
moment when the Arab started openly talking, if 
not of autonomy, at least of full rights as a national 
minority. Now the problem is that where is the 
newfound sprit "equality" and unprecedented 
representation able to lead the Arab's community 
in 1997 and beyond ? Under a labour 'govt, theirs 
could have been an influential role. Under Likud, 
they vyill be reduced to local issues and fighting 
impending budget cuts . However, they can and will 
continue the struggle for equality. 
^ ^ RAID. TUNISIA, PLO, ROLE, US. 
36 . BERINDRANATH (Dewan). Zionist aggression on 
Tunisia - the real culprit . Democratic world 14, 4 1 ; 
1985, Oct.. 13; 5-6. 
The massacre of innocent Palestinian and Tunisian 
citizens perpetrated through the mostrous said by 
US - supplied Israeli jet fighters on PLO of 
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headquar ters in Tunis is a case of meticulausly 
premiditated and preplanned crime commited jointly 
by tlie US-Israeli wag machine and this crime would 
not have been possible without connivance and the 
fullest suppor t from the USA. It was pointed out 
by Mr.Arafat that the first raid would not have been 
possible without refulling facilities being provided 
at a NATO based in the Mediterranian to the ultra 
lethal F-16 fighter bomber supplied by PLO 
stablished its headquarter Tunis because USA to 
Israel. Tunis is far enough from Israel to convey 
the message with the required amount of brutality 
to the rest of Arab states but Israel had now 
become a supreme military force over the entire 
area, and no country in the Arab world was beyond 
the reach of Zionist aggresion. Another reason for 
Tunisia being made the target of Israel bombing 
attack was the fact that Tunisia is known for its 
love for peace . 
, ISRAELI ARABS. COMMUNITY,STATUS. 
37. SANDLER (Shmuel).' Israeli Arabs and the Jewish 
state: The activation of a community in suspended 
ant inat ion. Midle Eastern Studies. 3 1 , 4; 1995, 
Oct; 9 3 2 - 5 2 . 
The Arabs who stayed in Israel had ben 
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overwhelemed by the power of the Jewish state and 
failed to develop a Palestinian collective identity 
and communal organization. Their minority status, 
their isolation from the geographical centres of 
Arab nationalism, and their predominently rural 
lifestyle inhibited their political activity.The low 
status of Palestinianism, at the time, further 
hampared the absence of a nationwide Arab party 
inhibited their emergence as a viable active 
community in the Israeli polity. There was always 
the unspoken fear that , because of intense Arab-
Israeli conflict.a mobilized Arab community would 
be suspected and this trigger a reaction of the state 
resulting in expulsion. The rise and decline in the 
strength of the Jewish ' s ta te ' provides a unifying 
explantation for bath the paralysis of the Arab 
community and its activation in the wake of the 
Yom Kippur War. 
, ISRAEL - US, CITIZENSHIP, GOLDAMIER. 
3 8 . SOM ANAND. Israel and America: Partners indeed. 
Democratic world. 14, 36 ; 1985 , Sep.8 ; 8-9. 
It may be considered incredible by many peoples 
that a person having an American passport and all 
other rights that go with the citizenship of the 
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United S ta tes would be elected Prime Minister of 
Israel and remain on the post for years . Golda Mier, 
the lady who acted tough with the Arabs and never 
liked to yield even an inch of territory to the 
Pales t ine .She migrated from US to Israel, but not 
many p e r h a p s know that after migration she did not 
surrender her American passport, not even when 
she was elected the Prime Minister of Israel. This 
question asked to the officials of the State Deptt. 
in Washington, they would try to avoid such an 
embarras ing query by saying it the difficult task 
because of requirement going through all passport 
that have been relinquished. So many examples are 
there of the people whom have citizenship of both, 
and they could any time go back to America and 
contest an election without anybody asking "why 
you are here?" An overwhelming majority of 
American passport holders are Jewish families who 
do not tolerate Arabs in Palestine. 
, , WITHDRAWAL, SECOND STAGE, 
LEBANON. 
39 . DATTA(Surinder K).Illusion and reality: Peace in the 
Mideast. Democratic world. 1985 , Apr, 14; 5-6. 
Israeli army began second stage of its withdrawal 
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from southern Lebanon. In Feb. 1985 , the Israeli . 
army completed the first stage, evacuating the port 
of Sidon and its hinterland on the western side of 
southern Lebanon. The second stage encompasses 
much of the southeast. This created the illusion that 
the intentions of Israelis were peaceful. Or the 
illusion that the third and final stage of the 
withdrawal would also take place. Or the Israelis 
have altogether given up the idea of a 'cordon 
sanitaire' north of the border to be controlled by 
the Israeli soldiers and by the Israeli-backed 'South 
Lebanon Army'. Illusion aside, the reality is the 
occupation of Arab lands and the 'Pariah nation' 
that has come to stay admist then. Equally 
important and real are two distinct view points -
the Israeli and the Arab - both so extreme as to 
mutually exclude the other. 
- , JERUSALEM. 
40 . EL-SHEIKH (Khalid). Arab status of Jerusalem. 
Democratic world. 13; 1984 , June, 3; 10-11 . 
Throughout the history, Jerusalem, the city of 
peace, attracted the invaders since ancient times. 
The city, sacred and holy to the divine religions, 
Islam. Judaism and Christianity had been eternal in 
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the hear ts of the believers of God. Due to this, city 
was conqured 18 times. The first appearance of the 
Jews in Jerusalem was during 1300 B.C. After this 
the Jerusa lem conqured by many conquerors. The 
British commitment through the Balfour Declaration 
to establishing a national home for Jews in 
Palestine had opened the doors wide to Jewish 
immigration into Palestine and Jerusalem. While the 
number of Jews in 1922 did not exceed a few 
thousands in Jerusalem out of a total of 50 ,000 
in the whole of Palestine. It jumped in 1948 to over 
80 ,000 Jews in Jerusalem and over 450,000in 
Palestine as a whole. This exploitation of the 
British colonial period (1917-1948) by the Jews 
had increased the Zionist influence over Palestine 
and encouraged the setting up of armed gangs and 
terrorist organisations to control Palestine.New 
migrant Jews formed their settlements outside the 
walls of the city. This situation continued untill just 
before the annaxation of Jerusalem by the Zionists 
in June 1 9 6 7 . The city is encircled today by a ring 
of Zionist settlers. 
-- , , EAST, ANNEXATION, ISRAEL. 
41 LUSTIC (Ian S). Has'Israel anexed Jerusalem.Middle 
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East Policy. 5, 1; 1997 , Jan; 34-45 . 
Israel neither annexed East Jerusalem is June 1967 
Nor improved its sovereignty there . Nor did its do 
so with the Jerusalem"Basic Law" in 1980. 
Examination of laws passed, ordered, issued and 
official Israeli government declarations, along with 
cousideration of Israeli court cases and the opinians 
of Israeli legal scholars, indicate the neither 
annexat ions nor sovereighty has been officially 
asser ted . What Israel did was change the municipal 
boundry of the city of Jerusalem to add seventy-
two square kilometers of the West Bank-a change 
in the city boundry segally changeable by a simple 
order of the Interior Ministry. Arguments before 
Israeli courts that expanded East Jerusalem 
coust i tues a portion of sovereign Israeli trritory 
have not been accep ted . These legal and 
administrative realities are significant in view of 
upcoming negotiations over the future of the city 
and evidence that most Israeli are ready to cede 
por t ions of Arab inhabited East Jerusalem and its 
surroundings. 
42 REMPEL (Terry). Significance of Israel's parial 
annexat ion of East Jerusalem. Middle East Journal. 
755 
5 1 , 4; 1997, Aut; 520-34 
Examining the significance of the de jure measures 
which the state of Israel employed to consolidate 
Jewish control over .East Jerusalem in 1 9 6 7 . While 
options for the future states of East Jerusalem may 
be deminished by de facto measures, i.e., the 
Creation of facts' on the ground the de jure, or 
legal measures by which Israel has incorporat ions 
in response to the contentious nature of the 
annaxat ion/ in tegra t ion and provide room for 
accomodation in the negotiatious on the future 
status of East Jerusalem. 
, ^ HOLY PLACE, SACRED RELICS, 
IDENTITY. 
43 ARMSTRONG (Karen). Holiness of Jerusalem: Asset 
or Burden? Journal of Palestine Studies. 27, 3; 
1998, Spr; 5-19. 
Since the 1967 war, Jerusalem and the Jewish holy 
places have acquired a new centrality even in the 
traditionally secular Labour Zionist vision. After 
nothing a parallel shift toward religiosity among the 
early Christains following the excavation of the 
Holy Sepulchre. Article discussing the connection 
between secred relics and identity as well as the 
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impuls to demolish rival artifacts and claims. 
Trasing the city's changing importance to the three 
faiths over the centuries, correlat ing the intensity 
of feeling with perceptions of threat and loss. 
Examining the different concepts of holiness 
wi thJudaism's and Christianity's more exclusivist 
cult of the city's sanctity. At last discussing the 
David 's conquest of 'Jerusalem, which leaves scope 
for grea ter inclusiveness than is generally assumed. 
, ^ LAND, SHARE. 
44. EMMETT (Chad F). Status quo solution for 
Je rusa lem. Journal of Palestine Studies. 26. 2; 
1 9 9 7 , Wint; 16-28. 
Shar ing sovereightly of political turitory is not 
parac t iced often, yet it seems to be the only 
reasonable solution^ for the complex issue of 
Je rusa lem. Using the holy places of Jerusalem as 
a model , for showing that how sharing sacred 
sacred space, albeit on a very small scale, can be 
done peacefully. For more than a century Greeks, 
Latins, Americans and copts have shared the church 
of the holy spulchre in an interlocking system of 
svat tered sovereignty. Such a system also could 
work between Israelis and palestine as they shared 
157 
the scared space of Jerusalem. 
, , -, ^ , MONORITIES, NON-
JEWISH. 
4 5 . HOLLEK (Teddy). Sharing united Jerusa lem. 
Foreign Affairs. 1988-89, Wint; 156-168 . 
As defence and foreign policy will be reserved to 
the government of Israel, there should be no 
problem with soverignty, real or symbolic, within 
one unified city. The country's present mood, 
particularly after last month 's elections, no 
government would be able to enshrine in law the 
right of the non-Jewishminorities of Jerusalem, 
because a sufficient majority in the Knesset 
probably could not be mustered to pass such a 
measure. However it may be feasible for the 
government to issue regulations empowering the 
municipal i ty of J e r u s a l e m to make such 
arrangements as are Just and necessary. This would 
greatly calm Arab anxieties, specially it the 
government were to issue sattlements of intent and 
principle as to main concerns of the Arabs, such 
as the temple Mount, Jewish sattlement in the 
Muslim Quarter of the Old city and news Arab 
housing outside the walls. 
ISRAEL. 
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,OLD CITY, SETTLEMENT, THIRD PHASE, 
46. DUMPER (Michael). Israeli sett lement in the Old 
City of Jerusalem Journal of Palestine Studies. 2 1 , 
4; 1992 , Sum; 32-53 . 
Since 1967, Israeli settlement policy in Jerusalem 
has been directed towards a single overiding goal: 
the counsolidation of Israeli control over Palestinian 
East Jerusalem in order to present any future 
redivision of the city. It is has meant strenuous 
efforts to construct housing and encourage the 
sett lement of Israel in the palestanian parts of the 
city. There have been four phases of Israeli 
sett lement in the Old City. First took place in the 
immidiate aftermath of June 1967 war involed the 
demolition the second phase, from 1968 to the late 
seventies, the Israel Govt, expended the Jewish 
quarter by expropriating Palestinian and Israel 
propert ies between the Arminian and Magharib 
quarters, evicting the Palestinian tenents and 
replacing than with Israel. Begning in the early 
eighteen, militant Israel settler groups initiated the 
third phase aimed at establishing an Israeli 
presence in the heart of Muslim quarter of Old City 
and near the Haramal-Sharif. The fourth phase 
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begen in 1987 when the minister of housing, Ariel 
Sharon, occupied a property in one of the MusUm 
quarter. Article evaluating and examining the third 
phase. The successes of third phase have done is 
place within reach the long-term plans of the govt, 
to reduced the pelestinian population in the Old 
City and therefore help achieve the demographic 
balance sought for the whole of Jerusalem. 
... . .^... . .^OTTOMAN^ PERIOD. 
4 7 . ARNON (Adar). Quarters of Jerusalem in the 
Ottoman Period Middle Eastern Studies. 28 , 1; 
1992, Jan; 1-65. 
Defining the quar ter of the city of Jerusalem as 
they were during the four centuries of Ottoman rule 
in Palestine (1517-1917) . Defining the quarters ' 
means establishing the division of the city as 
quarters or, describing the locations and boundries 
of areas in the city with a given name and finding 
the changes which occured over the years in the 
system of quar ters . Demograpical aaspects of the 
quarters has also discussed. Maps and tables are 
provided too. 
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-—,KILLINGS, MASSACRE, HEBRON. 
48. HIBRON MASSACRE a normal event. Muslim and 
Arab Resoectives. 1. 4-6; 1994 , Jan-March; 268-
6 9 . 
The Hebron massacre was the latest demonstration 
of the violence and te r ror i sm which have 
characterised the Zionist and movement from its 
very inception to the present day. On 25 February 
1 9 9 4 , Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish setter, entered 
the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron with a machinegun 
and kept pumping bullets into the worshippers until 
he was overpowered by his victims and beaten to 
dea th . Bloody riots spilled into other west Bank 
towns, the Gazzah Strip and the old city of 
Jerusalem security in more killings of Palestinians. 
The Americal-born Goldstin was follower of Rabbi 
Meir Kahane. joined the Jewish Defence League 
under Kahane and was represented Kahane's 
extremist Kach party that wants nothing less than 
the expulsion of Palestinians from their own land. 
He said that all Arabs are enimies, they dream of 
Jihad against Jews. 
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.LABOUR MARKET, STRATEGY LABOUR 
LEAGUE, STRATEGY. 
49 . BERNSTEIN (Deborah S). From split labour market 
strategy to political co-operation: The Palestine 
Labour League. Middle Eastern Studies. 3 1 , 4; 
1995 , Oct; 7 5 5 - 7 7 1 . 
The conditions which led to the formation of the 
Palestine Labour League (PPL) also led to the 
failure of the stretegies used by it. In the first 
s tage , the PPL a t t empted to vi t igate the 
competition faced by Jewish workers in the split 
labour market of Palestine through resing the 
standard of the Arab worker, a couse of action 
defined by precisely because of the overall context 
of the split labour market, and the second stage, 
PLL hoped to mitigate the national conflict through 
attempting to subtitute a Histadrut affiliated labour 
organisation, run by Jewish Histadrut activities, for 
the Arab, nationally oriented, existings one. This 
also failed partially because there was simply not 
enough to offer the Arab worker, but more 
important, because the national conflict and the 
Palestinian national movement had consolidated to 
such an extent that blatant co-optation had little 
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effect and created, above all enimity and 
opposit ion. 
.LAND, SHARE. ROLE, US. 
50. KHALIDI (Walid). Palestine problem: an overview. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 2 1 , 1; 1991 , Aut; 5-
16. 
The crux and kernel of the Arab-Israeli confilict is 
the Palestine problem, struggle between two 
nat ional movements. Zionist and Palestinian 
national movement.. The issue of the control of 
sharing of the land of Palestine. PLO is a civilian 
organization and its backbone is a -network of 
Palestinian pofessional unious. The Gulf was has 
negative and possitive implicatious with regard to 
the resolution of the Palestine problem and the 
Arab-Israel conflict. U.S.. is not only decisive part 
of a solution but also of the problem. 
,LAND-WATER. WEST BANK. 
5 1 . ELMUSA (Sharif S). Land-water nexus in the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
2 5 , 3 ; 1996. Spr; 69-78 . 
Examining the Israel claims that west Bank territory 
is needed to safeguard its water supply within the 
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pre-1967 borders, the validity of those claims from 
the hydrological and economic standpoints and the 
consequences for he Palestinians of Israel retention 
for weather in Israel territorial acquision, or Can 
annexation of West Bank be possible? The water 
for the Palestinians. 
-—-,LEADERSHIP, ARAFAT 
5 1 . SINGH (KR). Political agenda before Arafat. World 
Focus. 15. 5; 1994, June; 7-9. 
Discussing some cha l l anges that the new 
Palestinian leadership, under the guidence of 
experience politicians like Yasser Arafat, will have 
to face. These challanges can be not only with 
intra-palestinian negotiat ions, through a consensus 
building p rocess and conciss ions but not 
compromised on basic principles. It is possible the 
new process may throw up a new leadership, but 
that can not be seen as the begning of anew 
autocratic rule under the dictatorship of Yasser 
Arafat, as is claimed by some of his colleges. 
.....^ .--—.ROLE, FATAH, REBELS. 
5 3 . DATTA (Suriender 'K). Rise and fall of Yasser 
Arafat. Democratic World. 1983, Nov, 20; 5. 
Arafats early days of politicses and cryings of his 
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rally was all for Palestinian's return, but they took 
some changes as he keep ahead the pace with his 
resolution. Arafat faced the worst ever humiliation 
from his own rebels bent on totally finishing his 
military base and thus denying him any future 
political or displomatic clout to press home the 
calims of his people-the hapless Palestinians. Arafat 
cowed by his own Fatah rebles and recently offered 
to lay down arms to prevent future blood both and 
agreed to a ceasefire, bowing to the relentless 
pressure of his Syrian-backed man. There is no 
heratic posibility opening itself to him now. Here 
after he lives a modern day originally belongs to 
the Palestinians, made even more remote a reaching 
possibili ty of a Pales t inian homeland. The 
at tant ions is diverted now to the PLO.s internal 
problems. By the time United Nations adopted a 
resolution in the partition of Palestine, the Jewish 
population has jumped, up as a result of imigration. 
Arafat has been fighting a battle for a cause 
perpatually in international limelight starting with 
the hijacking of plan to hyperbolic vows to 
diplomatic finessl in dealing with the problem. 
165 
—--, LEGAL SYSTEM, 1948-OSLO AGREEMENTS, 
PROBLEMS. 
54. ROBINSON (Glenn E). Polities of legal reform in 
Palestine Journal of Palestine Studies. 2 7 , 1; 1997, 
Aut; 57-60 . 
After brifly reveiving the legal systems in the West 
Bank and Gaza from 1948 until the Oslo 
agreements . the author examines the major 
obstacles to creating a viable legal system in 
Palestine. These are the difficulties in unifying two 
distinct legal systems-the continental , Jordanian 
system in te West 'Bank . and the Anglo-Saxon, 
Common law system in Gaza-and the blurred lines 
of authority. The author argues that the Palestinian 
legal sector, where dicision making has been 
c h a r a c t e r e z e d by u n c e r t a i n t y . d i k t a t , and 
pereonalism. can be seen as a micro cosm of PA 
politics. In both the legal sector and in general , the 
PA has created a politics of antithesis to 
consolidate own power. 
—-.MINISTATE, GAZA, JERICHO, WEST BANK, 
PROSPECTS. 
55 . BEYAR (Lisa). Trying take two steps: A deal on the 
Gaza Strips and Jerico may help get stalled peace 
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talks going. Time. 142, 36 ; 1993, Sep, 6; 32 . 
Palestinian Libration Organisation Chairman Yassar 
Arafat sorhe time liked to claim the Gaza Strip. 
There is speculation that after a quarter-century of 
exide he will soon return to Gaza Strip to run a 
Palestinian ministate there preparation for ruling a 
larger one that would also encoupass the West 
Bank. Something second to be afoot in Gaza Strip 
when Shimon Peres told the US television, to 
withdraw its military force there and to turn it and 
the West Bank city of Jer icho over the Palestinians. 
As Israelis and Palestinians prepared to resume 
Middle East peace talks in Washington. Peres 
indicated the two sides were closed to such a deal, 
which has been labled "Gazaand Jericho first" pares 
agreed "Gaza and Jericho first" but said that deal 
did not entail " the creation of another stal". Many 
Palestinians in territories including those the Gaza 
Strip, fear that they accept a partical deal they will 
never obtain the ultimate goal of their own state 
in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip 
—--, NATIONALISM, POLICY ,ARAB, ISLAM. 
56 . MOHAMMAD GULREZ . Con tempora ry Arab 
Nationalism. Journa l of West Asian Studies. 199; 
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The aims of Arab Nationalism were never 
formulated in a set of principles at the time Arab 
grew aware of themselves as a group seperate from 
others in the Ottoman empire. Before World War 
I, while the Arab idia of Nationalism was mingled 
with the idea of Islamic Unity, Arab nationalism 
scarcely aimed beyond the rehabilitation of the 
Arab race in a multinational empire. The aim of' 
Arab Nationalists was nearly torestore the Arabs to 
their lost role in Islam to which they felt entitled. 
Arab nationalism is not based on religion alone. 
The palestine-libration is essentially an irridentist 
movement. To Arab nationalists, it symbolyzed such 
a degree of degenerat ion of Arab like as to render 
the Arabs not only incapable of controlling their 
own integrity. The failure of pan-Arabism in 1948 
to forestall the creation justfy in part of the state 
of Israel in Palestine served to the minitory coups 
which overthrew ancient regimes in Syria and 
Egypt. Arab Nationalism as is existing today can 
be seen from the strategic point of view, as a 
mediate phase between the disintegration of a total. 
Islamic Policy and identity and the incorporation or 
assimilation of the resulting nationalistic identities 
into the global western polity. 
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, RE-PALESTINIZATION. ISRAELI ARABS. 
57. ROUHANA (Nadim). Accentuated indentities in 
proteracted conflicts: The collective identity of the 
Palestinian citizens in Israel. Asian and African 
Studies. 27, 1-2; r 9 9 3 , March-July; 97 -127 . . 
With the recovery of Palestinian nationalism and its 
surge in the mid-1960s, various segments of 
polestinian society within and outside Palestine 
underwent a process of re-palestinization. The out 
come of June war in 1967, renewed countact with 
the Palestinians in the occupied territories, the rise 
of the PLO as the gelvanizer and embodiment of 
Palestinian nationalism, and above all the growing 
realization that Israel was an exclusive Jewish 
system all accelerated the process . By early 1980s, 
many Arabs in Israel perceived themselves as 
Palestinians who were an inseparable part of the 
Palestinian people. Political behavior of Arabs in 
Israel, as related to their own status in Israel and 
to the palestanian cause, is inexplicably interwined 
with the collective identity. Arab expressed their 
Palestinian identity by supporting the uprising and 
the PLO.s policies. This support was more strongly 
manifested on the sentimental level than on the 
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behavioral level. They employed legal-formal level 
of their Israeli identity to direct their organised and 
collective political behaviour at achiving better 
conditions within the system. 
, NEGOTITATION, SELF-GOVERNMENT. 
58 . SHEHADEH (Raj). Negotiating self government 
arrangements . Journal of palestine Studies. 2 1 , 4; 
1992 , Sum; 2 2 - 3 1 . ' 
The first stage of any negotiation is to agree upon 
the terms of reference. In the case of the Israeli-
palestinian negotiation now underway, those terms 
were spelled out in the US-Soviet letter of 
invitation to the Madrid conference "with respect 
to the negotiations between Israel and Palestinian", 
the phrase from the letter: "self-govt. arrangement ' 
lends itself to a wide range of interprelations. But 
for the present phase at least the negotiations are 
over just that arrangement, what is left for the 
palesitinians negotiators is to attempts to devise the 
best strategy that will lead to what they hope to 
achieve through these negotiations. Successful 
negotiations for "self govt." arrangements can not 
take place in a vacuum. They can only take place 
within the context to be instituted. A central 
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constituent of this reality is the entire fabric of laws 
and administrative chanes pertaining to the Israeli 
settlement that directly affected in myriad way the 
lives and future of the Palestinian inhabitant. 
,OCCUPATION, ANNIVERSARY, AMERICAN 
PALESTINIANS. 
59 . Fifty year Oppressions. Middle East. 278; 1998, 
May; 8-9. 
Palestinian 50 ' is writen on T-shirts and placards. 
A gigantic quilt with 4 1 8 square patches is pased 
from state to state. ,These are the names of Arabs 
villages or communities and a date,embroidered in 
red-green, white and black. Dates are all in 1948 
and names are those of the 418 communities 
destroyed by Zionist forces when they set up their 
state in Palestine. Embroidering is took place in 
America, i.e. Boston. Massachusetts. Washington 
DC, etc. The quilt has gone through United States 
from one city to the next.In each Arab community 
some one has embroidered one square patch. Thus 
on the 50th anniversary of the end of what was 
Palestinity the memory is celebrated in America of 
all places. Some community leaders appreciated 
that hthis inter-community effort has also served to 
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raise the conciousness and increase the cohesion 
in a frequently disheartened community. Article 
specially discussed that what is the situation of 
Palestinians inthe Arab World as borders being 
e x c l u s i o n a r y , Pa l e s t i n i ans have ben 
compartmental ised into dozens if not hundreds of 
communities worldwide, largest of these in the Arab 
World, especially in Jorden, Syria, Lebanon, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq. 
. . . . . . . . EFFECT, ECONOMY. WEST BANK, 
GAZA. 
60. PANT(Girijesh). Palestinian Economy. World Focus. 
15, 6; 1994 . June ; 10-14. 
A UNCTAD study points out. the years of 
occupation have made the Palestinian economy the 
population of Gaza is wide. But economy a 
distorted, unarticulated and weak production base 
unable to sustain its own population and provide 
an impetus for sustained growth and development. 
The Palestinian economy in West Bank and Gaza 
has been passing through a phase of stagnation 
since the early eightees. Recession in the Israeli 
economy and declining oil prices have had an 
adverse impact on the economy of Gaza is small. 
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The economy reflects very lopsided growth, the 
main source of employment is the service sector, 
not agriculture and industry. This reflects the 
fragile nature of the economy. The Department of 
Economic Affairs and Planning of the PLO has 
prepared a programme for the Development of the 
Palestinian National Economy for the year 1994-
2 0 0 0 . Palestinian Development Programme has 
identified the objectives including the housing and 
employment opportunities. 
--—,--—, ISRAEL, ASSESMENT, 1947-98 . 
6 1 . CHERIAN (John).Fifty years of misery. Frontline. 
1998,Apr. 3; 56-7. 
Israel is all set to celebrate 50 years of its 
existence. Not to be forgotten meanwhile is the fact 
that the occasion also maks 50 years of injustice 
for the Palestinian people at the hands of the 
Jewish state and its,allies. Article assessing the 50 
years, from 1947 till 1998 , in the light of 
injustification for the Palestinian people,which they 
have tolerated. As Israel commemorates its 50th 
aniversary, the condition of Palestinians has gone 
from bad to worse despite the mirage of durable 
peace the 1993 Oslo accords created. Benjamin 
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Netanyahu govt, is actively trying to derail the 
peace process by refusing to implement the Oslo 
agreements even partially. The Oslo agreement 
treated into the Israeli govt, concept of security 
that would keep its occupation of the West Bank 
intact. Article also argues with the economic 
conditions and growing unemployment rates within 
the closing border by the Israel. 
.......... ,TORTURE, PALESTINIANS. 
62 . POLICE BRUTALITY in occupied Pales t ine . 
Palestine Digest . . 1976, Sept; 1-2. 
The use of torture by the Israeli authorities in 
occupied Palest ine has been widely documented by 
such bodies as International Red-Cross and World 
Council of Churches, and free Palestine as in the 
past highlighted the brutality and violence used by 
the Israeli occupation of force to suppliers the 
Palestinian population. Allegation of torture are 
usually dismissed as lies or propaganda by the 
Zionist s ta te , but now public opinion in Israel is 
coming to release the truth behind the claims. The 
descriptions of the methods used by the police 
force in Natania when interogating suspects both 
Jews and non-Jews expressed inthis article. The 
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slogan of Natania police was that ' the more electric 
shock-the less toil' which exports confessions from 
deta inees by means of electric shocks, teargas and 
other barbaric methods. 
t 
,OCCUPIED TERRITORIED, EFFECT, WAR, 
GULF 
63 . HASAN (Shamir S). Palest inian and the Gulf war. 
Strategic Studies Journal. 4 . 1-2; 1 9 9 1 ; 43-55 . 
In the face of massive Jewish immigration to Israel, 
rising emigration by Palestinians due to rapid 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s in the occupa ied 
terri tories, a world community preoccupied with its 
on concerns, the prospects for Palestinians are 
deteriorating repaidly. One would agree with 
George T. Abed, that the eimpact of the Gulf crisis 
on the struggle in Palestine would depand on the 
inherent strenth and motivation of the Palestine 
national movement. The immediate demand is on 
the capability of the present Palestinian leadership 
to refocus its sight on the core issue of Palestine, 
while introducing structural reforms at the same 
t ime, by keeping away from all 'extraneous 
concerns and distractions' . 
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,ORGANIZATION, UNDERGROUND, JEWISH, 
HISTORY. 
64 . GOLDSTEIN (Yaacor N). Jewish-Arab confilict: The 
first Jewish underground defence organisation and 
the Arabs. Middle. Eastern Studies. 3 1 , 4; 1995 , 
oct; 744-54 . 
Describing the atti tude of 'Bar-Giora' and 'Ha ' 
shomer, the first Jewish underground defence 
organisaiton in Palest ine, towards the Arabs in the 
yeas 1907-20. It is based on the relevant historical 
evidences reflecting the perseption of their political 
mother party 'Poalei-Zion' and the abundant 
recollections of pert inent members involve in these 
two associations. Bar-Giora and subsequently Ha' 
shomer were a part of the Jewish Palestianin labour 
movement in general and of the Polei-Zion party 
in perticular at the time of ,second Aliya. Like the 
modern party, these association were based on an 
ideology expressed in the phrase socialist Zionism. 
A parallelism and match seemed to lie between 
these two components , but as in many libration 
movements of a socialist shade, ideologically as 
well as practically, absolute priority was given to 
the nationalist element. In its very nature and the 
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defination of its role, Ha'shomer, like Bar-Giora 
before it, become ' the avant-garde of both the 
Jewish labour movement in Palesteni the Yishur 
Zionism, in defence of Jewish national intrest in the 
land. Its attitude towards the Arabs derived from 
its avant-garde character and orientat ion. 
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, ROLE 
LEADERSHIP, ARAFAT WEST BANK and_ GAZA 
STRIP. 
65 . ROBINSON (E. Glenn). Authoritarianism with a 
Palestinian face, Current Hisstory. 9 7 , 615 ; 1998, 
Jan; 13-8 . 
The governing Palestinian Authority in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip is cha rac te r i sed by 
personalized, authoritarian politics. The evedence is 
abundent. Both local and internatioanl human 
rights groups have rebucked the authority for 
abuses commited by a plethora of autonomous 
security and police ^forces. All important political 
dicisions are taken by president Yasser Arafat 
alone, around whom as cult of personality has 
formed. The democratically elected parliament the 
Palestinian Legislative Concil, has been so 
marginalized by Arafat and his cabinet that it has 
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become little more than a debating society making 
a mockry of its role as the defender of Palestinian 
democracy. And the once vibrant Palestinian civil 
society has been vertually under seige by 
Palestinian government. Generally focussing on an 
essentialist antidemocratic understanding of Arab 
Islamic political culture, miss the point of the 
political origins of PA's autoritarianism. 
--—,PEACE PROCESS. 
66 . LEADERMAN (Jim). How to help the Israelis and 
Palestianin reach peace? Middle East Quarterly. 1, 
1; 1994, March; 5-17. 
The foundation stones of a comprehensive Israeli 
P a l e s t i n i a n a g r e e m e n t will have to be 
fundamentally different from any heretofore used in 
pacts Negotiated between existing state in the 
Middle East. There is a basic Geopolitical difference 
between the setuations in which the Israelis and 
Palestinian find themselves and the condition that 
fixed the nature of the agreement between larael 
of Arab states. For this reason, peace making 
between laraelis and Palestinian is going to required 
and extra ordinary amount of patience, time 
creativity- and probably other peoples mony and 
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mediation as well. 
......... ,AGRIMENT. FUTURE. 
67. WALSH (James). Risking peace: A historic break 
through by Israeli and Palestinian and peace makers 
signals the first sign of thaw in a life-or-death 
struggle. Time 142, 37; 1993, Sep, 13; 12-5. 
In the past few miraculous years what must be 
considered one of the greatest miracles of all, is 
the first acknowledgement by Israelis and 
Palestinians that they can share the land both call 
home. The psychological break through in 
recognising each others humanity is huge, the steps 
neither Israelis nor Palestinian would take before. 
Making it were will take years to realize, but only 
a failure of the test they have set themselves can 
undo what has been done. Nagging question is that 
whether these two can live with a victory for peace 
rather than for Israel or Palestine. Israel and PLO 
have seized the movement to clear a vast mental 
hurdle. With enough good faith on both side's along 
with crucial US diplomacy and aid from other 
countries, the two could build their cromised lands. 
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,AGREEMENT, PEACE PROCESS, GAZA-
JERICHO, ANALYSIS 
6 8 . KUMARASWAMY (PR). Gaza-Jericho agreement: 
An asymmetrial accord. Stratiqic Analysis. 17, 2; 
1994 , May; 219-32 . 
The Palestinian who support the Ghaza-Jericho 
plan, view the Interim Accord as the first step 
towards the eventual realisation of an independent 
Palestinian state. On the other hand, the Israeli 
government views the accord as pivotal for the 
prevention of such a possiblity. The prolonged 
occupation of the terri tories has given an 
oppor tun i ty for s t r ive to ope ra t i e various 
in te l egence agenc ies , b reak the geographic 
contiguity of the Arab population through Jewish 
sattlement and to appropr ia te a large segment of 
the public land in the territories as " state land". 
There are likely to pose serious and often inivitable 
obstacles to the Palestinian negotiating position. 
Under the Ghaza-Jerico plan the PLO enjoys the 
a d v a n t a g e on the q u e s t i o n od substant ia l 
concessious and timeframe. But when it comes to 
negotaiting positions and prerogative, Israel posses 
the edge. 
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,HEBRON, PROSPECTS, 
69. HEBRON-LIVING with the deal, (editorial) Middle 
East. 2 6 5 ; 1997, March; 6-8. 
Like most of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements , the 
Herbon deal is far from perfect and hardly 
equibtable to both side. But Yasser Arafat 
proclaimed the city free and Palestinian self-rule 
there has begun. Now Palestinian and the few 
hundred Jewish settlers who live in Herbon look 
with capution towards the future. As the withdrawl 
of Israeli troops from all except the centre of 
herbon took place, both Palestinian -and Israelis 
continued to be sceptical of the agreement what 
was advertised a peace pact. Conflict in Herbon, 
unlike much of the Palestinian Israeli conflict is not 
based on nationalism but on relegion. Palestinian 
of Heron do not deny the properties that once 
belonged to the Jev^ish community at the begnning 
of the century 'belong to the Jews ' today. The 
problem with cohabitation of Herbon appears to be 
one of spirit, since they 'resettled' the city in the 
early 1980s the 'settlers' as they are known, have 
sported small submachine guns, rifles and hand 
guns as part of their daily attire. Worse still the 
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sellers are generally unfriendly and frequently even 
abusive of Palestinian in the city. Vehicle tyres are 
slashed, vegetable carts are overterned and spitting 
is a common way. in which settlers show their 
distaste for their Arab neibours. In such an 
atmostphare it is diffecult to build peace. 
PALESTINE, PEACE PROCESS AGREEMENT, 
HEBRON, REDEPLOYMENT. THIRD 1997. 
USHER (Graham). Third redeployment. Middle East 
International. 575 ; 1 9 9 8 , May. 22; 4-5. 
The third redeployment of the West Bank and the 
1 9 9 7 Hebron a g r e e m e n t , has -an esc row 
arranegment. which may or may not be connected 
to the to the thread of unraveling the palce 
process. .Bank of the discussion of Netanyahu with 
US was less over tje ercentage of redeployment 
than with fati of rthe third redeployment guaranted 
byu the Americans in the Hebron agreement. 
Netanyahu has d e m a n d e d that the third 
redeployment be collepsed into Oslo's final status 
talks on borders. In Israel 's coalition government, 
by the crucial coalition of members it is felt that 
there shaould be all publily andossed a National 
Unity government as the most appropriate coalition 
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for the final status negatiations. Hurban agreement 
has some divergences between PA officials and 
Arafat 's statement about the third redyployment 
which kept the Palestinians in the log. 
PALESTINE PEACE PROCESS, AGREEMENT, 
IMPREMENTATION. 
7 1 . DAWAL (Shebonti Ray). Middle East peace process 
critically havinged on the PLO-Israel accord? 
Strategic Analysis. 17, 7; 1994, Oct; 881-900 . 
So far all the doomsday propheses about Gaza 
erupting into Violentr civil war seem to have been 
bailed. However it will take were than tne Israelis 
and the Palestinians to implement the terms of 
agreement properly. The Palestinians need the 
suport of the majou Arab states and through in the 
past many of than had the Palestinians problem was 
the hear t ' of the comflict with the Jewish sgtate, 
and that any agreement between Israel and the 
PLO would be enough to make than join the peace 
accords, now that a diod has been made the, Arab 
states are now more than preoceupied by the 
price they would have to pay for the agrement. For 
the Israelis, the symbols of the sucess of the 
afreement are undisputedly different from those 
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professed by the PLO. Security issues top the Hst 
of their demands, and they are apprehensive that 
a military witheawaf will not be able to stop acts 
of voilence against fellow Israelis in the occupied. 
Inorder to keep piece, the will require a strong 
police face, but Israel is amount that a strong 
police forceit must never become another Arab 
army deployed near its most strantigic centres . 
—- -. , . NEGOTIATIANS, 
DEADLOCK 
72. GELLMAN (Borton). Israelis. Pakistinians "slide 
towards crisis. "Guardian Weekli;. 155, 25 ; 1996, 
D e c . 2 2 ; 1 1 . 
Contrariness of the ideas of Netanyahu and Yasser 
Arafat about sovereignty of Israelis and Pakistinians 
is a diadlock to the negotiations. Netanyahu is 
determined to impose his will on several questions 
that the Pakistinians see as central to their future, 
most notobly the status of Jerusalem and the 
expension of Jewish' settlements in the West Bank. 
Yasser Arafat aims to demonstrat that the 
Palestinian, soverign or not, have ampte power to 
resist. If a tern to fonfrontation is coming, it has 
its roots in that basic difference of outlook. It is 
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not only that their negotiations are in a deadlock, 
or that the Netanyahu govt, shares no common view 
with Arafat on the ultimate peace thay seek. There 
is a little chance for Pakistinians in the Likud 
party 's scheme or othyer several other positions 
that Na tanyahu ' s government now defins as 
absolute: no compromise on East Jersuallem, no 
return of Palestinian refuges from the war that 
dislodged them and no independent Palestinian 
homeland. Palest inian intellectual told that they are 
study toward the crises, more than a crisis Israeli 
insistence tht sattlement is not negotiable is 
convincing Pal-estinians that this is something they 
can do absolentlyu nothing about peacefully. 
, -—, , ISRAEL, H E B R O N 
73 . ADONI (Lamis). Redefining Oslor: Negotiating the 
Hebron protocol . Journal of Palestine Studies. 26, 
3 ; 1997, Spr; 17-30. 
Tracing the course of the negotiat ions that 
cu lmina t ing the Hebron r e d e p l o y m e n t 
implimentation agreement . In perticular focuses the 
shift in the Israeli, approach to Oslo which appears 
to have crystalizewd during he "tunned uprising", 
and on the US role. The Hebron protocol and 
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accompaning American authord documents make 
Israel 's security and the "principle of receprocity' 
the primery terms of reference of the peace 
process , giving Israel near total control over the 
future of negotiations and final status. The article 
concludes by showing the erosion of Palestinian 
claims through the Oslo process . 
^ . , OSLO, EFFECT. WEST 
BANK, CLOSURE 
74. BARGHOUT (Mustafa). Postenphoria in Palestine. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 25 , 4; 1996, Seems, 
87 -96 . 
"Postenphoric". the phrase which seemsup the 
mood in Palestine following the Palestinian 
elections. Despite many reservations about the 
agreement reached between Israel and the PLO a 
significant part of Palestinian people believe the 
agreement between Israel and PLO to be unjust. 
There were still high expactations about the peace 
process . The euphoria had given way to a deep 
sense of frustration and discouragement, pessimison 
and even aatienation. The most important factor 
triggering the changed attitude was the closure 
imposed by Israel following four sucide attacks by 
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Hamas. The most important result of the acute 
closure phase was what it revealed about the nature 
of the e x i s t i n g a g r t e e m e n t s b e t w e e n the 
Pakistinians and Issraelis about the power of the 
Israel and the powerlessness of Pakist inians. The 
other reason for a now type of closure was to 
demonstrate to the Israeli puvblic that even with the 
Oslo was to demonstra te to the Israeli public that 
even with teh Oslo agreement Israeli remains 
completely in control of the West Bank. 
^ . , ECONOMY, WEST 
BANK ^nxl GAZA STRIP 
75. ROY (Sara). Palestinian economy after Oslo 
Current History. 97 , 615 ; 1998, Jan ; 19-25 . 
The foundation for a viable, self sustaining 
Palestinian economy have failed to emerge in the 
wake of Oslo peace acords. Economyic conditions 
in the Gaza strip and West Bank have deteriorate 
marked markedly leaving the Palestinian economy 
weaker now than it was during the intifada. When 
confrontationjs between Pakistinians and the Israeli 
army were daily occurances. Initial expactat ions of 
economic properi ty emerged from Oslo I and the 
economy protocol , or Paris agreement. Then two 
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documents alongwith the Oslo II which formally 
extended limited self rule to the West Bank, define 
a legal framework for Palestinian economic activity, 
especially economic relation with Israel. Certain 
e lement of this framework are worth noting: First, 
under the terms of agreements , labor, capital, 
manufacture, foodstaff and the services remain 
subject to Israeli authority. SECOND, Israel retains 
author i ty over all borders , which translates 
economically into control over the movement of 
labour and goods, the closure notwithstanding. 
THIRD, as the World Bank has pointed out, the 
agreements split up the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
into a number of largely seperate conomic units 
with little economic intrrelationships among them, 
breaking up an already small domestic market into 
small one. FOURTH, despite removal of certain 
restrictions emposed during initary occupation, the 
majority of restrictions many of them economic, 
remain inforce during the interein period and can 
not be modified or repeated by the governing 
Palestinian Authority. 
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, OSLO 11, FOREIGN AID 
76. BARGHOUTI (Mustafa). P a l e s t i n i a n s at the 
crossroads. Middle East International. 5 1 7 ; 1996. 
19; 16-17. 
Evaluating the Oslo second aggreement and the 
complexities and challanges facing by Palestinian 
society as it passes through a series of transitions. 
Transition is really a transition from occupation to 
autonomy or is this a transition from one 
occupation to another? Dependfency of Palestinian 
states is mostly on foreign aid and the control of 
World Bank is increased over Palestinian economny 
and society, which now extended from agriculture 
and industry to helth and education. Democracy is 
an irrevesible necessity and a precondit ion for the 
survival of the Palestinian nation. 
^ PLO-SRAEL, SEP 1993, 
ANALYSIS 
77. EL-DOUFANI (Mohamed M). Middle East I : The 
Israeli accord and Arab critique. World Todaij. 5 1 , 
1; 1995, Jan ; 15-8. 
The accord between PLO and Israel signed in 
September 1 9 9 3 . has brought reaction in the Arab 
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world and Israel which have tended to mirror the 
t ime honoured divisions in teh region. Arafates that 
the PLO Issraeli accord is an unlikely framwork. For 
a start it consists almost entirely unilateral 
concessions by the Palestinian side and thus is 
perceived by many Pakistinians as a humilating 
begining to the process of peace. Second it 
conta ins several potential pitfalls in the from of 
omissions and ambiquities and so its ultimate 
success will depend on the extent to which these 
are overcome. This process will take at the very 
minimum five year the deadline for reaching 
agreement on the final status of the occupied 
terr i tories. Third, its final goal as for as the PLO 
is concerned is the creation of a Palestinian mini-
s ta te on the West Bank and Gaza strip, but this 
should by no means be presume. 
POLITICAL, 
PROSSPECTS. 
78 . NELAN (Bruce W). Can they pase the test Tnne. 
142 , 37 ; 1993 . Sep. 13; 16-98. 
Word of the secret agreement between Israel and 
the PLO reached the sun-reared slums of the Gaza 
Str ip , hundreds of Pakistinians streamed out of the 
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timing shanti refregee comp. They hung their red, 
black, white and green national flag on an improntn 
stage and danced to the music of a small folk 
vbond. Israeli Palestinian deal is a first s tep toward 
a new political arrangement. It is a momentous 
begining, offering a glimpse of the chance to end 
45 yers of hatred and bloodshad in the Holy land 
but it is still only a start. That is enough toe fuel 
the hopes of the mainstream moderates in Israeli 
and Pakestinian society. Augry and frightream 
moderates in Israeli.and Palestinian society. Augry 
and frighteaed extremists on both sides have plenty 
of givs and are accustomed to using them. Even the 
majorities that embrace the agreement are histant 
and fearfult as they endter uncharted Water. This 
is the supremetest , for Israelis and pakistinians. 
, ^ REFUGEES, FINAL 
STATUS, LEBANON. 
79. BRYNEN (Rex). Imaging a solution : final status 
arguments and Palestinian refuges in Labanon. 
Journal of ^Pa\esJdn£_ Studies.. 26, 2; 1997 , wint; 
42-58. 
Possible final status arguments for the Paskistinian 
refuge sissue are explored, with emphasis on their 
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consequences for the Pakistinians in Labanon. It is 
suggsted that the right of raturn will be Hmited 
largely to the West Bank and Gaza, where it will 
be shapoed by local economic conditions. Available 
compansat ion funds may be indequate. Greater 
research and policy' planning are needed in these 
a r ea s . More over, because labour will continue to 
host a significant Palestine population for many 
years to come, both Palestinian Leba and legal 
s ta tus of the Pakistinians are importative. 
^ , .SELF-RULE 
80. GANI (HA). Palestine settlement: still, a long way 
to go. Redical Humanist. 58 , 1; 1994, April; 11-
12. 
The Israreli-PLO peace accord of September for 
limited self-rule in the Gaza steip and the West 
Bank town of Jericho as a first step to wider 
Palestinian autonomy was expected to herald a new 
era of peace and change the political landscape in 
West Asia. The Euphoria generated by peace accord 
was virtually reduced to naught at the implimenting 
s tage . This is because both the sides do not see 
eye to eye over major issue on security, including 
the size of the area around Jericho to be evaluated. 
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the border crossings between between Egypt, Gaza 
and Jordan and Jericho and the size of land the 
Israeli defence forces need for security installations 
around Jewish settlement in the Gaza str ip. It is 
clear that for Israel making peace with the 
Palestinians is not easy peace treaty and delay in 
implementing the Israeli-PLO peace accord is likely 
to have serious implications. Implimenting the 
agreement reached between Israel and PLO as soon 
as possible without wasting any time is the only way 
to stop the bloodshed and violence on both sides. 
. . . . . . . . .WASHINGTON 
8 1 . MURAY (Leo). Aspectsof Washington Israel-PLO 
Agreement. Contemporav Review. 2 6 3 , 1534; 
1993 . Nov; 229-32 . 
With the Washington Agreement, Israel, the PLO 
and the countries that supported have set up the 
field for a five year's hurdle race. At every hurdle 
that one of the rumers does not jump the race can 
end. It is generally recognised that there is strong 
opposition to the Washington Accord among some 
Palestinians of all sections of society and that it 
will not be easy for Arafat's staff to find the score 
of delegate and officials that are needed. Arafat has 
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repeatedly stated that the Washington Accord is the 
first step towards a Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as capital possibly a confederation with 
Jordan which would give the Palestinians a majority 
in the Kingdom. Arafat for his part has left no 
doubt that he feels entitled to regard the 
Washington Accord as the first step no only toward 
the founding of a Palestinian state but also towards 
the withdrawal of the Israelis from all the territories 
seized in 1967 war. And Arafat is now engaged in 
obtaining the approval and support of the various 
bodies of PLO and the same time Rabin has to face 
growing resentment and opposition with every 
murder of an Israeli by Islamic extremist. 
....... ...... ARAB-ISRAEL, ROLE, NAM 
82. BRINDRANATH (Dewan). What NAM must do for 
Palestinians. Democratic World. 14,39; 1985, 
Sep ,29 ;5-6 . 
A stronger and more assertive role by the Non-
aligned Movement in support of the Arab-Palestine 
cause has become a major imperative not only for 
the movement 's solidarity and survival, but also for 
ensuring peace and stability in West Asia. There 
has a need by the time to discuss a major move 
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by NAM in support of the Palest inian people, 
especialy in view of the fact that hopes of all other 
initiatives have totally failed. Describing the NAM 
role and the fate of various alternatives and options 
which had been tried during lastfew years by some 
well-meaning though unrealistic leaders of Arab 
opinion. Well-meaning though totally unrealistic 
efforts were made by moderate Arab diplomacy to 
present the Palestinian case before the American 
public opinion in the most acceptable of terms. 
......... BILATERAL TALKS, INTERIM, FINAL 
STATUS 
83. ELTAWEEL (Faleh). Peace process in the Middle 
East. Strategic Studies. 15. 3-4; 1 9 9 3 , Spr-Sum; 7-
13. 
The Middle East crjsis is a century old problem 
which has been festering that long and cannot 
possibly be expected to be solved within a short 
period. The Palestinian-Israeli bilateral talks aim at 
reaching first an agreement on an interim period 
in the occupied territories of 5 years . The first 
status of these occupied territories would be 
decided in final status negotiations to begin the 
third year after the interim agreement has come 
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into force. Israel cannot go anywhere with Jordan, 
Syria or Lebanonon, before the injustices done to 
the Palestinian are "undone, and before there is a 
clear cut commitment to withdrawal from all the 
occupied territories within a just, lastiing and 
comprehensive peace . There have been ten roundcs 
of talks since Madrid, October 1 9 9 1 . 
, . COLLAPSE, ISRAEL, JEWISH 
SETTLEMENTS 
84 . ROAD TO ruin. Middle East. 267 ; 1997, May; 6-
8-
The refusal of the Israelis to halt the sett lement 
construction at Har Homa (Jebal Abu Ghneim) has 
set the peace process on the road to ruin. 
Politically the situation could hardly be worse. 
Election of Binyamin Netanyahu marked a series of 
aggress ive m e a s u r e s and c l a shes b e t w e e n 
Palestinains and Israelis. By deciding to go ahead 
with construction work on a Jewish settlement in 
the Palestinian a rea 'of south-eastern Jerusalem, in 
an area called Har Homa the Israelis have rekindled 
the fire of war and hetred. Bus bombings, cafe 
killings, suicide bombs, indiscriminate murder could 
again become common place. It has been convinced 
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that Netanyahu doesn't want to implement Oslo. 
Arab leaders are warning of the imminent collapse 
of peace process. Ever increasing number of 
Palestinians feel Netanyahu's intransigence, which 
flies in the face of the peace accords , represents 
the final humilation. 
. . . . . . . , .....^ ROLE 
85 . WHITHER NETANYAHU? Middle East. 270 ; 1997, 
Sep; 10 -1 . 
The peace process may seem dead, but the 
possibility of the demise of Israeli Prime Minister 
Binyamin Ne tanyahu th rows up b r igh t e r 
prospects . After promoting a "government of 
e x c e l l e n c e " , Ne tanyahu has d e l i v e r e d an 
administration of incompetence. The economy is 
slipping towards recession, the peace process, has 
collapsed and internatiional relations are at their 
worst in years. The government has been bedevilled 
by infighting and incompetence, stained by the 
charge of corruption over appointments and riddled 
with the appearance of policy being made on the 
hoof, as Netanyahu turches from one crises to 
another. The situation may seem dire but it is the 
point that peace between Israel and the Palestinians 
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was never going to be straightforward such bitter 
enimity and such opposing claims would never*be 
easy to resolve-especially with fundamentalists on 
both sides agitating to destroy the whole peace 
process. 
^ ^ DEADLOCK, BOMB, EFFECT, 
EXPLOSION 
86 . MENON (Kesava). Politics of violence. Frontline. 
1997, Sep, 5; 51-4. 
Peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians 
deadlocked since March 1997 by a violent 
incidence. The target this time was' a crowded 
market in Israeli part of Jerusalem where two 
bombs were simultaneously exploded in July 3 0 . 
These explosions occurred in Maha Yahuda market. 
Accusations have been levelled against the Islamic 
Resistance Movement, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad 
and Hizbollah. Israeli officials were quick to 
conclude that these a t tacks were the handiwork of 
Hamas, specifically its armed wing. Israel insists 
the Arafat and his authority must break up the 
structure of militant organisations and hunt down 
their main activists. This basically means that Israel 
sees the solution to the difficulties only in military-
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administrative terms. Netanyahu has made much of 
the militant organisations have been seen moving 
about freely in the Palestine controlled territories. 
. . . . . . ^ -.. . . , EFFECT, POLICY, ISRAEL 
87. MASUMA HASAN. Middle East peace process. 
Strategic Studies. 15, 3-4; 1 9 9 3 , Spr-Sum; 20-5. 
The environment in which negotiat ions for peace 
have been conducted since October 1991 , can 
hardly be considered encouraging for the Arab 
s ta tes and the Palestinians. Israel has continued its 
policy of Jewish colonization and deploration of 
Pales t inians , violation of human .rights, and 
imposit ion a blockade in the occupied territories, 
thereby denying Palestinians employment and 
access to East Jerusalem. The peace process which 
started on the basis of 'land for peace' is 
deadlocked after ten rounds on the question of just 
how much land Israel should give up to secure 
peace , or the price that Israel is willing to pay for 
peace . It appears that Israel is willing to discuss 
everything except actually giving up the land or 
withdrawing from the occupied territories. 
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. . . . . , . . . - . , DEATHS AND DAMAGE, WEST BANK 
AND GAZA 
8 8 . HALLORAN (Julian). Blood on the path to peace: 
How 'Mr peace' became 'Mr Security'. World 
Today. 52, 11; 1996 , Nov; 272-74. 
Severe blow was suffered by Middle East peace 
process; a lots of deaths and damage in West Bank 
and Gaza, the vicious war of words between 
Palestinians and Binyamin Netanyahu's Israeli 
goverment is still being assessed. There is still a 
process. But whether it is a peace process, and 
whether it is the same as that started by Shimen 
Pares and Yitzhak Rabin remains to be seen. On 
Jerusalem the plan envisaged the Palestinians 
having their capital in Abu Dis, a village on the 
outskirts of East Jerusalem with access from there 
to the Al-Aqsa mosque. Israeli voters knew nothing 
of stockhome plan, and in the weeks after Rabin's 
murder peres, his government and the peace 
process enjoyed a huge opinion poll lead. Paris 
tried to put on his military battle dress and to play 
Mr. Security. Mr. Defence. People bought Pares as 
Mr. Security. And people would prefer to see Mr 
Pares as Peace. 
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, DEMOCRACY, WEST BANK and GAZA 
89. SHIKAKI (Khalil). P e a c e p r o c e s s , na t iona l 
reconstruct ion and the transit ion to democracy in 
Pales t ine . Journal of Palestine Studies. 25 , 2; 
1 9 9 6 , Wint; 5-20. 
Describing the three process and examining their 
interact ion with special focus on democratization 
and the impact of the first two processes on its 
peace , dynamic and prospects . The processes of 
transi t ion to democracy in the West Bank and Gaza 
faces severe challenges. The peace process will 
probably continue to affect itnegatively,particularly 
as popular frustration mounts when final status 
negot ia t ions are deadlocked. The resolution of the 
conflict between national and democratic agendas 
will depend on how decision makers order the 
hierarchy of their priorities. Will the security-
re l a t ed agenda , polit ical i n d e p e n d e n c e and 
economic well-being continue to take precedence 
over political participation, accountability and 
freedom of expression? Will the elected council play 
a prominent role in the Palestine politics? Of will 
it become subordinate to the executive authority? 
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. . - . . , , DEVELOPMENTS, ISLAM, ROLE 
90. SATLOFF (Robert). Islam in the Palestinian 
uprising. Orbis. 33 , 3; 1989, Sum; 3 8 9 - 4 0 1 . 
The p e a c e process d e p e n d s as much on 
intrapalest inian developments as on Palestinian 
att i tudes toward Israel. By anointing Arafat with the 
oil of U .S . recognition, Washington has gambled 
that if the latter problem is solved, the intra-
Palest inian question will answer itself. But with the 
emergence of fundamentalist Islam as a vital new 
force in Palestinian politics, this is by no means 
assured. The functionalists do not necessarily reject 
the policy of negotiating with Israel, but they 
accept it only if the goal is to negot ia te Israel out 
of exis tence . For nationalists, coordination with 
Islamic J ihad made tactical sense . It offered troops 
eager to take the better directly to Israel when 
armed struggle was losing its viability and even its 
2 
appeal . The U.S. government 's assumption that 
Arafat can and will deliver the Palestinians in the 
peace process must be seen as a very risky wager. 
, — - , EFFECTS 
9 1 . YORKE (Valerie). Middle East 's slow march towards 
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peace . World Today. 50, 5 ; 1994 , May; 8 6 - 9 1 . 
After decades of conflict, dramatic change is 
unfolding in the Middle East as a result of the 
Madrid peace process and the Oslo accord to which 
it gave birth. Even after Hebron and the revenge 
killing of Israelis by Palest inians, the international 
events which set former foes on the course of 
reconciliation in the case of the PLO and Israeli 
a course initiated by themselves - remain the same. 
Both leadership have an enormous stake in success 
and their peoples in the hoped-for benefits of 
peace . The Israel and Palestinian know they have 
no practical alternative and Arab leaders also know 
that their collective failure to see the process 
through and the disappointed expectations this 
would generate would play into the hands of the 
Islamic militants and anger a turbulent future. It 
may be tantatively suggest that while the peace 
process will be subject to major setbacks and 
delays, the agreement so far reached rule out a 
return to the status quo ante,and that the 
qualitative change in the percept ions of Israel and 
its Arab adversaries that had taken place virtually 
rules out resort to war involving the use of weapons 
of mass destruction. 
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— - , - — , , ALAQSA TUNNEL, UPRISING 
9 2 . ESSACK (Karrim). Palestine power the tunnel of 
contention. Frontline. 29, 17; 1996, Nov, 30; 8-
9. 
The two day uprising resulted in 60 deaths. It 
claimed the lives of 45 Palestinians and 15 Israelis 
who won and who lost can be seen by the reasons 
that: there is increased recrimination in the Israeli 
establishment. And the intelligence of the Israel 
admitted openly that it made a mistake in 
underestimating the anger of the Palestinians and 
their capacity to conduct an uprising. Also the 
Israeli leaders now pretended that they did not 
know about the 600 yard long tunnel under the Al-
Aqsa mosque in east Jerusalem that sparked the 
uprising. Such was the support for the Palestinians 
uprising that Netanyahu was forced to reverse his 
decision and declared that he was temporarily 
suspending its opening. The opening of tunnel was 
the last straw and the PNA declared as an act of 
war against the Palestinians and Arab people. The 
Palestinian military forces have now been put on 
the alert to defend area A sections which are seen 
as liberated Palestinian areas. 
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,—--, , ASSASSINATION, RABIN (Yatzhak) 
93 . ASSASSINATION OF Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
condemned. UN Chronicle. 3 3 , 1; 1996, Spr; 20-
1. 
The assessination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
of Israel is an outrageous act of terror which had 
struck one of the greatest leaders in Israel's history 
- was condemned in the strongest possible terms 
by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali Secretary-
General expressed that the post year had seen 
important progress in Middle East peace process. 
The Israeli-Palestinicin Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank and the Gaza strip, signed on 28 
September 1995, represented a significant step 
forward in the implementation of the September 
1993 declaration of principles. It provided a solid 
basis for the realization of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people, a goal that has long been 
sought by the United Nations. Those developments, 
together with the ongoing implementation of the 
Israeli-Jordan peace accord, would generate 
momentum for progress on the Israeli-Syrian and 
Israeli-Labanese tracks of the Middle East peace 
talks, leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting 
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solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
AVIEL (David). Dancing with demons: Can the 
agreement between Israel and PLO produce peace? 
Review of International Affairs. 47, 1049-50; 
1996, Oct 15-Nov, 15; 28-35. 
Events like the assassination of Prime Minister 
Rabin, the series of bomb blasts in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem and the election of a right wing prime 
minister in Israel raised some doubts as to the 
future of the peace agreement between Israel and 
PLO. In the agreement the partie is stated that they 
are reaffirming their determination . to live in 
peaceful coexis tence, mutual dignity and security; 
desire to achieve a just, lastiing and comprehensive 
peace and historic reconciliation and Israel will 
cede to the Palestinian six cities and 450 towns and 
villages. The agreement between Israel and PLO is 
a business contract between two suspicious and 
hostile part ies. It was reached not because the 
parties were eager to enter into agreement but 
because they had no other choice. The Palestinians, 
who for genera tons never missed an opportunity to 
miss an opportunity ran out of options. Having 
tried many wars, it was time to try peace. 
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9 5 . MORRIS (Benny). After Rabin. Journal of Palestine 
Studies . 2 5 . 2; 1996, Wint; 77 -87 . 
The Rabin 's assassination might have marginally 
contr ibuted to both a hastoning and deepening of 
the peace process. In the wake of the tragedy, the 
government seems to have more support for the 
p e a c e policy than Rabin ever enjoyed, and Shimon 
Pe res is certainly benefiting from a period of grace, 
relatively free of right-wing harassment and 
p r e s s u r e s . Desp i t e the comfor t ab l e post-
assass inat ion public a tmosphere , peres is unlikely 
to push forward with the peace process either the 
Pales t inians or Syria, with much greater urgency or 
with greater flexibility than did Rabin. Regarding 
the elections observers doubt that assassination will 
have much of an impact on the Ilsraeli political 
scene beyond perhaps tilting leftward a certain 
p ropor t ion of the 10 percent or so of Israeli voters 
who traditionally have floated between left and 
right. The voters' decision will be determined 
principally by whether or not they believe that 
withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and 
from the Golan Heights is in Israel's interest or a 
moral threat to Israel's existence. 
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, MURDERS 
96 . LEVITT (WK). Round of murder puts cooperation 
in question. World Today. 5 2 , 5; 1996, May; 
Yahya Ayyash is a circle in the chain of holy Jihad: 
his assassination i s ' a n i nd i ca t i on of the fragibity 
of the so-called peace. It was Ayyash's death 
following that of the Islamic Jihad leader Fathi 
Shqaqi , short murdered in Malta, which provoked 
the horific blood letting. Israel ruled as four bombs 
claimed sixty lives in eight days putting the peace 
process and the political lives of Shimon Peres and 
Yasser Arafat on the l ine. Ayyash's killing 
reinforced the sense of out rage . No one was in any 
doubt that this, like Shqaqi death, was an Israeli 
job. At the very moment when the two sets of 
Islamists had called a halt to acts of terror, is hard 
to explain. The moratorium had lasted for seven 
months and looked set to continue as Arafat 
gradually drew Hamas into the state building 
project . The Israeli provocat ion was reminscent of 
its expulsion of over four hundred Hamas and Jihad 
figures of southern Lebanon. Another peace 
breaking murder was of fatah supporter in town of 
Al-Bireh was done by Palestinian police officer. 
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.......... . .- . . , OCCUPATION, CONFLICT 
9 7 . RAI SINGH. Palestinian conflict and the peace 
process . India Quarterly. 4 9 , 3 ; 1993, Jul-Sep; 1-
16. 
Israel 's occupation of South Lebnon and the 
Palestinians believe that peace cannot be achieved 
without totalwithdrawal of Israeli forces and the 
recognition of the right of the Palestinians. Article 
specially discusses the Palestinian's stand of 
conflict and what impact occupation has on the 
conflict, as it had gone to be an all-out Arab-Zionist 
conflict over Palestine. Peace process to resolve the 
conflict of Palestine was initiated at Camp David 
in 1978 . Palestinian intifada could not achieve the 
desired results in the Israeli-occupied territories. 
The goal of the Palestinians in peace talks is 
Israel 's complete withdrawal from all territories 
occupied since 1967 and the setting up of the Arab 
state of Palestine proclaimed in 1988 in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the East Jerusalem 
as its capital. Israel does not acknowledge that it 
is an occupying power in territories it captured in 
1 9 6 7 . The USA considers these territories 
occupied,but it refrains from translating its 
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judgement into policy. UN may treat the Palestine 
issue as its ward pending a comprehensive peace 
se t t lement . The UN trusteeship may be reviewed to 
push the peace process to fruition. 
^...._, , POLICY, ISRAEL 
98 . SHIKAKI (Khalil). Future of the peace process and 
Palest inian strategies. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
26 , 1; 1996 , Aut; 82-8. 
Israel 's future peace policy may be effected by the 
also p r o c e s s , the nature of the coalition 
government and the expected reactions of major 
local and international actors. Impact 'of coalition 
g o v e r n m e n t on N e t a n y a h u ' s peace policy. 
Ne tanyahu ' s constraints and likely directions. 
Feelings of the new Prime Minister about the failure 
of previous government and plan for future 
tendency by new government Israel's policy 
regarding final status issues will force the 
Palest inian leadership to choose between two 
s t ra tegies . 
.....^ ^ FINAL AGREEMENT, PLO, ROLE 
99. ROBINSON (Glenn E). Growing authoritarianism of the 
Arafat regime. Survival. 39, 2; 1997, Sum; 42-56. 
Forgoing a final agreement would be a politically 
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safer route for the PLO to take than to terms that 
are widely and deeply rejected by the Palestinian 
population. Such a possibility is now the subject of 
speculatation by those who see the final interim 
arrangements as being coterminous with the final 
arrangements. The arrangements need not be 
formally recognised by the two parties, as they 
would be enforced by Israeli power. If the PLO does 
fail to reach even its minimal aims in final status 
negotiations, its current authoritarianism will almost 
certainly endure well into the future. Such a result 
will not likely be conducive to a long-term, stable 
and just peace. The also process • remains an 
insufficient short-term fix to long term problems. 
, — - , IMPLICATIONS 
100 . GOWDA (K Nagappa). Peace in West Asia. Frontier. 
26, 9; 1993, Oct, 19; 7-9. 
The debacle and liquidation of inappeasable, 
inexorable and knotty emulation of better passing 
between Israel and PLO, posed a new era of peace 
in West Asia. The peace momentum generated by 
the Israeli PLO accord, as it has been said may lead 
to settlement of other West Asian problems for the 
division of Palestine and creaton of a Jewish state 
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and an Arab state in kind of Indo-Pakistan 
Par t i t ion. However, this outstanding development 
indicated not only a new milestone of peace and 
stability in West Asia but also a major point in the 
in ternat ional field long after the melting of USSR. 
-—,-—, INFLUENCE, HAMAS 
1 0 1 . Shikaki (Khalil). Politics of Paralysis II : Peace now 
or Hawas later. ForeiQn Affairs. 7 7 , 4; 1998, Julyr-
August; 2 9 - 4 3 . 
The factors of which is the success of Fatah is 
based are : leadership of Arafat and lack of 
i n i t i a t i v e by Is lamist oppos i t ion . . Pe r sona l 
influenceces of Arafat and political willes have let 
him dominate and change Palestinian politics in a 
way not other figure could. But Arafat will not live 
forever. If the peace process flags, Arafat falls and 
Hamas rises, the nationalist centre could indeed 
lose its hold on power to islamists. The third force, 
the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic Jabad focus on 
personal behaviour, embrace the value of political 
Islam and seek to establish an Islamic state, hamas 
and the leftist, s inability to come to terms with 
the growing legitimacy of the PA the direct result 
of the peace process which they rejected made it 
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extremely difficult for the opposition to define a 
role for itself in the new Palestinian politics. The 
t r ad i t iona l i sm that l imits the appeal of the 
Democretic front for the librartion of Palestive 
(DELP) and Popular Front for the Libration of 
Pa les t ine (PELP) provides a strong basis for 
expanding Hamas, influence. 
........ INTERNATIONAL AID, WEST BANK AND 
GAZA 
102. Brynen (Rex). Buying peace P.A. critical assessment 
of international aid to the West Bank and Gaza. 
Journal of Palestive Studies. 25, 3; 1996, Spr; 
7 9 - 9 2 . 
International assistance to Gaza and West Bank 
seen by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and external 
donars as an essential component of the peace 
process . With some $2 .5 billion pledged for the 
period 1994-98, it also represents one of the most 
substantial example of place building through aid 
"in post cold war era. The criticism on the slowners 
of the Palestinian assistance programm. Pakstinian 
challenges and the performance fo the Palestinian 
Authority. Israili policy its profound effects on the 
current process of development assistance. The 
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Pales t in ian case underscores the development 
assistence as only part of an overall peace building 
process . 
-—,-—, ISSUES, AGREEMENTS 
103 . ISRAEL JORDON place treaty welcomed; Progress 
in other areas hoped for U.N. Chronicle. 32, 1; 
1 9 9 5 , March; 35 . 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali on 26 October, 
1 9 9 5 congratulated king Hussein of Jordan and 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Isreal on the 
signing earlier that day of the peace treaty between 
t h e i r count r ies ending y e a r s of a s ta te of 
belligerence. Boutros Ghali hoped that the historic 
event would be followed by full implimentation of 
the Israeli Palestinian Declaration of principles, and 
by new progress in the Israili Labauer and Israili 
Syrian negotiations, leading to a comprehensive, 
just and lasting peace in Middle East. The 
agreement on the difficult issues of water sharing 
and borders represented mother milestone in the 
middle East peace process. 
-—,-—, LAND CLAIMS, ARAB-ISRAEL 
104. FISCHBACH (Michael R). Setting historical land 
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claims in the wake of Arab-Irraeti peace . Journal 
of Palestine Studies. 27, 1; 1997 , Aut; 38-50 . 
The Arab-Israeli peace process created frame works 
in which Arabs and Israelis could seek resotution 
of long-standing land claims engendered by the 
1998 war. Decades of hostility and diplomatic 
nonrecogni t ion preventol s ta tes and individual 
landowners alike froVn claiming llandowned prior to 
1948 that later by across hostik borders and cease 
fire t imes. The 1994 Jordanian Israeli peace treaty 
and the various Israeli PLO agreements have 
afforded Palestinians, Jordanians and Israelis the 
opportunity to resolve or at least discuss such 
issues. Israli Syrian talks may allow a discussion of 
similar bilateral claims. 
— , — , NEGOIATIONS, BILETERAL, MULTILETERAL, 
FACTORS 
105. BHATTY (Moqbool Ahmad). Outlook for the Middle 
East peace process Strategic Studies. 15, 3-4; 1993 
Spr-Sum; 14-19. 
The Middle East peace process centres on one of 
oldest d i spu tes confronting the i n t e rna t iona l 
community, since the Second World War, the over 
Palestine. For almost half of century, this problem 
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has been a source of tension and violence and the 
region has witnessed four major conflicts in 1948, 
1956, 1967 and 1973 . The one power that has 
ensured the security and servivai of Israel is the US. 
With delente between the Soviet Union under 
President Gorbachev and the US under President 
Regan making strides in the late 80 ' s the PLO 
signified its readiness to recognise Israel, and to 
negotiate with it on the basis of UN reso lu t ions . 
However the Likud govt, under Yitzhak Shamir 
refused to talk to PLO, which it characterized as 
a terrorist organisazion and proceeded to supress 
the non -v io l en t "intifada" l aunched by the 
Palestinian population of the occupied territories to 
highlight their outrage against the denial of 
fundamenta l r i g h t s , as well as a g a i n s t the 
countinuing inroads into their area through new 
Jewish sett lements, that had appropriated 60% of 
Arab lands. With the bilateral negotiations, there 
have been multilateral talks under the aegis of the 
peae conference, on such issues as arms control, 
economic development, refugees, water resources 
and the environment. But in the absence of real 
progress in the bilateral talks, the working groups 
have not achieved any significant results. At least 
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author also evaluate the negetive and positive 
factors of t he peace p rocess . And also the 
Pakistan 's posi t ion about the peace process . 
-—,-—, ISRAEL, GOVERNMENT, NETANYAHU, 
ROLE 
106. KUMARASWAMY (PR). Benjamin Netanyahu, s 
policy s ta tement : An assesment. Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 2 0 , 2: 1997, 
Wint; 1-23. 
When Yitzhak Rabin presented his government to 
the knesset in July 1992 and declard his land for 
peace formula not many dreamed that he would 
negotiate with the PLO, let alone make peace with 
it. His first handshake with Arafat was anything but 
normal and friendly. Yet he was quick to come to 
terms with ground realities. Likwise it is possible 
that Binyamin Netanyahu would mellow down, learn 
the art of governing, dilute his guidelines, disprove 
his critics and surprise the septic. Given the 
composit ion of his coalition, the signs was not 
encouraging. His election compaign was packed 
with allegations of labour appeasement towards the 
Arab and Palest inians. He had to be cajold into 
recognizing Yassar Arafat as his neighbor and 
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negot ia t ing partner, Netanyahu appears to be 
seeking excuses to highlight lack of Palestinian 
commitment and adherence to the peace process. 
107. MENON (Kesava). N e t a n y a h u under p ressure 
Frontline. 1998, Feb, 6; 59 -60 . 
The future of the negotiations between Israel and 
the Palestinians hinges on the fate of the Benjamin 
Netanyahu Government. There is a good chance 
that Clintons luck will come into play again and 
rescue one of the most important projects on his 
a g e n d a negot ia t ions b e t w e e n Israel and the 
Palestinian people. This might become possible if 
the tutering govt, of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel 
falls in the next few monthy. Levey has fourod him 
increasingly at odds with Netanyahu is the approach 
to the negotiations with the Palestinian an peoples. 
Netanyahu has cleverly presented himself as a 
different person to different poeple. A construction 
boom in the Jewish settlement in west Bank is just 
one method by which Netanyahu is undermining the 
basis of negotiations. The other part of his agenda 
has been to frustrate the efforts to implement 
specific agreements. These agreements envisage the 
withdrawal of Israli troops from West Bank areas 
in three stages, thereby handing over these parcels 
218 
of land to the Palestinians for their control 
Netanyahu's methodology has become evident in 
the cause of t h e u n e n d i n g w a r a n g l e over 
redplayment. 
, —--, ISSUE 
108. WIZARAT TALAT (A). Middle East peace process-
issues and negotiat ion startegies. Strategic Studies. 
15, 3-5; 1 9 9 3 , Spr-Sum; 31-7 . 
The United States sponsored Middle East peace 
process began in Madrid raised much expactat ion. 
Although many at tempts had been made to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict before the initiation of this 
step, they did not lead anywhere. The major issues 
of peace process which are considered essential by 
different par t ies , which are vary from nation to 
nation and what is considered crucial by one party 
does not even figure on the list of priorities of the 
other. To the palestanians the main issue of con-
cern is the mechanism for transfer of power to the 
Palestinians in areas now under Israeli occupation. 
Israeli set t leement to the Palestianians in areas now 
under Issraeli ocupation. Israeli sett lements have 
created many problems for the Palestinians. On the 
Israeli agenda the issue of Palestinian state hood 
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does not even figure. The Israeli 's have offered only 
limited antonomy to the Palestinians. Constraints 
reduce options thereby influencing the choice of 
s t rategy. The biggest constraint for Palestinians is 
the time factor. Israel has not taken any initiatives 
which would contribute towards a lasting peace. 
, , - — , - — , SEWAGE, JERUSALEM. 
109. POLLARD (Ann) and DUH^id (Mick). PoUtics of 
Jerusa lem's sewage. Muslim and Arab Perspective. 
1, 7-9; 1994, Apr-June; 4 3 0 - 3 2 . 
Sewage bcomes a particularly sensitive political 
issue when one takes into accounts, Palestinian 
claims to those very parts of the city from where 
the sewage is emanating. The Israeli govt, is in fact 
caught upon the horns of a dilemma: to concede 
any form of Palestinian participation in the manner 
of Jerusalem's sewage disposal would impinge upon 
the complete sovereignty over Jerusalem the Israeli 
s ta te so assiduously pursues. It will be difficult for 
Israeli state to both make use of these parts, of 
the West Bank as a ^aint toilet for the eastern side 
of Jerusalem and at the same time dely any 
Palestinian interest in the matter. It is unlikely that 
Palestinian and Israeli peace negotiation will devote 
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much time to this question at this stage, but as 
negotiation's proceed one can expect the a t tempt 
to seperate Jerusalem from the West Bank may 
prove, at the very least on a functional level, more 
difficult than the rhetoric leads to believe. 
.....^ . . , - , MEETING, LONDON 
110. WAR (Luck) and SHARROCK (David). Middle East 
talks switch to London. Gardian Weekly. 158 , 7; 
1998 , April, 2 6 ; 1 . 
Tony Blair haid^d a breakthrough in the Middle 
East peace process when American invitation to a 
meeting in London were accepted by. Mr. Yasser 
Arafat and Isral i Prime Minister B inyamin 
Netanyahu. However, Polestinians and Israelis have 
serious reservations about what can be achieved at 
the London meeting. Mr. Blair has been keen to 
stress that his initiative should not cut across 
proposals put forward by US to restart the peace 
process and acceUrate moves towards a final 
settelment. The talks have been stalled for a year 
over. Israeli plans to build Jawish sett lement on 
occupied land and by Islamic suicide boirvbing. The 
Israelis have balked at the US plan for a theirteen 
persent withdraw from the West Bank and a freeze 
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on settlement construction and Palestinian insist 
that, contrary to Israeli claim they are doing all 
they can to combat Islamic militants. Mr. Blair held 
a final round of discussion with Mr. Netanyahu. His 
these days of Middle East apprently garlanded with 
success. 
-, POST OSL.O, 
1 1 1 . STORM BEFORE clam? Middle East. 2 7 1 ; 1997, 
Oct; 9-10. 
After the initial euphoria that a genuine Israli-
Palestinian peace process was in the making, the 
optimism had turned to despair. Negotiations that 
once promised so much had ground to a halt in a 
mire of mutual recrimination A real conciliation 
between the two sides was as far away as ever. The 
situation seemed hopless. There have been pitfalls 
along the way, and the entire peace process was 
dealt a severe blow by the ascendency of firstly 
Hamas and then election of Netanyahu and his right 
wing govt, in Israel. That has been proven to be 
a stumbling block rather than a final curtain for the 
peace process . After all, there has been no at tempt 
to reverse the withdrawals that had already taken 
place. The sucide bomb attack In Jerusalem market 
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have the perverse effect of helping to revive the 
moribund Israeli Palestinian peace process. There 
are much haggling r ema ins but the ten ta t ive 
proposol put together by Arafat 's deputy Abu-
Mazen and Israeli politician Yossi Beilin last year, 
together with the separa te but similar proposit ion 
that Beilin and a leading likud member draw up, 
shows that the two sides are not so far apart . This 
could be the storm before the clam. 
, - — , - — . —-,REDEPLOYMENT. 
112 . USHER (Graham). Arafat 's twists and turns. Middle 
Easjijnternational. 5 8 0 ; 1998 , July; 4-5 . 
Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met for their 
official talks in an effort to revive the dormant Oslo 
process. After three days of direct talks, Yasser 
Arafat unceremoniously called them off. The talks 
have reached deadlock because of Israel's refusal 
to accept the US initiative, based on a further 13 .1 
percent redeployment form the West Bank. Pales-
tinian negotiators were even more seathing, charg-
ing that Israel had not in fact addressed the US 
initiative. Even by the several standards of the Oslo 
negotiations, Arafat's twists and turns over the 
direct talks appear unfathomable to most observers. 
223 
The Palestinian leader is currently under red pres-
sure from the PA cabinet and his own Fatah 
movement to suspend negotiations untill and unless 
Israel agrees to the US initiative. In agreeing to 
hold direct talks, Arafat has already signalled that 
his bottom line is not a 13.1 percent redeployment 
buy a deal within the parameters of the US pro-
posals. 
— - , , NETANYAHU, DOMESTIC COM-
PULSIONS. 
113 . MAHAPATRA (Aswini K). Turning point in the West 
Asia peace process: Time for Israel to choose. 
Third World Impact. 8. 90; 1997. June; 7-8. 
The crisis that the Israeli-Palestinian peace is 
facing has its roots in the basic difference of 
outlook. For his part. Mr. Arafat has been consis-
tent in his declared goal of a Palestinian state with 
part of Jerusalem as its capital. Where as the Israeli 
Prime Minister believes in peace with security. It 
is the kind of peace that would fulfill Netanyahu's 
election campaign jingle peace for peace a slogan 
minted solely to counter the land for peace formula 
which is the cornerstone of the peace process. 
Peace-Netanyahyu-style offers a Bantustan solution. 
224 
In this the Palest inian Authority will have maximum 
authority will into stop the enlargement of Israeli 
set t lements , But it will keep Jerusalem irrevocable 
off limits. Doubtless such a solution will crate 
binational s ta te . The dilemma confronting the Prime 
Minister is whether to nurture Israel's partnership 
with the Palest inians or watch the Oslo process die. 
Leaning exclusively on his hard line constituencies, 
the embattled Israeli leader my shore up his crum-
bling domestic standing. But, in the peace process 
he will not merely destroy the historic experiment 
in compromise between the Israeli Palestinians 
national drams, al^o establish a warrior-priestly 
state that will remain hostage to the dictates of the 
Jewish Aytollah. 
, , OSLO, effect of ISRAEL, ELECTIONS 
114. DAJANI (Burhan). Alternative to Oslo? Jornal of 
Palestine Studies. 25 , 4; 1996, Sum; 5-19. 
Likuds stunning victory at the Israeli polls, it makes 
particular sense to reexamine the peace process 
that began at Madrid, reviewing where it appeared 
to be heading, its current aspects, and where the 
Palestinian should go from here. Crucial to Israel's 
success in the interim stage was the Palestinian 
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failure to insist upon a prior agenda for negotia-
tions, thus allowing Israel alone to determine their 
nature scope, direction and content. It was the 
agenda issue that set the Oslo negotiators apart 
from the Palestinian delegation in the Washington 
negotiations, which had snagged precisely because 
of the delegation 's insistence on an agenda. This 
essay address what might be the alternatives it, as 
seems likely, the peace process grinds to a halt. 
, —, , OPPOSITION, role of RIGHT. 
1 1 5 . LUSTICK (Ian S). Oslo agreement as an obstacle 
to peace. Journal of Palestine Studies. 27, 1; 
1997, Aut; 61-6 . 
The most sophisticated American and Israeli Jewish 
opponents of the Oslo peace process pay lip service 
to the agreement which ignoring its political con-
tent and insisting that it be understood as a legal 
document and as a basis for pushing Israeli pre-
rogatives and punishing Palestinian violations. 
Substituting adversarial legal standards for the 
modus operandi of a political partnership is thus 
a calculated also process and ensuring its demise. 
Right-wing opponen ts of Oslo in Israel and in the 
American Jewish community have implemented this 
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strategy doggedly, with enormous sophistication, 
and with substantial success. 
, —, , ROLE, US 
BLACK (Ian) and Sharrock (David). US acts to 
salvage Middle East peace. Guardian Weekly. 157, 
26; 1997, Dec, 28 ;4 . 
It is time now to meet separately to the President 
Clinton for Arafat and Netanyahu and this is a sign 
of seriousness of the discussions that are taking 
place. After nine months of deadlock in the Oslo 
talks, the US can do little but try to keep the show 
on the road. The plan for separate- encounters 
underlines the extent to which plan for separate 
encounters underl ines the extent to which relations 
have deter iorated since Mr. Arafat's historic self 
role deal with Mr. Netanyahu's murdered predeces-
sor Yitzhak Rabin in 1993 . Accelerated Israeli 
settlement activities and attacks by Palestinian 
suicide bombers haVe brought deadlock over the 
next stage of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank 
which is a vial if talks are to begin on a final peace 
deal. Netanyahu said that any withdrawal from the 
West Bank would take place only after a five month 
testing period, his govt, will proceed only if the 
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Palestinians provide that they were seriously crack-
ing down on militants. Secretary General of Pales-
tinian cabinet said that no one has veto power over 
the Palestinian, not the US and not Israel. 
.....^ . . . . . , . . , . . , SELE^ RULE, WEST BANK, GAZA, 
1993 . 
1 1 7 . SAJAD IBRAHIM (KM) Palestinian self rule: from 
pillar to post. Radical Humanist. , ; 1995, Maris; 
32-3 . 
As the Palestinian self-role in the Gaza strip and 
the West Bank town of Jericho is steadily advancing 
there has been no improvement in the. PLO Israeli 
relations since the Oslo agreement of September 
1993 . Arafat's fledgling self-rule also faces stiff 
resistance from the militant groups of Palestinians 
including the Names and Islamic Jehad. Moreover, 
the occasional outbreak of violence and a series of 
other issues are rightly considered as major impedi-
ments to Arafat since they all tended to prolong 
elections in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Israel is not yet ready to concede the Palestinian 
sovereignty mainly on account of the Prevailing 
security situation. Expiry of the time schedule for 
elections to the Palestinian council has come as a 
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d i sappo in tmen t to many P a l e s t i n i a n s . I s rae l ' s 
hyperconcern for the security a r rangements in the 
Palestinian areas is considered as one of the major 
causes for the present s ta tement . For this, the 
Palestinian self-rule authority has to prove its 
credibility as well as its ability to control and 
contain the militant Palestinian groups . In such a 
situation there would be no other options before 
Israel but to negoti.ate for further Palestinian de-
mands including the elections in the entire West 
Bank and Gaza strip. 
^ , ,STATUS, JERUSALEM. 
118. MASALHA (Nur). Who rules Jerusalem? Index on 
censorship. 24, 5; 1995; 1 6 3 - 1 6 6 . 
Jerusalem is the key to peace between Palestinians 
and Israelis. Without a solution of its disputed 
ownership, there a^ n be no durable Arab-Israeli 
peace. Palestinians and Israelis claims on Jerusalem 
are anything but: while the Palestine libration 
organisation (PLO) claim jurisdiction over only Arab 
Jerusalem, Israel's Labour govt, has maintained a 
rigid, crossparty consensus on exclusive Israeli 
Political control and sovereignty over the whole 
city. Statement of Yitzhak Rabin that , the city will 
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remain united under Israeli control for eternity and 
Je rusa lem will not be open to negotiation, fly in 
the face of his government ' s commitment to the 
Oslo Accord of September, 1 9 9 3 that agree to the 
s tar ts of talks over the final and permanent status 
of Jerusalem in 1996 and numerous UN resolutions 
passed since 1967 that conform the legal status 
of East Jerusalem as an occupied territory. The 
s ta tus of Jerusalem as conceived under interna-
t ional law and UN resolutions is central to this final 
and permanent status. 
^ ^ PLO-ISRAEL, CO-OPERATION. 
119. SALTER (Leonard M). Bringing Israeli 's and Pales-
t inians together. Midsteream. 4 4 , 4; 1998, May-
J u n e ; 3-5 . 
A preliminary scenario for an Israeli PLO peace 
was outlined at also, the project was pursued with 
very little ardor on either side. The PLO demanded 
more land in carving up of the present Israel; the 
Israel demanded more security from the Hamas 
Hezbollah fanatics. 'The Oslo Accord, if not col-
lapsed, is limping. When Prime Minister Netanyahu 
met with President Clinton to offer to give the PLO 
ten percent of the land under Israeli control in 
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1967, the offer was reflected. The article describ-
ing he efforts of intellectuals about how to get 
along with your neighbor"? It is the dream of a 
university of Middle East where Arabs and Israelis 
can study side by side, discussing their region's 
problems free from acrimony, appears to be ad-
vancing towards reajity. Article drawn a brief out-
line of how collaboration on the solution of a 
complex local problems can bring neighbors to-
gether. If Israelis and Palestinians will focus on the 
three areas education regional development, and 
high tech industries all to be developed simulta-
neously in the Middle East, the ear 'of hate and 
bit terness will disappear. 
, ,POLICY, FRANCE, MITTERRAND, 
ROLE 
120. WOOD (Pia Christina). France and the Israeli Pal-
estinian conflict; The Mitterand policies, 1981-
1992. Middle East Journal. 47 , 1; 1 9 9 3 , Wint; 21 -
40 . 
Mitterand's strong support for Arafat and the 
moderate faction of- the PLO is the most likely 
constant. Throughout the 1991-92 which it believes 
eventually must be .allowed to participate directly 
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in the peace process. For example, Palestinian 
leader Faisal-al-Husscini had met with Roland 
Dumas, and Ahmad Kurei, director of the PLO's 
economic depa r tmen t , held talks with serge 
Boidevaix, the secretary general of the Quai 
d 'Orsay. Political support; in 1992, Pari 's allocated 
13 million Frances for technical and cultural coop-
eration with the occupied territories. The French 
govt support for chairman Arafat remains a key 
elegant in its approach to the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict. His brush with death in the Libyan desert 
in April 1991 , however and the infighting between 
Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 1992 raise 
concerns that France's relations with the Palestin-
ians might be too narrowly dependent on Arafat and 
the Fatah organisation. 
, , .ISRAEL, AGREEMENT, 1993, 
ANALYSIS 
121 . IRSHAD PERWEZ. Prospects for peach in West 
Asia: The regional approach. Journal of West 
Asian Studies. 9; 1993; 1 2 2 - 3 1 . 
Analysing the various factors which have exercised 
pressures on both the parties in conflicts: Israelis 
and Palestinians to seek the negotiated settlement 
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of their d isputes , and the prospects of the on going 
lace process in West Asian briefly discusses the 
approach adopted by the two major political parties 
of Israel, namely Likud and Labour, and how these 
part ies see the conflict over Israel and Palestine. 
The prospec t s of the success of the September 
1993 peace agreement are not high. Despite the 
fact that various factors have been operative in 
bringing together the leadership of Israel and PLO 
to negot ia te peace, this agreement may in all 
likelihood meet the same fate as other earlier 
a t tempts at peace making had failed are not 
covered. 
, , r , , JEWISH 
SETTLEMENT,US, CRITICISM. 
122. SCHEWEID (Brry). US criticises Israel over settle-
ments Guardian Weekly. 155 ,25 ; 1 9 9 6 , Dec, 22; 
3 . 
Breaking a long silence, President Bill Clinton 
publicly chided Israel for its policies on Jewish 
set t lements on the West Bank, calling them an 
ostacle to Middle East peace making. The Israeli 
cabinet decided to channel millions of extra 
dollars to the settlement, which will entitle settlers 
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to generous tax concession and govt, grants, could 
encourage Israelis to move to the occupied terri-
tories. Govt, officials hope the incentives will swell 
the number of settlers to more than 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 by 
the end of the century. Mr Cl inton 's criticism was 
p r o m p t e d to Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin 
Netanyahu, warning that his support for the settlers 
could have tragic results. The Clinton administra-
tion had s topped a long standing policy of referring 
to the set t lements authorized by Labour and Likud 
governments as an obstacle to peace . Thanking the 
Israeli Palestinian dispute as full of tension and 
frustration. Mr. Clinton has made his concern to 
Israelis that he does not think anything should be 
done which would be seen as pre empting the 
outcome of something they have already agreed 
should be part of the final negot ia t ions. 
, ^ . ^ NEGOTIATIONS, OSLO, 
POST OSLO. 
123. ARAS (Bulent). Palestinian Israeli peace process 
since Oslo: reality or dream? Strategic analysis. 
1996, Nov; 1155-75. 
Peace has been an elusive butterfly in the question 
of Pales t ine . There were hundreds of meetings, 
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negotiat ions, and discussions since the emergence 
of the quest ions . The tensions between IsraeHs and 
the Palest inians have led to terrorism on both sides. 
Human rights issues pertaining to both ethnic 
groups became an international topic. There were 
many countr ies involved in the effort to assist with 
the peace p rocess . At last, at the end of 1993 , with 
declaration of Principles (DOP) the light at the end 
of the tunnel become apparent . The ongoing peace 
process shows that the future of the process will 
depend on the future of the new state in Palestine. 
Thus, as a conclusion, it may be more appropriate 
to take the future' of the palestin6 state into 
consideration. 
I T C 
ROLE. 
124. ARURI (Naseer). Oslo's muddled peace . Current 
History. 9 7 , 6 1 5 ; 1998,Jan; 7-12. 
Each suspension of the talks had lead to a resump-
tion, which in turn has produced a new and more 
complex agreement. ' The net result has been a 
multiplication of the problem arising from the 
influx of new agreement and the inevitable emer-
gence of new conflicts over interpretat ions. The 
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real catalyst that has tend the ongoing secret 
affair in Oslo involving the few teated aids of 
Rabin and Arafat, was the crucial decision by 
Clinton administration to break the impasse with 
so-called bridging measures. A proposed declara-
tion of Principles was announced by secretary of 
s ta te . Three elements in that declaration were 
crucial: first, the implication that the West Bank 
and Gaza are* "disputed rather than occupied ter-
ritory, thus implying that Israel has an equal right 
to lay claims on land, second, the conspicuous 
absence of any reference to the exchange of land 
for peace, and third, the requirement that the 
Palestinians Agree, beforehand, that all matters 
relating to sovereignty are outside the scope of the 
negotiations for the interim phase. This manifest 
public departure in US policy was the real context 
for the PLO Israli agreement at Oslo. Moreover, 
after the Oslo agreement was concluded, disagree-
ments over its meaning and implications began to 
surface. 
, , y S , BUSH. 
125. MILLER(Linda B). US and the Middle East: Years 
of living contiously World Today. 4 6 , 1 ; 1990, Jan; 
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4-5. 
The Bush administration has wanted to have the 
best of all possible worlds. The dialogue with the 
PLO inherited from President Reagan's last minutes 
acceptance of Yasser Arafat 's rhetorical disovowal 
of terrorism and acknowledgment of Israel 's right 
to exist, signalled that the US sought a policy of 
inclusion of all local parties and would maintain 
its bilateral relat ionship with Israel on something 
other than an Anti Soviet or anti Iran foundation. 
By obtaining Egypt 's assistance in bringing the 
Palestinians and Israeli's together. Mr Baker has 
tried to keep the election idea alive without really 
coming into grips with its inherent difficulties, 
specially the role of East Jerusalemites living out-
side the terr i tor ies . The pause that year of living 
cautiously has engendered could be used construc-
tively , if the Arab states and the PLO admit, at 
least to themselves, that the Intifada will not 
produce Israeli withdrawal, and if Israeli political 
leaders admit that the corrupting effects of the 
occupation threa ten both Israel's Jewish and demo-
cratic character . 
126. SHAMIR HASAN (S) Peace in West Asia: Prelude 
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and postscript Journal of West Asian Studies. 9; 
1 9 9 3 ; 98-106 . 
Evaluating the peace efforts in West Asia and 
discussing the prelude and postcript of these ef-
forts. In West Asia, .the pursuit of peace has often 
proved a frustrating exercise in futility. This has 
been more so in the enduring Arab Israeli conflict 
which has defied resolution from most of the 
century. Consequences of Gulf war proved a pre-
lude to new peace efforts. After the libration of 
Kuwait a concerted international effort was the 
incumbent need to uphold with equal zeal those UN 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict, 
and to seek a comprehensive settlement of this 
problem. Tthe Bush administration deserved credit 
for using its diplomatic leverage to initiate the 
peace process and to create for the first time, at 
least the illusion that the United States was even 
handed in the Israeli Palestinian setting. It still 
remains ambiguous whether the peace process 
under, the auspices of George Bush-James Baker 
framework was genuinely ever aimed to do more 
than de-escalate the conflict on a state to state 
level. It can be assumed that a bargain which does 
not provide sovereignty to the Palestinian people 
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would not hold. The Diplomacy of Washington has 
not gone for enough in the direction of associating 
Palestinian Israeli "peace" with self determinat ion 
for Palestinian people. 
^ , , .effect on NATION-
ALITIES, CAPTIVE 
127. FALK (Richard). Can US Policy toward the Middle 
East change course? Middle East Journa l . 4 7 , 1 ; 
1993 , Wint; 11-20. 
There are some of the serious land mines implicit 
in the current US political consensus that is dedi-
cated to a low visibility foreign policy.. These land 
mines are present on the terrain of US foreign 
policy toward the Middle East and may actually 
explode in the aftermath of diplomatic successes, 
such as a peace process that somehow miracu-
lously Produces a Palestinian solution. Should self 
determination be achieved by the Palest inians why 
not by the Kurds? why not an behalf of other 
captive nations in the regions? One of legacies of 
the colonial period is a series of artificial states 
in the region that encompass large ethnic minori-
ties that increasingly conceive of themselves as 
compative nat ions. Ironically were to emerge it 
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would be one of the few s ta tes in the region with 
a relatively homogenous ethnic national identity 
tha t could provide a foundation for a democratic 
future. A democratic model of this sort of Pales-
tinian entity would be extremely threatening to the 
autocrat ic regimes in the Gulf, which accounts for 
some of their ambivalence over the fears toward 
the Palestinian movement. 
,-- --, , --,REAGAN 
128. KEMP (Geoffray). Middle East opportunities. For-
eign Affairs.: 1988-89, 1 3 9 - 1 5 8 . 
Some painted to a lessening of teasions, some 
intensified confrontations that had long simmered 
below the boiling point, and some, coming in the 
last days of the year, increased the need for timely 
diplomatic initiative by the US. The sudden drama 
of the events like; the Palestinians living in the 
West Bank and Gaza invited the Intifada, forced 
secretary of state George Shultz to become reen-
gaged in peace process. The Shultz plan, which 
drew upon the provision of the camp David accords 
and Reagan peace plan was based on the well 
known tand for peace formula laid out in UN 
resolution 242. It called for an international con-
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ference and implied that Israel would have to give 
UP some of the Arab territories it occupies . The 
UN voted almost unanimously to move the General 
Assembly to Geneva to her Arafat speak. This was 
a telling rebuff to American policy and it put 
pressure on the administration to find some way 
to be more positive towards Arafat, initiative. 
, , ^ —,ROLE, KISSINGER, 
1973-76 . 
129. MANDELL (Brian S) and TOMLIN (Brian W). Me-
diation in the development of norms to manage 
conflict: Kissinger in the Middle East. Journal of 
Peace Research. 28 , 1; 1 9 9 1 , Feb; 4 3 - 5 5 . 
Article integrates the context and process of me-
diation in an exploration of the ways in which third 
parties may alter the parameters of a dispute in 
order to manage conflict. It does so through a focus 
on the role that mediation may play in fostering 
new norms of conflict management. Adopting an 
evolutionary approach to the development of norms 
in conflict system, the study of the mediation 
activities of US secretory of state Henry Kissinger 
in Middle East during the period 1973-76 confirm 
the presence of a > number of discrete elements 
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associated with the development of a new norma-
tive order to restrain conflict. Those finding are 
important insofar as they suggest that Kissinger's 
contribution to the Arab-Israeli peace process was 
more than a short term, tactical success . The 
analysis suggests that mediation may accomplish 
more than a reordering of the performance struc-
ture of disputants . It may well promote and embed 
within a conflict system new kinds of behavior that 
are not realized for a number of years but whose 
importance and potential extend well beyond the 
more limited success of the moment. 
^ , , ,SHULTZ, • LEBANON. 
130. RAJ (Christopher S). Shutz's West Asia shuttle. 
Democratic World. 1983, May 8; 8-9. 
George Shultz's West Asian tour was to talk with 
Egyption leaders and followed by talks with Israeli 
and Lebanese officials in the subsequent days 
appears tobe high profile, high voltage personal 
diplomacy. Shultz 's first priority appears to be to 
close the small but agonizing gap that lingers 
between Israel and Lebanon on the terms of Israeli 
withdrawal, and second is to salvage president 
Reagan's much battered plan for a Palestinian 
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Israili settlement. The importance of his mission, 
bo th to check the deterioration of the American 
pos i t ion in West Asia and to provide a badly 
needed tonic for the Administration's foreign policy 
overall , can hardly be overstated. Israel presented 
n ine conditions to shultz for the withdrawal of its 
t r oops from South Lebanon but Lebanese officials 
strongly protested to Shultz on the Israeli demands 
and Lebanese government strongly told Shultz that 
it could not concede my independent role of Major 
Haddad, nor could it tolerate Israeli trops in the 
so-called security zone, as indicated in the condi-
t ions presented by Israel. 
, ,POLITICS, TRADE, ARAB-ISRAEL. 
1 3 1 . AWARTANI (Hisham) and KLEIMAN (Ephraim). 
Economic interactions among participants in the 
Middle East peace process.Middle East Journal. 
5 1 , 2 ; 1 9 9 7 , Spr; 215-29. 
The geographical trade pa t t e rn and the trade 
polit ics of the six partners in Arab Israeli peace 
p rocess , namely, Egypt. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, and the Palestinian Territories, suggest that 
the scope for expanding t rade among them is 
ra ther limited. The week tendency of the Arab 
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members of the group to trade among themselves 
indicates that it is not the state of hostilities that 
existed between most of them and Israel that 
hindered intra-regional trade. Their relatively high 
tendency to trade with a Middle Eastern country 
outside the group, namely, Turkey also suggests. 
The markets for Middle East exports lie outside 
the region. But because the distances between then 
are negligible , the trade Israeli Jordan Palestinian 
Territories has, nevertheless, the potential of de-
veloping considerable border type trade, as well as 
various types of Joint ventures. 
, ,REACTION, ARABS. 
132. KHASHAN (Hild). Are the Arab for peace with 
Israeli? Middle East Quarterly. 1,1; 1994 , March' 
19-28. 
Most official Arab reactions to the September 1993 
Israel PLO agreement on a declaration of prin-
ciples for peace have been impressively positive. 
This reaction followed a similarly positive disposi-
tion to the American sponsored peace process, 
launched formally in Madrid in October 1 9 9 1 , 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Coalition victory in the Gulf War. The real peace 
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requires more than most reconciliation of the heart, 
an acceptance of the need to compromise goals and 
aspira t ions even at the level of the individual. In 
the end, peoples as well as governments must agree 
to end a conflict. 
- —-, ,ROLE, BRITAIN AND AMERICA. 
133. BLACK (Ian.). Middle East peace hangs in balance. 
Guardian Weekly.. 158, 19; 1998 , May 10 ;1 . 
Crucial talks in London on the Middle East peace 
process were on the brink of collapse after British 
backed American mediation failed to bridge the gap 
be tween Israeli's and Palestinians. , The Israeli 
Prime Minister had passed several new conditions, 
including dropping any reference to a time out on 
Jewish settlements and a Palestinian pledge not to 
declare a state. Palestinian insisted the Israeli 
leader had never been serious about negotiating, 
and was seeking to by time and avoid further 
concess ion. Talks between Israelis and Palestinians 
have been deadlocked since Mr. Net anyhow's govt. 
Star ted building a new Jewish settlement in Arab 
East Jerusalem. Suicide at tacks by Muslim militants 
depend the crises. The main stickling point has 
been Israel's refusal to withdrawal from a further 
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thirteen percent of occupied. West Bank land in the 
next stage of innplementation of the 1 9 9 3 Oslo 
peace accords. 
, , ,EUROPE, SETTLEMENT 
JEWS. 
134. HAMID (AH Muhsin). Palestinian and Israel peace 
settlement. World Affairs. 3 ,2; 1994, Dec; 4 0 - 4 2 . 
Major factors for inititating Arab Israeli conflict are 
the ambitious of European Jews for a homeland in 
Palestine the desire of Europe to get rid of the Jews 
once and for all and shift them to Middle East, the 
support of the Western powers to . the Zionist 
movement. Though after the termination of bipolar 
regime of world, the utility of Israel for the West 
has diminished greatly, yet Israel trying to normal-
ize relations with its Arab neighbours without 
committing itself to the crucial issues such as 
withdrawal of occupied Arab territories, right of self 
determination of Palestinian people, shift of the 
Jews settlements from the occupied terri tories, 
vacation of East Jerusalem, return of Palestinian 
refugees to their homeland and elimination of its 
weapons of man destruction with nuclear capability. 
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,GULF WAR, AGREEMENT, 
1 9 9 3 
135. MATTAR (Philip). PLO and the Gulf crisis. Middle 
East Journal . 48 , 1; 1994, wint; 31-46. 
The Septeniber 1993 Israeli PLO accord is likely 
eventually to reverse the enormous damage caused 
by the crisis. The agreement is a product of historic 
even ts , including, ironically, the Gulf crisis itself, 
which provided an optimal movement for peace. 
After a number of missed opportuni t ies by Israelis 
and Palestinians to end their struggle for historical 
Pales t ine , the signing of their agreement repre-
sented the triumph of realism over ideology, and 
diplomacy over the use of force. It is the PLO after 
all, that will implement the interim agreement, 
negot ia te over such fundamental issues as Jerusa-
lem, Jewish settlements, the right of return, com-
pensa t ion , and Palestinian sovereignty. It is the 
PLO that ultimately will be called upon to establish 
the infrastructure for a modern , democratic and 
independent state of Palestine. The future of Pal-
es t ine is largely depend on Israeli compliance with 
the letter and the spirit of the accord that is, 
get t ing self rule followed by sovereignty for East 
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Jerusalem and virtually all of West Bank and Gaza. 
It will depend, however, on PLO performance, 
particularly regarding institution building and de-
mocracy. 
—, , --,ISRAEL GOVERNMENT. 
136. AMAYREH (Khalid). Peace Process "dying". Middle 
East International. 570; 198, March, 13 ; 8. 
Yassar Arafat has warned that Middle East peace 
process is dying and way already be dead, the 
peace process is in a very dangerous position. 
Arafat also blames that Israeli government for 
including in a delegate and systematic effort to 
corrode the peace process had brought it to a state 
of total paralysis and virtually death. The Israeli 
govt, is willing to see the peace process become 
part of the past, nothing is moving; everything is 
going backwards. Arafat agreed that the fault lay 
not with the agreements (Oslo accords) themselves 
but with Israeli's refusal to abide by their terms. 
Arafat also reiterated earlier calls for an urgent 
Arab summit to put up a United front against Israeli 
intransigence. In a rheeting with Netanyahu he said 
that he would demand the full and precise imple-
mentation of the agreements between Israel and the 
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Palest inian authority 
, , ,NAM, CONFERENCE. 
137. NAM DECLARATION on Pales t ine . World Focus. 
18 , 7; 1997, July; 19. 
The conference of Non-Aligned Movement countries 
Foreign Ministers urged the members to freeze 
re la t ions with Israel to help salvage the West Asia 
p e a c e process. 12th conference of NAM stalling 
re la t ions with Israel was a first step to put the 
p e a c e process on the rails. Minister wanted NAM 
countr ies to use all available measures to ensure 
Israel 's compliance with the te rms and,reference of 
the Madrid conference and the land for peace 
principle , the basis for a possible than between 
Palest ine and Israel. The Ministers warned the 
Israeli government that failure to respond posi-
tively, will trigger further appropr ia te measures. 
, , —--,US, ELSENHOWER. 
138 . GERNER(Deborah J). Missed opportunit ies and 
roads not taken: The Eisenhower administration and 
the Palestinians. Arab Studies Quarterly. 12, 1-
2; 1990 , Wint-Spr. 67 -100 . 
The eight years of the Eisenhower administration 
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witnessed a series of missed opportunities by the 
United States for a resolution of the Palestinian 
issue which would have been better for the Pales-
tinians, for regional stability, for US relat ions in 
the region. Despite an overall policy toward the 
Middle East that was explicitly and publicly even-
handed and impartial, the Eisenhower administra-
tion was unwilling to mediate a resolution to the 
conflict between Israel, Palestinians, and the Arab 
states. Two factors stand out among that many that 
account for this disappointed record. First the 
Eisenhower administration followed the already 
established policy of rejecting Palestinian national 
aspirations and the right of the Palestinian to self 
determination. Second the Eisenhower administra-
tion fundamentally misjudged the nature of the 
problem believing that improvements in the eco-
nomic well being of Palestinian refugees would 
serve as adequate compensation for the loss of a 
homeland and the Palestinians in the West Bank 
would be content to like indefinitely as Jordanians 
under the rule of a king. The opportunity for a 
resolution of the Question of Palestine never really 
desired by the Eisenhower administration was lost. 
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, -,SECURITY, COOPERATION. 
139. KARSH (Efraim) and SAYIGH (Yezid). Cooperative 
a p p r o a c h to Arab-Israeli security. Survival. 3 6 , 1 ; 
1 9 9 4 , S p r ; 114-25. 
As Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanian attempt to 
implement their historic September 1993 Declara-
tion of Principles. It is imperative to anticipate the 
risks and threats that lie ahead and to consider 
how to safeguard prospective peace agreements 
agains t future challenges. Thre is a need to 
cons t ruc t cooperative security structures, which 
can be capable of pre-empting tensions, managing 
c r i ses and absorbing p re s su re generated by 
changes in the strategic environment. Therefore 
art icle proposes the formation fo an Arab Israeli 
secruity community" the main functions of which 
would be to provide Israel and its immediate Arab 
ne ighbours with the means to manage military, 
political and strategic relations on a coopratie 
bas is . 
-— , ,SELF-RULE. 
140. SHUKLA (Shashi). Palestinian self -rule: Prospects 
for peace . Foreign Affairs Reports . 44 , 1 -2; 1995, 
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Jan-Feb; 1-16. 
PLO inaugurated the self rule by signing an accord 
in year 1993 which was a historic break through 
the most significant development in the history of 
contemporary West Asia. Problem of Palestinian is 
a problem regarding conflicting claims of two 
people, the Jews and Muslims, to the some piece 
of land, which emerged as a territorial problem, 
acquired a religious and ideological dimension and 
finally became the serious political problem of the 
region. If we go through the history, we conclude 
that Palestine was the Jewish's homeland, like to 
the homeland goes back to the 12th century. The 
Jews set up their two kingdoms the Judea and Israel 
on different parts of Arab Deserts. The seed of 
Jewish Palestinian conflict were sown when Zionist 
demand for National homeland for Jewish in Pal-
estine received legal and moral sanction of Britain 
by Balfour Declaration. Palestinian problem took 
a dramatic new turn in 1987 when Palestinian 
living in the occupied territories staged Intifada 
against the Israeli occupation. By November 1988, 
some 90 states formally recognised the existence 
of Palestine. In Madrid on Oct. 1991 , for the first 
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t ime all part ies to Arab Israeli dispute set together 
for talks and Isrelis came face to face wit 
Pa les t in ians . The trust building that took place in 
Oslo , culminated ,in the signing of 'Declaration 
of Principles for Palestinian self rule at Washington 
in S e p . . It was a peace Accord based on the mutual 
recogni t ion pact. It is a s tep by step peace 
se t t lement begining with five years intering peiod 
of Palest inian self rule in Gaza and the city of 
J e r i cho in West Bank. 
, ,SETTLEMENT. JEWISH, PROB-
LEMS, JERUSALEM. 
141 . CHEMARAPALLY (Yohannan) . J e ru sa l em: The 
p e a c e process unravals. People ' s Democracy. 20, 
4 0 ; 1 9 9 6 , Oct; 12. 
Arabs were prohibited from enter ing many parts of 
Je rusa lem, with Arab East Jerusa lem almost com-
pletely cut off from the West Bank and Gaza. 
Jewish sett lements part multiplying in the occupied 
West Bank. Palestians were being once again up-
rooted and their hornes demolished to make way for 
Jewish homes in Jurusalem. Israel now has a 
p re sence in over to percent of the West Bank. In 
Je rusa lem, Netanyahum govt, has begin a new 
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construction programme. The Palestinian claim for 
Jerusalem as their capital was given short shrift 
and the offices of PLO in that city were closed 
down at the orders of the new Israeli govt. West 
Bank and Gaz were cut off from Israel proper for 
most of year leading to untold hardship for the 
Palest inians. Yasser Arafat had begun showing signs 
of impatience. With his political credibility already 
at a low ebb, he had no other option but to give 
tacit support to the latest uprising (intifada) of the 
Palestinians. The peace pact any way did not 
address itself to he plight of more than half of 
Palestinian population. Under the peace plan, they 
have no automatic right to return. 
^ ,UN,SECURITY, COUNCIL, ROLE, 
DEPORTATION. 
142. SECURITY COUNCIL Condemns deportation of 
Palest inians. UNChronicle. 30, 1; 1993 , March; 
7 0 . 
The deportation to Lebanon on 17 Decemer. 1993 
of some 400 Palestinians from the occupied terri-
tories was strongly condemned by the Security 
council on 18 December 1993 as a contravention 
of Israel's obligations under the 1949 Fourth 
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Geneva Convention In unanimously adopt ing reso-
lution 799 (1992) , the council demanded that Is-
rael, the occupying power, ensure the safe and 
immediate re turn of all those depor ted . With re-
spect to the Middle East place process the UN has 
been invited to participate in the multilateral ne-
gotiations on regional issues. Charekhan appointed 
by secretary General, who coordinated the role of 
UN in working groups on arms control and regional 
security, water, environment, economic and re-
gional development, , and refugees. General Assem-
bly declared an international conference on the 
Middle East, under UN auspices, wotfld contribute 
to the Promotion of peace in the region. In adopt-
ing resolution 4 7 / 6 4 D-one of five texts relating 
to the question of Palestine ( 4 7 / 6 4 A- ) the world 
body also reaffirmed five basic principles for the 
achievement of peace in Middle East: Israeli with-
drawal from occupied territories; security arrange-
ment for all s ta tes , resolving the problem of the 
Palestinian refugees; dismantling Israeli settlement 
in the occupied territories; and guarant ing freedom 
of access to holy places. 
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.UPRISING, INTIFADA, 1987 , 
ROLE. 
143 . SAYIGH (Yezid). Intifadah continues: Legacy dy-
namics and challenges. Third World Quarterly. 11 , 
3 ; 1989 , July; 20-49. 
Since its eruption on December 1987 the sustained 
popular uprising in the Israeli occupied Palestinian 
terr i tories of the West Bank and Gaza strip has 
shaken the status and opened new prospects for 
peace and conflict in the region within its first year 
intifadah provoked radical shifts in policy by most 
principal actors. On 15 November 1988 Palestine 
council declared an independent state of Palestine. 
It also affirmed i ts . acceptance of UN resolutions 
1 8 1 , 242, 338 as the basis of place talks and two 
state solution to the Palestine Israel conflict. PLO 
chairman Yasser Arafat recognised Israel's right to 
exist peace and security and the USA consequently 
initiated a substantive dialogue with the PLO. The 
Palestinian have undeniably come a long way to-
wards achieving their goals of self determination, 
in the fir m of a independent state. The role of 
intifadah is equally evident whether in transforming 
international opinion or in providing the PLO with 
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the initiative and the opportunity to undertake a 
beside shift in declared strategy. Article specially 
studying the features that h a v e m a d e the Palestinian 
uprising so remarkable, with a review of its histori-
cal legacy, its impact, and the chal lenges facing its 
future developments . 
—- ,—-- , -,INTIFADA, 1 9 9 0 , GULF 
CRISIS, INTERACTION. 
144. HEACOCK (Roger). 'From the Mediterranean to the 
Gulf and back again: The Palestinian Intifada and 
the Gulf was . Arab Studies Quarterly. 1 3 , 1 - 2 ; 
1 9 9 1 . wint-Spr; 6 5 - 8 1 . 
Examining the interaction between the Palestinian 
Intifada and the Gulf C .isis, from mid 1990 to mid-
1991 Arguing that significant changes have taken 
and are taking place in the discourse of Palestinian 
activities and intellectuals, even as the Intifada 
continues. Author tried to show that Palestinians 
have historically been subject to the geographic and 
cultural full of two distinct cultures: that of the 
Mediterranean and that of the Gulf, which have 
successively had the upper hand as polls of 
attraction and influenc ; the nineteen eighties rep-
resented the clear ascendancy of the Gulf model. 
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which has now once again, at least for the time 
being been supersedeti by the drive to coordinate 
with the Mediterranean nations of Asia, Africa and 
Europe. 
- - , - --, US, PROPOSAL 
REDEVELOPMENT, WEST BANK. 
145 . USHER (Graham), Entering the end game. Middle 
East International 579 ; 1998 , July, 17; 5. 
The six month interim provided by American efforts 
to save the peace process appears to be entering its 
and game. It is essential that parties talks with each 
other to resolve the impasse were seen by the 
Palestinians as granting Netanyahu another stay of 
execution regarding the US proposal for a 13.1 
percent further redevelopment in the West Bank. In 
the fear that the US will not publish its proposal, 
and so not blame Netanyahu for the impasse, the 
Palestinians have beer readying the ground for life 
after the US. Yasser Arafat, Mubarak and King 
Hussain, in a mini summit, agreed to grant 
Netanyahu more tim'e to accept the US proposal. 
, , WATER, USE AGREEMENT, 
TABA (aslo II), 1995. 
146. ROUYER (Alwyn R). Water issue in Palestinian-
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Israeli peace process . Survived. 39 , 2; 1 9 9 7 , Sum; 
57-81 . 
Under the Israeli occupation, Palestinians have 
been divided involvenrient in the management and 
development of water resources and have been 
severally restricted in water consumption for both 
agricultural and household use. Palestinians charge 
that Israel stealing their water while preventing 
them from using their fair share of this resource. 
Israeli counter that they have prior claim to the 
water and that any further development by the 
Palestinians would damage the aquifer. The Taba 
Agreement of September 1995 made progress 
towards resolving this dispute but only limited 
implementation has occurred and negotiat ions of 
an equitable water sharing formula have been left 
to the final status talks. The issue can only be 
settled with an agreement base don the principle 
equal individual minimum requ i r emen t s for 
Palestinians and Israel alike. 
- -—. —--, WITHDRAWAL PLAN, TROOPS, 
ISRAEL, REJECTION. 
147 . BORGER (Julian). Arafat spurns Israeli withdrawal 
plan. Guardian Weekly. 158, 6; 1998, Feb, 8; 4 . 
Yasser Arafat rejected a plan for a further limited 
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Israeli withdrawal from West Bank, but the United 
S ta tes secretary of 'state Madelien Albright called 
Arafat ' s response hasty. In West Bank talks Ms. 
Albright asked Mr. Arafat to respond to a plan that 
would turn over a further ten percent of the West 
Bank to Palestinian control in three phases. Mr. 
Arafat ' s rejection of the proposal could signal a 
possibly a fatal setback to the personal peace 
initiative that Pre.'iident Clinton launched in 
Washington. With separate talks with Mr. Arafat 
and Mr. Netanyahu in Washington. Mr. Clinton 
suggested that the next t roop withdrawal should be 
in three stages, the second and third contingent on 
Palest inian fulfillment of a set of conditions. The 
Israeli govt, accepts a phased withdrawal, but is 
spurring the US demand that it vacates more than 
ten percent of the West Bank. Also the British 
diplomats have disagreed with Washington's 
suggestion of trying withdrawals to precondition, 
and have been less reticent in condemning Israel's 
expansion of Jewish sett lements in the West Bank. 
—-, PLO, EFFECT, INTIFADA. 
148. COBBAN (Helena). PLO and the Intifada. Middle 
East Journal . 44, 2; 1990, Spr; 207-23 . 
Far from being taken by uprising by the outbreak of 
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Intifada, the PLO leadership reacted as effectively 
as could have been expected considering it was 
physically located 2 ,000 km. from the occupied 
areas and barred from easy communication with 
intifada Participants,by a barrage of Israeli enforced 
impediments. The PLO leaders also effectively 
harnessed the tremendous power of the Intifada to 
pursue the political strategy they had fevoured for 
a number of years; to seek entry to a negotiat ion 
through which the occupation would end and to 
establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza in its place. The degree to which the intifada 
gave new power not only to its direct part icipants 
in the occupied areas but also to the PLO leaders 
outside is notable. The PLO leaders were hot able, 
during the first two years of the intifada, to win 
the formal commencement of the negot ia t ion. By 
the close of 1989 Palestinians had failed to force 
the Israeli govt. To agree to formal negotiat ions 
over the long term stalus of the territories that they 
sought. They did succeed, however, in bringing 
home to Israeli decision makers the reality that they 
could crush the intifada through military means 
without stretching Israel's national consensus beyond 
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the breaking point. At the end of 1989 the battle of 
wills between Shamir and the PLO leadership 
remained unresolved. 
, PLO-ISRAELI ARABS, RELATIONSHIP. 
149. FRISCH (Hillel). PLO and the Arabs in Israel 1967-
9 3 : Politicization or redicalization? Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics. 2 , 3 ; 1996, Aut; 446-64 . 
One of the most important questions raised by the 
establ ishment of the Palestinian Authority under the 
PLO leader Yassar Arafat concerns the likelihood of 
secessionist tendencies among Israeli Arabs, the 
probability of irredentist behaviour by the Palestinian 
Authority, and the likely impact of both on the 
terri torial and political integrity of the state of 
Israel. The following article, addresses the question 
by analyzing the historical relationship between the 
PLO and Israeli Arabs through the theoretical 
prism of the politicization-radicalization debate 
engaged by scholars studying the relationship 
between the Arabs of Israel and the Jewish state. 
—-, , LEADERSHIP, CRITICISM. 
150. TURKI(Fawaz). Palestinian self-criticism and the 
libration of Palestinian society. Journal of Palestine 
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Studies. 25 , 2; 1996, Wint; 71-6. 
As a first person writer author draw his experiences 
as an unhoused wandered a Palestinian exile from 
the refugees camps whose concern was to expand 
the particulars of his own life to enfold the 
universality of the Palestinian condition in general. 
In the heady days of national unity, what were the 
antiquated norms of Arab culture or the cynicism 
corruption and inaptitude of PLO official dom? 
There has seen the days between the world of PLO 
official dom and the intellectual community an 
alliance of brisk vulgaration of the Palestinian, a 
hidden complicity between intellectual activist and 
corruption commissar that gratified a demonically 
perverse passion for national unity. Palestinian 
every man feels betrayed by his leadership, his 
movement, his dream. There is vacuum in his life 
that he can not fill. 
.PLO-SOVIETS, RELATIONSHIP. 
151 . KOHN (Lawrance). Comrade Arafat. Midstream. 
38 ,5 ; 1997, June-July; 2-3 . 
Arafat is referred as the pious Muslim and the 
species of neo-Balshevik, served as the ally of 
Moscow next. Describing the representat ion of Mr. 
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Arafat for General Union of Palestinian students at 
the communist world festival in Czechoslovakia in 
1 9 6 6 and in 1970 is a PLO defector reported that 
all key PLO decisions were made only on Soviet 
approval . Arafat also met Soviet foreign minister 
in Cairo in the March 1 9 7 4 and after which Mr. 
Gromyko announced, that the Soviet union regarded 
the PLO as the role representat ive of Palestinians. 
Comrade Arafat's Fatah ' s ideology is the Fatah 
const i tutes the revolutionary vanguard of the 
Palestinian people whose struggle constitutes port 
of the common struggle against Zionism and world 
imperialism. The camaraderie between-Soviets and 
PLO is apparent and coordinate diplomatic moves 
aimed at strengthening the communist camp. 
,POLICY, BALFOUR, 1921-23 . 
152 HUNEIDI ( Sahar). Was Balfour policy reversible? 
The colonial office and Palest ine, 1921-23. Journal 
of Palestine Studies.' ' '27. 2; 1990 , Wint; 23-41 . 
Focusing on the role played by the Middle East 
Department of Britain's Colonial office in shaping 
Palestine policy from early 1921 to September 
1 9 2 3 , when the mandate for Palestine took effect. 
It shows the department ,s efforts to neutralize the 
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growing domestic challenges to the Jewish national 
home policy and highlights the contrast between 
the departments t rea tment of the successive Arab 
delegations and the privileged access accorded to 
the Zionists. It concludes that if there were times 
during this period that the policy could have been 
overturned, the efforts of the Middle East department 
were largely responsible for keeping it on course. 
, BRITISH, SEMAKH TRIANGLE, HISTORY. 
1 5 3 . Gil-Har (Yitzhak). British commitments to the Arabs 
and their application to the Palestine - Trans-
Jordan boundry: The issue of the Sem^kh Triangle. 
Middle Eastern Studies . 29, 4; 1993, Oct; 690-
7 0 1 . 
British policy in Palest ine was directed by practical 
principles including the Palestine- Trans Jordan 
boundary delimitation. But since the British policy 
makers started to involve themselves in the moral 
issue of providing justice both for the Arabs and 
Jews, they were caught in an inextricable 
entanglement. At the end of the Ottoman rule the 
western boundary of Vilayet of Damascus passed 
east to the sea of Galilee and to the Semakh 
Triangle and to the area to the south of the Yarmuk 
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in accordance with the British govt. Interpretation 
and definition in its statement of Policy (the white 
Paper) of June 1922; this would have saved it a 
greet number of political problem 
, ^ , SOCIOECONOMIC 
CHANGE. 
154 ISSA KHALAF. Effect of socio -economic change or 
Arab societal collapse in mandate Palestine. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. 2 9 , 1 ; 
1997 , Feb; 93-112. 
Social and economic changes and disruptions in 
Palestinian Arab society, ongoing since late Ottoman 
times, continued and accelerated under British rule 
and sustained Zionist colonization. Palestinian 
peasan ts , migrant wage labours, and urban workers 
under the Mandate were buffeted by for as beyond 
their control. This resulted in massive dislocation 
and disjointed or uneven development. The combined 
effects of physical and economic ranges of war; 
Zionist terror, atrocities, and expulsions; the 
breakdown of social order and urban economy and 
the return of migrants to their villages; the lake of 
central Govt, direction; and national leader ship all 
contributed to Palestinian society 's dissolution in 
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1 9 4 8 . The Palest inian refugee problem was a 
prolonged affair, unfolding over many months and 
encompasses several phases . However, while 
opposition to Zionism united almost all segments of 
Palestinian society was inflow unstable, dislocated, 
unorganized, without collective authority, and 
vulnerable to disintegrat ion. 
, , FOREIGN, ARAFAT. 
1 5 5 . DASHUPTA ( Punyapriya) asafat 's foreign relations. 
World Focus. 15 .6 : 1994 , June; 15-7. 
Examining Arafats foreign relations and their 
impact on his policies to achieving his goals. His 
relations with the UN, Egypt, Lebanon and to which 
extent he got the access to the goals. The 
Palestinian intefada saved Arafat and his PLO. 
Arafat and his PLO had little to do with the 
intifada, in Tunis .while the agitations for the 
assertion of Palestinian self respect was begin led 
by local leen aged activists, often aligned with 
Islamic fundamentalist force like Hamas. For Arafat 
what happens to other Arab is not so important. 
His role concern is how to make the Gaza-Jericho 
experiment successful, extend his sway to the 
whole of the West Bank and achieve a sovereign 
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Palestinian state. He has realised that in this quest 
of his he cannot expect much help from the other 
Arabs, non-aligned, the Africans or even the UN. 
He has to depend now mainly on the Americans and 
such donor institutions as world Bank and shape 
his foreign relations accordingly. But his success 
here not assured. 
, , ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY, POLICE 
156 . WHO WILL police the police? Middle East. 2 6 3 ; 
1997 , Jan; 12-3. 
Travelling through tlie hills of the we'st bank and 
costal roads of Gaza Strip, at a one checkpoint 
after another travellers are greeted with the wake 
of Submachinegun and the inevitable demand: 
Passport? The number of Israeli soldiers and 
Palestinian security officials seams endless and 
overbearing in a land known to most of the world as 
holy. Many presumed the place to be at hand after 
yasser Arafat and late Yitzhak Rabin signed the 
initial agreements of what was intended to be a 
peace treaty, events since election of the right wing 
Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu indicate 
otherwise. In recent hare have only emphasized that 
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a daily three of force, and the frequent use of it, 
is now part and parcel of life in the west Bank and 
gaza. Palestinians are still in a daze after the 
violence that took the lives of over 60 of their 
compatr io ts and wounded over are. They have 
become pensive, recognizing that many of their 
towns and villages are surrounded by Israeli tanks, 
p repared to respond with fire against any attack on 
them, be it with stone, Molotove cocktails or live 
ammunit ion. There is a little h o p e that Palestinians 
will attain their wish for s ta tehood in the west 
Bank, Gaza and East Je rusa lem as the peace 
accords have had to take a back seat to daily 
conflict. 
, , , CLOSURE, GAZA, 
EFFECT. 
157. USHER (Garaham). Israel l ightens its grip on the 
terr i tories. Middle East Internat ional . 522; 1996, 
March, 29;6-8 . 
Israel got 11-day Internal Closure of the west Bank 
and Gaza in which 2,3 million Palestinian were 
effectively cantonised- but it got lifted. A big bread 
famine occurred in the strip than around 2000 
Gaza workers were allowed to work in Gaza's new 
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industrial zone which straddled its border with 
Israel. Israeli army state that Palestinians will still 
not be allowed inside the boundaries of state. There 
is a great hunger in Gaza and the unemployment 
noted by UN which is 6%. Meanwhile the 60 ,000 
or so Palestinians depriviable of their livelihoods in 
Israel will be employed in temporary work schemes 
instigated by the UN paid for by the donour 
countries and lasting for three month. PNA 
officials viewed the UN latest efforts. Unless the 
closure is lifted and Israel allows in the basic goods 
required by economy the UN package won't help 
was the verdict of finance minister Zuhdl Nashashibi 
for three years into Oslo, Israel closure policies 
have not only understood just how dependent 
Palestinians remain on the coprice of Israeli rule. 
,--—, , — - , WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, 
ECONOMY. 
158. ROY (Sara). Separation or integration: Closure and 
the economic future of the Gaza strip revised. 
Middle East Journal. 48, 1; 1994, sint; 11-30. 
Israeli policy in the Gaza Strip and West Bank has 
been and continues to be defined by what it does 
not allow rather than by what it does . What it does 
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not allow is real indigenous control over key 
economic resources needed for the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian economy. What it . 
does allow is a form of dependent economic growth 
linked to and mediated by Israel. Israeli proposals 
calling for self rule in the occupied territories, 
therefore, envision an economic future for the 
Gaza and West Bank that is essentially no different 
from their economic past. The Gaza- Jericho plan 
with its promise of limited autonomy in the Gaza 
does not alter the structural asymmetries between 
Palestinians and Israelis, it reshapes and reinforces 
them. The economic fundamentals of occupation 
remain unchanged Under the term of plan, Israeli 
govt, will transfer political control over gaza to the 
PLO. Israel. However, not renounced its claim to 
the occupied territories. Its rejection of Palestinians 
sovereignty and refusal to transfer decision making 
authority over land, zoning and water strongly 
indicate that it will not cede substantial economic 
control to Palestine. 
, , , COMPROMISE, PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY, REDEPLOYMENT. 
159. ANDONI (Lamis). Compromise with Israel. Middle 
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East International. 569; 1 9 9 8 , Feb, 27 ; 9-10. 
The Palestinian leadership agreed to a compromise 
with Israel over the terms of further Israeli Troops 
redeployment and to more US opposed security 
restr ict ions on the population of the West Bank and 
Gaza. The understanding be tween Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu and the PLO's Muhammad 
Abbas has paved the^ way for resumed meetings of 
joint technical committees and sent a conciliatory 
signal to Washington. Israel has agreed to present 
an estimate of military location and Israeli 
set t lements in the territories that are not to be 
included in further redeployments . The Palestinians 
would stand to lose if they did not accept 
proposals put for ward by Washington. The 
Palest inians suggested that their third stage of 
redeployment be in\plemented simultaneously with 
the beginning of final status ta lks . The US told the 
Palestinians that it would consider including such 
provisions if the Palestinian resumed the stalled 
talks with Israel. 
—,—,—,DISCRIMINAT10N,WATERISSUE, JORDAN 
BASIN. 
160. BESCHORNER (Natasha). Water and instability in 
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the Middle East: The Agenda for 1990 , . Adelphi 
papers . 2 7 3 ; 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 ; 6 5 - 7 1 . 
In the Middle East a number of water related 
economic and strategic issues remain unresolved In 
Israel and the Jordan Basin there is a problem of 
competing institutions and bureaucracies. The 
policy o\ subsidizing water for Israeli settlers in the 
occupied terri tories constraints with the high water 
charger imposed on Palestinian population. To 
many Palestinian water pricing is another form of 
political discrimination. Neither Jordan nor the 
Palestinian populat ion in the occupied territories 
can expect any concessions on what they presence 
to be their water rights in the short to medium 
term, and Israel has rejected the concept of water 
sharing by quota. Israel contents that relaxation of 
such restrictions would lead to mismanagement and 
strategic vulnerability. Water issues are on the 
agenda of current multilateral peace talks; The 
Israeli negotiating position is based on technical 
cooperation set against Arab, particularly Jordanain 
and Palestinain, demands for gestures of political 
goodwill and recognition of usage rights. 
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.effect on GOVERNMENT 
161. MARCUS (Janathan). Israel: What now? World 
Today. 45 , 2; 1989, Feb; 2 2 - 5 . 
If the peace process were to gather pace, than 
Israel 's present government will fall apart under 
t h e weight of its* own contradict ions. For the 
moment , there is no majority in Israel for a 
dramatic peace initiative. The country remains 
deeply divided and the most that can be said about 
the new government is that it reflects these 
divisions. Perhaps both Israel and the Palestinian 
need a new generations of leaders to pursue the 
task of peace. The Intifada in its own way may have 
begun the task of throwing up a new Palestinian 
leadership. As far -as Israel is concerned the last 
election may have ushered in the final innings of 
the old political generation. 
^ ^ .EFFECTS, RECONCILIATION, 
JEWISH-PALESTINIANS. 
162. YAIFTACHEL (Oren). Israeli society and Jewish 
Palestinian reconciliation: Ethnocracy' and its 
territorial contradictions Middle East Journal. 
5 1 , 4 ; 1997, Autumn; 505 -19 . 
Israel 's settlement and socio-economic policies have 
274 
caused internal ethnic and class divisions that now 
threaten the prospects of Jewish- Palestinian 
reconsiliation. The association of peace primarily 
with interest of Israel 's economic and cultural elites 
has alienated most peripheral groups, particularly 
the Mizrahi and Haredi Jews. Therefore the current 
efforts to arrive at territorial compromise with the 
Palestinians find Israel in a deep identity and 
socio-political crisis caused by the consequence of 
the state 's ethnocretic regime. The crisis born of 
the surfacing of on overt contradictions, for the 
first time in Israel is history, between two major . 
Zionist goals: territorial expansion arid economic 
growth. This contradiction, and its associated 
ethnic and class tensions are likely to create 
obstacles to the ongoing efforts to advance Jewish-
Palestinian reconciliation. 
. . . - . , . . . - . , . . . . . EFFECTION, ROLE, LIKUD, 1992. 
163 . SMOOHA (Sammy) and Peretz (Don). Israel,s 1992 
Knesset elections: Are they critical? Middle East 
Journal. 47 , 3 ; 1 9 9 3 , Sum; 444-63 . 
The 1992 elect ions exposed the structural 
weaknesses of the liked bloc as compared to the 
labour bloc. The structural superiority of the labour 
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bloe gave it a lead over liked in compatition for 
vates , for mation of coatition governments, and 
stability of nerrow coalition governments . With 
respect to the peace process , the Liaed elite 
ideologically is commited to Greater Israel and 
intransigent in its politics on thios matter. The 
liked govt, looked for every opportunity to 
disengage from the peace talks, inciting rejectionsm 
and counting on Palestinian blutders. In contrast 
Labour supports the pragmatic politics of land for 
peace . The Rabin govt, maintains taht for Israel,s 
own sake, it should withdraw from most of the 
terri tories and disoociete itself from . involvement 
with the Palestinian populations there, if Israel is 
to remain a Jewish and democrat ic state. Within the 
labour party there is an influential faction that is 
willing to compromise on the issues and has called 
for direct megotiations with the PLO. Labor party's 
preparedness to return most of the territiries and 
its commitment to peacemaking are essential for 
reaching a peace sittlement. The 1992 elections 
way proves critical if the labor govt, becomies an 
effictive peace maker it will need to be secure in 
power. 
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—--, , .ESTABLISHMENT, GREATER ISRAEL. 
164. Pipes (Daniel). Imperial Israel: The Nile-to-
Euphrates calumny. Middle East Quarterly. 1,1; 
1994 , March; 29 -39 . 
Even before the state of Israel come into existence, 
Arab leaders accused Zionists of seeking to 
establish a s tate that would cover most of the 
Middle East. This notion of a greater Israel, quite 
distinct form the one understood by Zionists, 
eventually become so routinized and accepted, it 
by now serves as the conventional wisdom in all 
the Arabic-speaking countries and Iran. However 
fantastical, the fear has real significance virtually 
guaranteeing misunderstanding, poisoning attitudes 
to ward Israel, and making resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict more difficult Although a distant and 
difficult topic for Americans to deal with, it 
deserves U.S. Government attention as part of the 
general effort to forward Arab- Israeli peace 
negotiations. 
, - — , - — , F A C T O R S , WAR, 1967. 
165 . PEDATZUR (Reuven). Coming back full circle: The 
Palestinian Options in 1967. Middle East Journal . 
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4 9 , 2; 1995, Spr; 2 6 9 - 9 1 . 
Examining and explaining the initial choice of the 
Palestinian option made by Israeli policy makers, 
and the factors that led them to abandon it and to 
adept the Jordanian option instead. An examination 
of the conditions and circumstances existing in the 
first year following the June 1967 war reveals that 
the chances of the Palestinians option were poor 
from the outset. Despite the fact that Israeli policy 
makers believed it to be practicable, the 
Palestinian option was doomed to failure because 
of factors over which they had no cpntrol. 
, ,-—-,HUMAN RIGHTS, WEST BANK, GAZA. 
166. SHERMAN (Stephan). Alienating the inalinable. 
Middle East International. 5 2 2 ; 1996, March, 29; 
2. 
United National adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in December 1948 The Universal 
Declaration, like the four Geneva conventions 
promulgated in the following year, was designed to 
prevent any repitition of the cruelties perpetrated 
against individuals or whole comminutes by 
governments claiming jurisdiction over there. Equal 
and inalienable rights is quoted in the Universal 
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Declaration It contain 30 articles. The included the 
rights to equality before the law, freedom of 
speech and association and freedom of movement. 
But in 29 years occupation of the West bank and 
Gaza Strip, Israel has never paid the slightest 
attention to its obligations towards the Palestinians 
in the matter of human rights. But ruling Israel can 
see what they are leading for when they resort 
once again to the failed policies of the part: to 
mass deportat ion; to closures' which intensify the 
misery and unemployment among the mass of the 
Palestinian populat ions 
.. .-.^.. . . .^-.. . .^JEWISHNESS. 
167. DOWTY (Alan). Israeli's first fifty years. Current 
History 9 7 . 6 1 5 : 1998, Jan. 26 -31 . 
Israel was to be a state like other states, based on 
liberal democrat ic European models and other ideas 
of the time. If Jewishness is defined in religious or 
racial terms, this poses serious issues. Yet even if it 
is defined as a national or ethnic identity, as in 
other nat ionstates with a dominant ethnic character, 
the challenges to democracy in Israelis case have 
been particularly datunting. The central puzzle of 
Israeli politics in how the state has managed to 
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maintain a stable democratic system. In part, the 
answer ties precisely in its Jewishness, the 
continuity of which Herzl not with standing helps 
explain the strengths and weakness of this 
democracy. Though not democrat ic by modern 
standards these practices created a foundation for 
the growth of democratic institutions by providing 
modes of participation that effected the essentially 
voluntary nature of community membership and by 
developing body of law that mandated basic human 
right. The power sharing that made the Zionist 
set t lement possible was exemplified in the role of 
religious Zionist parties. 
. . . . . . . . . . JEWISH. SETTLEMENTS, HOUSING 
UNITS, JERUSALEM 
168. TAHSIN (Hassan). New sett lements shows Israel in 
its true colours. Radiance . 3 1 2 , 15; 1996, March, 
17-23 ; 19-20. 
Israeli housing minister affirmed that his govt, plans 
to build a new settlement consisting of 5,500 
housing units in different a reas besides the existing 
6 , 3 0 0 0 units around occupied Jerusalem. By so 
doing, Israel intends to make a mockery of 
international public opinion and pave the way for 
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making Jerusalem its capital without waiting for the 
final round of negotiations to determine the 
political status of the holy city. A contradicting and 
controversial s ta tement was made by the Israeli 
state minister for peace affairs regarding the future 
of Palestinian state as pointed out that the 
Palestinians agreed in principle to the proposal of 
the emergence of confederation between the 
Palestinians and the Jordanians but without a 
Palestinian army. Instead of dealing with the crux 
of the problem the creation of independent 
Palestinian s ta te , the Israelis keep raising marginal 
issues they called on the PLO to amend its national 
character which calls for the elimination of Israel 
and continuation of the armed struggle against 
Israel. On the over hand Israel goes on pressing the 
PLO to amend its chart while demise than 
Palestinians their right of having an independent 
state. This shows Israel in its true colours. 
, . . . . . , ^ ^ ,—--,WEST BANK 
169. ZIONIST RAPE of West Bank. Democratic World. 
1983 , Feb., 20 ; 10; 
Prospects of settling up of a Palestine state on the 
West Bank and Israele's domination to turn the 
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entire area into Jewish set t lements . The trend of 
increasing Jewish colonization of West Bank is 
indicated that by 1985 more than 70% of all 
residential quarters on the West Bank would be 
owned by the Jews. The demographic balance of 
Arabs and Israelis has already got drastically upset. 
Major colonization of the West Bank and the 
approval for construction of 35 additional West 
Bank settlements at a total cost of 830 million 
which Zionist cabinet had approved. Settlement 
officials predicted that within the next three 
months , 24000 Israelis will move into 6000 new 
housing units nearing complet ion in dormitory 
towns near Tal Aviv and Jerusalem which almost 
doubling the population of the West Bank. The 
process of Zionist influx and Jewish settlements and 
a disturbing exodus of young, well educated 
Palestinians is going on simultaneously and now it 
is difficult to establish a Palestine state as how 
much of the West Bank has been gobbled up by the 
Zionists. Anormous constructions work has been 
done and being done by the Israeli Housing Ministry 
as by the end of 1985. nearly one lakh new Jewish 
houses would come up on the West Bank. The 
Zionization of West .Bank is not only changing the 
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ancient land scape of the Israeli occupied West 
Bank, it is also changing West Asian politics in a 
way that treated to have all sort of peace plans 
buried in the dust. 
, — - , , , ,JERUSALEM 
170. MENON (Kesava). Expansionist agenda. Frontline. 
1998 , July, 17; 6 0 - 1 . 
Israeli governments have consistently pursued the 
objective of making Jerusalem as exclusively Jewish 
a city as possible. They tried to achieve this goal 
through building and coming regulations that were 
weighed against the city's Arabs. It app.roved a plan 
to include some outlaying town within Jerusalem's 
municipality boundar i e s and to extend the 
municipality's jurisdiction to some West Bank 
settlements. With this the Jewish population in the 
new Jerusalem will increase by more than 30 ,000 . 
This plan will have the collateral impact of 
providing addit ional legal protect ion to the 
settlements now included in Jerusalem. The policy 
of squeezing Arabs out of Jerusalem can not be 
implemented within the time frame envisaged for a 
final settlement of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israel 
has taken recourse to reducing their presence in 
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terms of numbers. With the extension of the 
Jerusalem municipality's authority to towns and 
sett lements that were outside of its ambit unit now, 
a situation has been created where the Arab 
population, for all its growth, will be a smaller 
portion of the city's whole. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t A o 1 
171 . KOTHARI (Miloon). Systematic dispossession: 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Mainstream. 33 , 26; 
1995 , May, 20; 25-31 . 
Jerusalem is a Jewish city, a Palestinian city and 
a Christian city. each with its- distinctive 
contribution to the whole that comprises all their 
influences, their uniqueness of symbolism of 
culture, of-ways of living. Of all these it is the 
arteries of the Palestinian Jerusalem that are 
undergoing slow yet steady asphyxiation - brought 
on by a myriad of well pat terned and planned Israeli 
policies. The historical tragedies are to be joined 
soon by Jerusalem, unless immediate steps are 
taken to preserve the Palestinian character of East 
Jerusalem. Jerusaleni's uniqueuess ended by the 
victorious culmination of the demographic battle, 
waged by successive administrations, that has 
284 
already achieved demographic superiority and a 
physical dominance at the rings of Israeli settlement 
surround East Jerusalem and cut is of from West 
Bank. The merits of the accusations apart , one 
aspect in the collective history of Jerusalem is 
clear- unless immediate steps are taken, the 
Palestinian identity of East Jerusalem will suffer 
irreversibly and with it the unique blending that for 
centuries characterized, and still cont inue to, 
Jerusalem. It is imperative that action be taken now 
to protect Palestinian owned undeveloped lands 
from future expropriat ion and to s top the 
demolition of Palestinian homes. 
, , , , , o l A i t, 
172. NEFF (Donald). Israel's breathtaking achievement. 
Middle East International. 1996, Jan, 19; 17. 
Israel's plan was to 'establish a purely Jewish state 
in Palestine, as shown by the public and firm 
statements of the Israeli elders rather than to 
establish a democratic state. The current peace 
process not only ensures that the Palestinian 
population will be confined to bondstones but 
I s r ae l ' s f eve r i sh road bui lding p r o g r a m m e 
guarantees that they will stay there . All major 
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P a l e s t i n i a n popula t ion c e n t r e s and Israeli 
set t lements have been or soon will be, surrounded 
by a system of bypass and security roads for Israeli 
use . Such a pattern of roads under Israeli control 
makes certain that the Palestinians will remain 
confined to their small plots of land, where they 
can be isolated with ease and with little extra cost 
for security forces. 
. . . . . . . . . . . WEST BANK AND GAZA 
173. ALGAZY (Joseph). Israeli sett lement policy in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Arab Studies 
Quarterly. 7; 1995; 62 -73 . 
June 1967 war traced the boundaries of Israeli 
occupied territories. Before the battle of the June 
War were over, Israeli's national unity government 
seized the extensive areas after evacuating the 
inhabitants and destroying their houses. After war 
land appropriation and colonization began. Since 
than it has excelerated. All Israeli settlement 
activities contradict, international law. Under the 
Alignment governments, the colonizing efforts was 
c o n c e n t r a t e d in those a r e a s designed for 
anneciation to the state of Israel: East Jerusalem, 
Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion, Gaza strip, Pitchat 
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Rafiah, Sharma-e-Sheikh and the Golan Heights. 
The priorities of the 'Alignment governments 
regarding the location of settlements in West Bank 
were decided in accordance with the Allon Plan, 
named as the ' territorial compromise ' by Alignment 
leaders. All water resources in the West Bank have 
been pure under government control and used 
extensively by the set t lements . Other water 
resources have been diverted to Israeli areas inside 
the green line. The Palestinian populat ion, which 
was agricultural till the Israeli occupation in June 
1967 is going through accelerated process of 
proletarianization. The occupied terri tories have 
served as an abundant source of cheap labour, a 
work force which lacks protection and rights. The 
Israeli government limits and controls the imports 
and exports. The labour force is entirely dependent 
on the Israeli market. The extence, side by side, 
of the State of Israel and of a Palestinian State is 
the solution that will bring peace to a part of the 
world where many wars have caused much suffering 
and endangered world peace. 
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MASSACRE, SABRA, SHATILA, 
1 9 8 2 
174. SABRA AND Shatila Massacres. Muslim And Arab 
Perspectives. 1, 4-6; 1994; Jan-Mar; 257-67. 
Sabra and Shatila are two Palestinian refugee 
camps in West Beirut. They witnessed massacres in 
September 1982 which sent shock-waves around 
the world about how low humans can stoop to in 
treating defenseless .people perceived as 'enemies ' . 
In the summer of 1982 Israel, taking the benefit 
of neutralizing the major Arab power through Camp 
David, invaded Lebanon. During the early days it 
declared aim was to secure peace for Galilee, i.e. 
north Israel, by hitting at Palestinian guerrilla basis 
in South Lebanon. They kept pounding Beirut by 
air and rockets and bombs of every conceivable 
kind, destroying the myth of Arab solidarity for 
ever. No sooner the 14000 Palestinian fighters 
were evacuated rather dispersed around the Arab 
world, that the US contingent, to the Lebanese, 
Palestinian and French protests was mysterious 
withdrawn were yet to even start withdrawal. The 
purpose of the massacre was the same old new 
Israeli objective; to empty the place of Palestinian 
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presence. The Israeli occupation army stood guard 
encircling the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra 
and Shatila. 
, , , MINORITIES, MARONITE, ARAB 
WORLD 
175 . JAWAID IQBAL. Israel's policy towards minorities 
in the Arab World: A study of Jewish-Minorite 
relations. Journa l of West Asian Studies. 7; 1991 ; 
53-64. 
Describing the Israel 's policy which it has towards 
the Arab world. Evaluating the Jewish-Maronite 
relationship; its genesis and evolution. Also 
analysing the Lebanese independence and its 
impact on Zionist-Maronite relationship and the 
Israeli plans for intervention in Lebanon. Article 
also raise the light on the Lebanon and the first 
Arab-Israeli war. 
— - , , , POLITICAL PARTY, LIKUD 
176. PALLIS (Elfi). Likud party: a primer. Journal of 
Palestine Studies . 2 1 , 2; 1992, Wint; 41 -60 . 
Describes the Likud's establishment, powers and 
the ideology which it has regarding the Israel and 
Palestine; the rights of the Jewish people in the 
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land of Israel. Also explains the declining 
importance of Likud's ideology and the realization 
of the weaknesses of 'Greater Israel' ideology that 
brought the party to the power. As time changed 
the Israel's Likud party also changed accordingly. 
Examining the role of, Likud actor, Yitzhak Shamir 
as the Prime Minister elected in 1983 , and heirs 
of Shamir: Mosh Arens, Devid Levey and Ariel 
Sharon. It is the important matter now infront of 
the Likud Central Committee to choose the leader 
in the next election. 
..-..^.....^.....^ PRISONS, TORTURE, GAZA 
177. TORTURE IN Israele prisons. Muslim and Arab 
Perspective. 1, 4-6; 1994, Jan-Mar; 2 9 3 - 9 5 . 
A Palestinian study documenting the use of 
psychological and physical torture on Gaza prisness 
has shown that Israel is using violence and torture 
to subdue the resistence fighters. The study was 
conducted the resistence fighters. The study was 
conducted by the Ghazzah Community Muntal 
Health Program (GCMHP) Director Eyad Sarraj on 
the symptoms of traumatic stress following 
imprisonment. It was made public on 20 May 1993 
in Ghazzah. The size of the sample was 500 ex-
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pr isoners . The prisoners participating in the study 
were all from Gaza and have spent between six 
months and 10 years in prison, which has 
horrifying and staggering results. According to 
Saraj 's report, more than 6 7 , 0 0 0 people from 
Ghazzah strip have been imprisoned by the Israelis 
since the beginning of occupation in 1967, this 
figure does not include all those imprisoned during 
intifadah. While there are about 12 ,000 Palestinian 
incarcerated in Israeli prisons. 
^...-.^...-.^ RAIDS, LEBANON 
178. JAWAID IQBAL. Israel's reprisal raids against 
Lebanon: Objectives and consequences. Journal of 
West- Asian Studies. 5-6; 1989-90 ; 65-79. 
Analysing the raids by Israel against Lebanon, and 
describing objectives and consequences of these 
raids . Presenting an evaluation of Airport Raid and 
its aftermath, intensification of Israeli raids from 
Cairo Agreement to the Crisis of May 1973. and 
the Rampant Escalation in Israeli raids from the 
crisis of May 1973 to the outbreak of Civil War. 
Deeper analysis of the Israeli raids against Lebanon 
suggests that in applying this policy to Lebanon, 
I s r ae l had cer ta in fundamenta l ly different 
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expectations. Between 14 June 1968 and 10 June 
1974, 3036 Israeli violation of Lebanese territory 
are repor ted , which included twelve major 
operations. During these raids hundred of Lebanese 
citizens apart from Palestinian were either killed or 
wounded, thousands^, rendered homeless and crop 
of many villagers burnt to ashes . The Israeli's 
interest was to liquidate all or any manifestation of 
Palestinian nationalism particularly militant variant 
so forcefully represented by the Palestinian 
guarillas. By resorting to a relentless series of raids 
Israel's aim in the long run was to bring about a 
polarization between the Lebanese Christians and 
Muslims over the issue of presence of Palestinian 
Guerrillas in the cquntry. 
, , ISRAEL-US, ORGANIZATIONS 
MOVEMENTS, DEMOLITION, AQSA 
179. JEWISH GANGS working to demolish the Aqsa. 
Muslim and Arab Perspectives. 1, 7-9; 1994 , Apr-
Jun; 3 6 0 - 6 1 . 
A number of Jewish movements and organisat ions, 
both Israeli and US based are working actively to 
get the shrinks in the Aqsa complex demolished in 
order to build the third temple on what they call 
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the 'Temple Mount'.' In this article there is a brief 
description of some of these prominent movements 
and organisations which have great resources at 
their disposal, these are namely Bitter, El Har-
hashem (To God's Mount), Faithful of Temple Mount 
(FTM), Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful), 
H a s h o n a i m Group , Kach (Thus), Tehiya 
(rehaissance) Party, Tribe of Yehuda and Yisrael 
Ariel Group. 
^.....^.....^ WAR 1967, PERSPECTIVE 
180. GERA (Gideon). Isarael and the June 1967 war: 25 
years later. Middle East Journal . 46 , 2; 1992, Spr; 
2 2 9 - 4 3 . 
On its nineteenth birthday, Israeli suddenly plunged 
into an escalating chain of events, which chook it 
to its foundations by visibly threatening its survival 
in a region hostile toward it. When it found no 
other way out of ' the crisis, Israel struck and 
overcome its enemies in six days of what was 
perceived as "a war of no choice". 1967 war and 
its causes. Aftermath and the implication of new 
situations assessed by Israel and improved its 
defense posture with hope to covert military gains 
into political achievements, and peace suddenly 
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loomed as an operat ional and practical objective of 
Israeli policy. 
, , , WATER, RESOURCES, JORDAN 
RIVER 
1 8 1 . IRSHAD PERWEZ. Water as a potential source of 
conflict: The Jordan river basin. Journal of 
Strategic Studies. 7; 1994; 51-9 . 
Concerns over access to water resources reflects a 
new interest in international relations as a potential 
source of conflict. The role of resources as a goal 
of military conquest has been acknowledged as the 
resources are a defining factor in the- power of a 
state. The Israel could ensure its water supplies to 
a large extent through the exploitation of the West 
Bank water by putting harsh restrictions on 
Palestinians water-use. The Palestinians of the West 
Bank are entirely dependent on its spring and 
ground water aquifers but allowed to use only a 
small proportion of the ground-water reserves. The 
conflict in this region have long been entertained 
with the accessibility to the water resources . 
Problem has now been exacerbated by other factors 
like the rapid increase in population, the expansion 
of irrigated area, and the 'green-house' effect. All 
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these factors indicate towards negative trend. The 
demand of water in the West Bank would increase 
if Palestinians returned to a newly created 
Palest inian state. 
^ , JORDAN, LAND, EFFECTS, WEST BANK 
FISCHBACH (Michael R). Implications of Jordaiian 
land policy for the West Bank. Middle East Journal. 
4 8 , 3 ; 1994, Sum; 492-509 . 
Jo rdan ian land policy in the West Bank ushered in 
profound changes in the way cultivators certified 
rights to land, mortgaged land and paid taxes on 
land from 1949-67. Beyond this the land program 
proved important politically as well, particularly 
regarding Israel and the 1967 occupation. The 
pol icy 's effects will also play a dramatic role in the 
economic and political stability of the Palestinian 
self-governing entity proposed by the 1993 Israeli-
PLO accords. Jordanian land law still remains in 
effect in the area, Jordanian land officials are the 
likely candidates to train the Palestinian land 
Authority mandated by the accords, and Jordanian 
survey team may well complete the interpreted 
set t lement campaign in the southern west Bank. 
Despite other such high publicized issues as using 
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th€ Jordanian diner as legal currency and Jo rdan ' s 
training of Palestine Libration Army t roops for 
police duties, Jordanian expertise in land affairs 
and land documents will prove quietly but vitally 
important in consolidating a viable Palestine 
Authority in the West Bank. Jordanian land records 
will also play a decisive role in setting questions 
of title to land and even 'cit izenship' rights in the 
entity-issues of no small importance to the West 
Bank's economic and political stability. 
, - — , - — , WEST BANK 
183 . ROBINS (Philips). Shedding half a kingdom: 
Jordan 's dismantling of this with the West Bank. 
British Society of Middle East Studies. 16, 1; 1989; 
162-75. 
King H u s s e i n ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t d e n o t e s to 
dismantling of the legal and administrative links 
between the two banks of state of Jordan. Through 
senior officers did intimate in advance the Jordan 
was reviewing its links with West Bank. There may 
be identify the main outcorne of the policy. King 
Hussein's decision to dismantle some links between 
East Bank and West Bank stands as the most 
important and tangible political gain of the intifada 
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since it began. The reaction of Palestinian's on 
the West Bank to the king's move which was on 
the whole a joyous one, suggests that the policy 
change was in turn a source of considerable 
satisfaction to those living under occupation. 
Opportuni ty for the PLO to play a constructive 
diplomatic role in the realm of the peace process 
p romoted the organisation to rise to the task. As 
a result PLO adopted a range moderate policies 
which have gone a long way towards transforming 
it into a respectable partner in any potential place 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . The k i n d ' s move effectively 
undermined the election chances of shimon pares, 
who had campaigned on the basis of peace 
negot ia t ions with Jordan. 
, , NON -ALIGNMENT 
184. ABU-LUGHOD (Ibrahim). Non-al ignment and 
commitment in the Gulf conflicts: Palestinian's 
policy. Arab Studies Quarterly. 13, 1-2; 1991 , 
Wint-Spr; 53-64. 
Analyzing the Palestinian policy on the Gulf conflict 
the identify and discuss the principles which 
underlay that policy and to discuss these matters 
relying upon, as far as possible, the public 
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expressions of official organs of the Palestine 
Libration Organisation (PLO). Kuwait's public 
expression of its hostility vis-a-vis the PLO, 
especially after the Arab states summit held on 10 
August 1990, and its mindlessly punitive behavior 
toward the res ident Palest inian community, 
reflected its strong belief in Palestinian partiality 
and open support for Iraq. Bush Administration's 
political moves, at tending its initiation of a so-
called peace process, in the aftermath of its 
victory, openly and stubbornly insisted on excluding 
an authentic Palestinian role in the yet to be held 
negotiative structure. It is assumed 'officially in 
publicly, that the PLO did adopt a policy that 
condoned Iraq's occupation and annexation of 
Kuwait. 
, , PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, 
INTERNATIONAL, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY and 
SERVICES 
1 8 5 . USHER (Graham). Politics of international security: 
The Palestinian Author i ty ' s new intelligence 
services. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 2; 1996, 
Wint; 21-34. 
With the signing at Taba of Israeli-Palestinian 
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interim agreement (Oslo U), it has clear that future 
realization of a peace settlement be tween Israel and 
the Palestinians no longer hinges on international 
legality. It rests on a definition of peace that 
translates as unconditional security for the Israeli's 
c o n d i t i o n e d securi ty for P a l e s t i n i a n s . The 
establishment of a strong policy force is one of the 
few unequivocal powers the Palestinian authority is 
granted in the original Oslo agreement of 1993 . In 
Cairo agreement signed in May 1 9 9 4 , the ceiling 
of security personnel the PA was permitted to 
recruit for Gaza and Jericho was 9 , 0 0 0 . With Oslo 
II, the ceiling for the West Bank was set at 12 ,000 . 
In both agreements it is stated that the Palestinian 
policy will constitute the only Palest inian security 
force and will have four operational divisions - civil, 
public, security, emergency and intell igence. 
, ^ PLO, ISRAELI ARABS 
186. SAHLIYEH (Emile). PLO and the Israeli Arabs. 
Asian And African Stjuiies. 2 7 , 1-2; 1993 , 
March-July; 85-96. 
Tracing the PLO's policy concerning the Israeli 
Arabs. PLO founded in 1964, but the interests of 
Israeli Arabs initially did not figure prominently in 
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its strategy and political calculations, even though 
the organisation drive legitimacy primarily from 
Palestinians inside and outside the occupied 
territories. The PLO did not engage in any any 
serious political mobilization of the Israeli Arabs as 
it had of the Palest inians in the West Bank and 
Gaza and in Lebanon and Syria. Political support 
for the PLO among the Israeli Arabs was useful and 
desirable, but not essent ial . Even after the 1970s, 
when the PLO began to recognize the political 
importance of the Israeli Arabs, its attitudes toward 
them remained primarily reactive rather than 
initiatory. The Israeli Arabs also did not fully 
identify with the PLO or support its final goals. The 
contacts of Israeli Arabs with their fellow 
Palestinians inside the occupied territories and the 
elevation of the PLO to a position of ideological 
leadership furthermore worked to consolidate their 
sense of belonging to the larger Palestinian nation. 
That is, the intifada has made them provide to be 
Palestinians. 
.....^.-...^ UN and_ NAM 
187 . GOYAL (DR). International dimension: support from 
UN, NAM. World Focus. 9, 9; 1988. Sep; 21-5 . 
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What is described as the Palestinian question in 
international politics is really the Israeli problem. 
A combination of Zionist aggressive determination 
and chicanery of British imperialism accomplished 
the astounding feat of replacing the state of 
Palestine with a new state of Israel, reducing the 
local population either to refugee status or as 
second class citizens in a racist state. The new state 
has proved a manace not only for the Palestinian 
Arabs but also for the neighbouring Arab states. 
The Zionist state of Israel maintains that the PLO 
is a terrorist organization and not a legal political 
entity, with which there can be no legitimate 
political sett lement. The stand is in sharp 
contradiction to the stand of the Arab league, the 
UN, NAM and other international organisations. If 
in spite of that the international community has 
failed to persuade or force Israel to comply with 
the desire expressed in the repeated resolutions of 
these organisations, it is largely because the 
mightiest super power of the day, the United 
States , doggedly opposes any punitive action, and 
partly because the Arab solidarity is weak and 
inconsistent. 
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...... us 
188. ABU-LUGHOD (Ibrahim). Amer ica ' s Palest ine 
policy. Arab Studies Quarterly. 12, 1-2; 1990, 
Wint-Spr; 1 9 1 - 2 0 1 . 
Summarizing the principal issues addressed by the 
policy in order to ' provide the explanation for 
A m e r i c a ' s o p p o s i t i o n to P a l e s t i n i a n self-
determinat ion. And briefly outlined the America's 
broad policy toward Palestine and the Palestinians. 
The United States has been and is unalterably 
opposed to the Palest inian r ight to self-
determination in all its aspects. That was true of 
the mandate period and it is true today. The United 
States, on a policy level, does not accept the 
indivisibility of the '• Palestinians as a people and 
thus is prepared to deal with them only as distinct 
units; as refugees, West Bankers, PLO people, and 
so on. Its complex policies have called for, support, 
promoted and sustained the subordination of the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel 
and the settlement of Palestinians of the diaspora 
in the countries of their residence. It is clear that 
American policy has been consistently hostile to the 
Palestinians and opposed to the fulfillment of their 
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national aspirations. The US has rendered the 
incredible support to Israel in its effort to suppress 
the Palestinians. 
, , US, CARTER, EFFECT, SETTLEMENT 
189. TERRY (Jenice J). Carter administration and the 
Palestinians. Arab Studies Quarterly. 12, 1-2; 
1990 , Wint-Spr; 153 -65 . 
Jimmy Carter, as had all recently successful 
presidential candidates, campaigned on a strong 
pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian platform. Throughout 
the campaign, Carter adhered to the Kissinger 
formulation of 'No negotiat ions with the PLO until 
it recognizes UN Resolution 242 and the right of 
Israel to exist. The Carter administration had been 
on the right track when it moved for a 
comprehensive sett lements with the resolution of 
Palestinian demands for self-determination. As the 
behind the scenes, negotiat ions with the PLO 
indicate the administration also come close to 
recognizing that the PLO was the sole legitimate 
political representative of the Palestinians, although 
it did not make the fact public knowledge. The 
Palestinians and Arabs had always argued that a 
separate agreement that excluded the Palestinian 
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would not achieve peace. By foregoing its quest for 
a comprehensive settlement in favour of a quicker, 
and politically more'expedient, step-by-step process 
the Carter administration drove the negotiations 
over a practiced detour on a dead-end road. 
, , — - , CLINTON 
190 RICHARD (Augustus Nortan). Clinton's Middle East 
policy: a scuttled peace. Current History. 97 , 615; 
1998 , Jan ; 1-6. 
Madeline Albright travelled to Doha, the Sheikhdom 
of Qatar to take part in a long planned regional 
economic conference what might been a step 
towards building peaceful Middle East turned into 
a major embarrassment for US policy. Without 
forward momentum in the peace process between 
Israel and the Palestinian- Authority, Albright had 
emphasized in a major policy speech that the Doha 
meeting was central to the peace process and 
economic future of the Middle East. Peace between 
the peace p rocess ' and economic future of the 
Middle East. Peace between Palestinian and Israelis 
may only be a matter of time, as Albright argued 
in her pre-Doha speech. The political opposition in 
Jordan complains that there has been no peace 
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dividend and a Israel 's stone walling of the Oslo 
agreement has been abetted by the US. But any 
historical standard, the resolution of the Arab-
Israel i confl ic t would s tand as a g r ea t 
accomplishment, but the Clinton administration is 
in danger of falling well short of resolving it. Most 
distressing through its different diplomacy the US 
has conceded the initiative to the bilUgerents, who. 
may be imaginative but not necessarily in peace 
making. 
, - — , - — , HUMAN RIGHTS 
1 9 1 . RUBENBERG (Cheryl A). US-PLO dia logue: 
Continuity or change in American policy. Arab 
Studies Quarterly. 1 1 , 4; 1989, Fall; 1-58. 
American policy on the question of Palestinian is 
characterized both by remarkable consistency and 
by its complete negotiation of the Palestinians as 
a nation of people with basic human rights - to 
independent state and to other rights that people 
in global community partake of simply by virtue of 
being human. Washington's initiation of formal 
talks with PLO was not employed as a means of 
facilitating a just solution or genuine peace in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather it was intended 
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as a device to halt the intifada so as to contain 
any contagious effect on neighboring pro-American 
Arab countr ies ; to preserve to strength of Israel's 
strategic and surrogate capabilities; and to provide 
an appea rance of impartiality in US relations with 
the Arab states and Israel in order to recover 
American control over the lucrative market in Arab 
world. The US also conceived the dialogue as a 
means of facilitate the termination of Palestinian 
nationalism and end the Palestinian quest for an 
independent state. 
. . . . . .._.-^.....^ LAND, JERUSALEM, EAST, EFFECT, 
UN, SECURITY COUNCIL 
192. DRAFT ON East Jerusalem not adopted by security 
council: United States vetoes text. UN Chronicle. 
32, 3; 1 9 9 5 , Sep; 44-5. 
A draft resolution calling upon Israel-the occupying 
power to rescind its order for expropriation of some 
53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem was not 
adopted by the Security Council on 17 May 1995, 
due to a veto by one of its permanent members 
- the United States. The vote was 14 in favour to 
1 against . The text would have confirmed that 
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Israel 's expropriatio.n orders were invalid and in 
violation of relevant council resolutions and the 
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection 
of civilians in time of war, US had exercised its 
veto for the first time in five years, reluctantly but 
without hesitation on a matter of principle. As co-
sponsor of the middle east peace process, the US 
said it believed that direct talks between the pat t ies 
were the only path to achieve a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace in the region. By declaring 
itself on the issue of Jerusalem, the Council would 
have violated that principle. The issue must be 
resolved between the par t ies with the support of 
the international community but without its 
interference. 
, — - , , MEDIA, ROLE 
193 . SAFTY (Adel). L a n g u a g e and p r o p a g a n d a : 
Challenges to media interpretat ions of the Palestine 
question. Arab Studies Quarterly. 13, 3-4; 1 9 9 1 , 
Sum-Fall; 91-117 . 
There have been numerous challenges to the 
media's representat ions and interpretations of the 
conflict over Palestine. These include readily 
documented facts and interpretat ions about the 
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moral, legal and historical aspects of the conflict 
which are commonly accepted by the international 
c o m m u n i t y but rejected by t h e Amer ican 
government and media. The analysis of the 
progmatics and semantics of the language used to 
interview, report and analyze the events of the 
Palestinian uprising shows that they continue to 
reflect a resilient system of interpretat ion that 
re interprets the normative and dramatic challenges 
c o n f r o n t i n g it. The m e d i a ' s dominan t 
in terpreta t ions of the Palestinian conflict remain 
compatible with official policy and responsive to 
the needs of powerful interest gr.oups. Thus, 
desp i t e symbolic concessions m a d e to the 
inescapability reality of Palestinian subjugation, the 
media 's normative assumptions and interpretive 
contexts remain rejectionist on both the historical 
record and international consensus on the 
legitimacy of Palestinian national r ights . 
, ,-—-, 1980s 
194. LESCH (Ann M). US policy towards the Palestinians 
in the 1980s . Arab Studies Quarterly. 12; l -2 ;990 , 
Wint-Spr; 167-189. 
Discussing the United States policy with the 
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Palestinians. Especially assessing the Reagan's 
administration, his strategic conception and the 
strategic cooperation with the Israel; the Shutlz, 
plan and to which extent it has the Palestinian 
representat ion; Bush administrat ion at some extent. 
,—--, , 1988-98 
195. CHRISTISON (Kathleen). Bound by a frame of 
reference, part III: US policy and the Palestinians, 
1988-98 . Journal Of Palest ine Studies. 27, 4; 
1998 , Sum; 53-64. 
The policy makers most responsible for shaping 
policy on the Palestinian-Israeli question in both the 
Bush and Clinton administrat ions, a team led by 
special mediator Dennis Ross, came age politically 
at a time when the Palest inian perspective was 
vir tual ly excluded from Amer ican pol i t ical 
discourse. These policy makers, by their own 
testimony emotionally involved in Arab-Israeli 
issues because of their Jewish roots, are naturally 
inclined to view the issue from the traditional 
I s rae l -centered van t age po in t desp i te their 
occasionally harsh criticism of Israel's right-wing 
government and their vaunted understanding of 
Palestinian sensibilities. Part III of this series 
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examines how the old frame of reference still 
determines policy even in an era when Palestinian 
are seen as legitimate par t ic ipants in the peace 
process . 
, — - , - — , 1948-88 
CHRISTISON (Kathleen). Bound by a frame of 
reference, part II: US policy and the Palestinians, 
1948 -88 . Journal of Palestine Studies. 27, 3; 
1998 , Spr; 20-34. ' 
Following Israel's creation in 1 9 4 8 , the Palestinians 
d i s a p p e a r e d from Uni ted S t a t e s policy 
considerations and did not reemerge until the late 
1960s , when they forced themselves on the world's 
consciousness with a series of terrorist actions and 
a determined assertion of national aims. With the 
exception of Carter administration the history of 
the two decades of American policy making that 
followed is one of a concerted effort to undermine 
the PLO. Examining the frame of reference that 
molded policy maker thinking on Palestinian-Israeli 
issues one centered on the Israeli perspective and 
basically ignorant of the Palestinian view point from 
the Eisenhower administration through the Reagan 
years. 
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, , , REAGAN, UN, ANNIVERSARY 
197. PLO UNDER pressure. Democratic World. 14, 4 2 ; 
1985 , Oct, 20; 4. 
The Palestine libration organization the sole 
representative of the people of Palestine have come 
under pressure. Under pressure of the United States 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat will not participate in 
the fortieth anniversary celebration of the United 
Nation's President Reagan had taken the stand of 
boycotting UN session in the event of arafat being 
invited Sir Geoffrey Howe British Foreign secretary 
cancelled his meeting with two .senior PLO 
representative on the plea that they had not 
renounced violence publicly. The recent raid on 
PLO headquarters in Tunisia also falls in a pat tern. 
The PLO is now being brought into disrepute by 
being jacked the convenient label of terrorists so 
as to lock up the Palestinian cause for good. 
, , , TRUMAN, COLD WAR 
198. EVENSEN (Bruce J). Truman, Palestine and the 
Cold war. Middle Eastern Studies. 28 , 1; 1992, 
Jan; 120-156. 
An analysis of the Truman administration's cold war 
consideration of its Palestinian policy shows how 
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the region became imbedded in policy deliberations 
extending far beyond its borders. So too the 
interpreta t ions appearing in the press about what 
Palestine represented went far beyond the struggle 
of two peop les for a single land. Article arguing 
that it was not simple political opportunism which 
explains Truman 's support for the Jewish state. An 
analysis of the internal documents of the Truman 
administration reveals the degree to which the 
problems of Palestine became linked to a great 
power confrontat ion to fill the power vacuum being 
created in the near east by the British retreat from 
empire. Truman faltering performance on Palestine 
highlights the power of interpretation in policy 
making. 
—--, POLITICS, SYSTEM, PATRIARCHY, ARAFAT 
199. JARBAWI (Ali). Palestinian politics at a cross roads. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 24. 4; 1996 , Sum; 29-
39 . 
The Palest inian political system continues to be 
characterized by patriarchy, with one man at the 
centre of the political process. It was hoped that 
the election of the legislative council would change 
that, introducing checks and balances, greater 
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accountability and transparency. It is already 
apparen t that the executive branch is trying to 
undermine it by keeping it out of the final status 
negot ia t ions and by curtailing its ability to hold the 
government financially and politically accountable. 
One indication of Arafat's plans is his appointment 
of a large cabinet of about thirty members . The size 
and the broad base of the cabinet seem designed 
to assure that the legislative branch will become an 
appendage of the executive. With the beginning of 
final s tatus negotiations, Palestinian political life 
enters a new and difficult stage. By the time this 
transitional stage ends, a new political map will 
have been drawn. While the present situation 
remains in flux, the general shape of that map can 
already be gleaned from the challenges currently 
underway. 
—--, ROLE, ANM, ACHIEVEMENTS, 1951-66 
200. SAYIGH (Yezid). Reconstructing the paradox: The 
Arab Nationalist Movement, armed struggle and 
Palestine, 1951-1966. Middle East Journal. 45 , 4; 
1 9 9 1 , Ant; 608-29. 
The war of June 1967 revealed the extent to which 
the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) had become 
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a pan-Arab Movement in name only. The war also 
dealt knell to what 'was left of the ANM's central 
decision-making g roup . Its Syrian and Iraqi 
membership, already shrinking, was absorbed by the 
Palestinians command or local parties. The ANM's 
'Center ' ceased to exist when Heroes of the Return 
and Vengence Youth Organization of Palestinian 
command joined a smaller guerrilla group to form 
the Popular Front for the Libration of Palestinian 
in December 1967 , from which the Democratic 
Front for the Libration of Palestine later emerged. 
The ANM failed to achieve the aims it had set for 
itself at its inception. It is unable .to make a 
breakthrough precisely in its defined core arena: 
Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflict. What made the 
ANM unique among its pan-Arab rivals was its 
Palestinian commitment, but this it subsumed under 
the priorities of Arab politics in the period upto 
1 9 6 3 . The ANM underwent its internal ideological 
debate and develojbed its Palestinians focus in 
1960s . Its Arab components fell away and its pan-
Arabism dissipated. Yet even then, the ANM 
stopped short of turning itself into full-fledged 
Palestinian organisat ion. Weighed down by its 
ideological baggage and political adherence to 
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Nasir, it held back from the armed struggle initiated 
by fatah, ceding the initiative at a critical juncture 
in Palestinian politics and dooming itself to 
secondary status and to further fragmentation after 
1967 . 
... . .^.... . ,BRITAIN, ZIONISM, 1 9 2 7 - 3 1 
2 0 1 . FRIESEL (Evyatar). Through a peculiar lens : 
Zionism and Palestine in British diaries, 1927-31 . 
Middle Eastern. 29 ,3 ; 1993. July; 4 1 9 - 4 4 . 
British presence in Palestine during the period of 
Mandate (1918-1948) has mostly sidetracked a 
significant issue: what were the , perceptions 
spiritual, ideological, historical that shaped, or at 
least influenced, British policies regarding Zionism 
and its aspirations in Palestine: In addition to 
British political interests, there were also certain 
ideas which influenced the making of the Balfour 
Declaration what happened to those ideas later on? 
How did they change and why? This article intents 
to explore tis issue concentrating on a short period. 
It aims to describe and to analyse how members 
of the British establishment in Jerusalem, or those 
close to it, saw what was happening in the country 
around the time of disturbances of 1929 and the 
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consequent white paper of 1 9 3 0 , the Passfield 
white paper . It was s first rehearsal towards change 
in British policy vis-a-vis Zionist aspiration in 
Palest ine, which reached their final stage in 1939. 
. . . . .^. . . .- ,GUERRILLAS, WAR, 1 9 6 7 . 
202 . SAYIGH (Yezid). Turning defeat into opportunity: 
the Palest inian Guerillas after the June 1967 war. 
Middle East Journal. 46 ,2 ; 1 9 9 2 , Spr; 244-65 . 
Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas of 1967 was lies 
in af termath the war before that their movement 
was a secondary force, with no clear course in 
sight. The war, by discrediting Arab authority and 
w e a k e n i n g s ta te cont ro l and c rea t ion the 
opportunity for the rise of the Palestinian 
guerrillas as regional actors. Creation of an 
au tonomous base and mount of an armed. 
Interaction in the Israeli occupied West Bank and 
this a t tempt led to a redefinition of the 
Palest inians relation with the other Arabs and to 
a transformation of internal Palestinian politics. 
Impact of insurrectionary at tempt is on relation 
between the guerrillas on the one hand and PLO 
and Arab governments on the other, before 
assessing the implications for the subsequent 
316 
development of the Palestinian movement. 
. . . . .^..—,JEWISH-DRUZE, ALLIANCE. 
2 0 3 . GELBER (Yoav). Antecedents of Jewish-Druze 
alliance in Palestine. Middle Eastern Studies. 28 ,2 ; 
1992 , Apr; 353 -73 . 
Ever since the revival of the Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, connections between Jewish colonies and 
the adjacent Druze, villages had developed on the 
local level. Country wide and institutionalized 
Jewish Druze dialogue commenced however, only in 
1930 following the establishment of the Joint 
Bureau for Arab Affairs by the Jewish Agency and 
the Jewish National council. Which is responsible 
for encouraging Jewish Arab relations, and soon 
embarked upon creating bonds with Druze in 
Palestine in the hope of eventually extending then 
to their brethren in Syria and Lebanon. The efforts 
of the Jewish agency to conclude agreements in 
1947 with other minority groups, such as the 
Maronites of Lebanon and the opposition factions 
in Palestine, similarly failed. As long as the contest 
between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was 
undecided, the minorities were apprehensive of 
publicity committing themselves in favour of the 
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Jews. An official Jewish Druze all iance become 
proactive only after the collapse of Palestinian 
Arabs and the halting of the regular Arab and the 
halting of the regular Arab armies in April-May 
1948 . 
.....^ ,PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY. 
204. HALEVI (Ilan). Self government, democracy, and 
management under the Pales t in ian Authority. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 27 , 3 ; 1 9 9 8 , spr; 35-
4 8 . 
Using as its starting point the May 1997 report by 
Palestinian parliamentary committee on the misuse 
of public funds, this essay looks into the 
performance of the Palestinian Authority and 
charges of corruption, pa t ronage , and human 
rights violations. It argues that most of the excess 
result from the legal vacuum created by the 
occupation and from the absence of institutional 
counterweights to the PA in all domains . While 
reactions to the report demonstra ted civil society's 
profound aspiration for the rule of law. Article 
concludes that the absence of a state recently 
means the absence of a state of law and an ongoing 
state of emergency.' 
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-—, ,—-,ARAFAT,EFFECT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
205. NEW MASTERS, old habits. Middle East. 266 ; 
1997, Apr; 1 0 - 1 . 
For many years , human rights organisat ions such 
as Amnes ty I n t e r n a t i o n a l d o c u m e n t e d and 
c a m p a i g n e d a g a i n s t human r i g h t s abuse s 
perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinians of 
West Bank and Gaza. With the return of Yasser 
Arafat and Palestinian rule, many hoped such 
events were a thin'g of the past and that the 
Palestinians would create an open, democrat ic and 
free society for themselves. But this is proving not 
to be the case . Arafat has imposed h'is autocratic 
style of leadership upon the areas controlled by the 
Palestinian authority and his numerous security 
press have imposed a reigon of terror upon the 
population. Democracy appears to be on the wans, 
as Arafat extends his control in three key ways 
centralising power and neutralizing the opposition, 
while muzzling the press and human rights 
organisation. With attacks on the Palestinian media 
now so widespread, it is hard to argue that press 
freedom exists within the Palestine community. The 
torture is widespread and some of the same people 
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who suffered under the Israeli occupat ion are now 
being the Palestinian Authority throughout his long 
tenure as the Chairman of , Arafat has proved to 
be in masterful political operator. 
, ,PALESTNIAN INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION FOR CITIZEN'S RIGHTS 
206. ASRAWI (Hanan). Once and future nat ion. Index on 
censorshi 2 4 , 5 ; 1995 ;157-62 . 
Interview describing that Palest inians Independent 
commission is for citizen's rights (PICCR) which 
do monitor the events, but it is not a human rights 
NGO. In the sense that they exist Israeli as well 
as Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza. Ms. 
Hanan describe that what the commission to do is 
to unify the laws and come up with a just and 
uniform legal system that meets contemporary 
needs. Further describes that even within Jericho 
and Gaza different systems operat ion; the West 
Bank is still Under military occupation and the 
application of military laws; Jewish Alen is illegally 
annexed and therefore under some sort of Israeli 
law. The PICCR have taken up their defence in 
the hope that they can continue their work with 
their integrity intact. There are many human rights 
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organizations but as the whole all have actual 
responsibly working systematically throughout the 
occupation and maintain their credibility. 
.....^..._.,PLA-EGYPTIAN ARMY, GAZA 1964-67 . 
207. SAYIGH (Yezid). Escalation or conta inment? Egypt 
and the Pa les t ine l ibration Arym 1 9 6 4 - 6 7 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 30 ; 
1998, Feb; 9 7 - 1 1 6 ! 
Describing the formation of the general command 
of the Palest ine Libration Army (PLA) and of its 
combat units in the Egyptian administered Gaza 
strip in 1 9 6 4 - 6 7 . consisting of the, minutes of 
meetings between the leadership of the Palestine 
Libration Organisat ion (PLO) and the PLA and the 
Egypt ian a r m y command and of official 
correspondence and formal agreements between the 
two sides. The primary contribution of this article 
is to present in analytical contribution of this article 
is to present in analytical context a rare cache of 
Arab archival material from the period. 
, — - , U N , GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SECURITY 
OCCUPIED TERRITORY. 
208. GENERAL ASSEMBLY asks Security Council to 
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consider ways to protact Palest inian civilian. U.N. 
Chronicle. 26 , 3; 1989, Sep; 16 -7 . 
The Geneal Assembly has asked the security council 
to urgently consider internat ional measuses to 
protect Palestinians territory occupied by Israel., 
including Jerusalem By resolution 4 3 / 2 3 3 , adopted 
on 20 April 1989 by 129 votes to 2 (Israel, united 
States), with 1 abstention (Liberia), the world body 
condemned the killing and wounding of defenseless 
Palestinian civilians and specifically the latest 
action of members of the Israeli armed forces 
against the defenceless civilians in the Palestinian 
town of Nahhalin. 
, ,UNRWA, EMPLOYMENT, OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES. 
209. FEILER (Gil). Palestinian employment prospects. 
Middle East Journal. 47 .4 ; 1993 ,Aut ; 633 -51 . 
Intifadah and Persian Gulf war have not had a 
significant impact on the number of Palestinian 
works employed in Israel, both events have resulted 
in a complete metamorphosis in Palestinian 
employment patterns in the Pers ian Gulf states, 
Jordan and occupied territories. In the long term, 
high unemployment rates within Israel, shorter 
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hours worked by the Palestinian within Israel, the 
substitution of Palestinian labor with soviet 
immigrants and anticipation of further immigration 
to Israeli of Jews from the former soviet republics 
will each reduce the availability of the work in 
Israel for the Palestinians. After more than two 
decades, the period of a single labor market 
between Israel an the occupied terri tories may be 
coming to an end. Unemployment has soared and 
living s tandards are dropping. The United Nations 
Relief and works Agency (UNRWA) is now 
distributing basic food supplies to the entire 
Palestinians population. Given that one of the 
demographic, features of the occupied territories is 
the high rate of young persons who will join the 
ranks of those seeking work in the next few years, 
it appears that the situation is likely to become 
worse. 
- . - . , - . - , U S AID, WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP. 
210. ROY (Sara). Development uner occupation? : The 
political economy of US aid to the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Arab Studies Quarterly 3 1 , 3 - 4 ; 1991 , 
Sum-Fal; 6 5 - 8 9 . 
There is a role for U.S. aid in the West Bank and 
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Gaza Strip but only with the introduction of some 
critically needed changes in the objectives and 
structure of the program. One critical problem 
characterizing America's assis tance initiative is the 
direct participation of the Israeli govt, in the 
project approval process. Without key changes in 
the US economic assistance program to the West 
Bank and Gaza, American aid will remain severally 
limited in its ability to ameliorates the harmful 
effects of occupation and assist in indigenous 
development efforts. The programm will continue to 
be controlled by Israeli military officials and 
manipulated to serve their interests and in the 
process , will increasingly a l ienate the local 
population wheel need for assis tance grows more 
and more acute. As far as US and other foreign 
aid programs are concerned, the issue is not one 
of money but of who controls that money and 
how it is used. ' In the highly politicized 
environment created by the Palestinian Israeli 
conflict, economic consideration cannot be divoced 
from their political counterpar ts but neither do 
they have to be subordinated to them 
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,SELF-GOVERNMENT, PNC, RETURN, WEST 
BANK AND GAZA, 
2 1 1 . CLAUDE (Patrice). Israel allows PLO leaders to 
re turn . Guardian Weekly. 154, 5; 1996, Feb, 4; 19. 
After voting of Palestinian election on the West 
Bank and Gaza strip the Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres announced his decision to allow the 
4 3 0 exiled members of the Palestine national 
Council (PNC) to return to the self governed 
Palestinian diaspora had the effect of a bombshells. 
It was described as abominable by the rightwing 
Israeli opposition and overwhelming by the internal 
Palestinian political community. It means that 
members of the PNC which represents Palestinian 
civilion society, the trade unions, the army of 
libration and all the factions within the PLO, 
including those opposed to the agreemets so far 
concluded with israel will be able, for the first time 
since its foundation in East Jerusalem 32 years 
ago, to return to self governed Palestinian 
terri tories. Peres told that there will be no 
restriction on their return. Nor will he require them 
to recognise israel or Oslo agreemens. But Habash 
has said that he will return to Palestine only after 
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the criation of a Palestinian state and when all his 
fellow Palestinians in the diaospora have been 
allowed to do the same. 
-—-, ,SELF RULE, GAZA. 
2 1 2 . LIFE IN Gaza after self rule .World Focus. 15 ,6 ; 
1994, June; 23 . 
The Palestinian flags strung outside Yasser Arafat 
is headquarters are tattered and a scorching sum 
has bleached the vivid greens and sees. Their of 
gaza, where the end of Israelite occupation has 
brought neither jobs nor houses Islamic militants 
are back to scrawling slogans on walls against the 
Israelis and Americans. Anti Arafat slogans may be 
next. Although Palestinians have their leaders, land 
people together in one place for the first time, the 
initial people together in one place for the first 
time, the initial exitement has ebbed and they 
grumble that self rate is doing little to improve 
their lives. The autonomy has not met the most 
basic aspirations of the people, Israel still control 
the borders of Gaza. The number of Palestinian and 
Israeli road blocks had multiplied. Getting a permit 
ot leave Gaza strip is more complicated. Arafat 
denied to go Jericho which he originally chose as 
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the seat of govt, until Israel fulfilled tis promise to 
originally chose as the seat of govt, until Israel 
fulfilled its promise to establish a safe passage for 
Palest inians between the West Bank town and Gaza. 
His first month in Gaza has been marred by 
violence. 
. . . . . . ,LANDLOSS, HISTORY 
213 . AGWANI (MS). Israel and Palestinian self-rule World 
Focus. 15 , 6; 1994, June; 3-6. 
The Palest inians question centered on two issues: 
land and people . Partition opened the way for the 
in gather ing of the Jewish diaspora in Israel and 
the simultaneous expulsion of some 800 ,000 
Palest inians from their homes. Some more last 
their homes as a consequence of the 1967 Arab 
Israeli War. Current estimates put the total number 
of Palest inians at over six million of this, two 
million live in the occupied lands including East 
Jerusa lem, one million in Jordan and another one 
millions in Israeli proper. The remaining two million 
are refuges scattered all over the world. Hence, 
with the exception of those who have become 
nat ionals of Israel or Jordan, the vast majority of 
the pass ionateness line either under Israeli military 
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occupation or as refugees. The land, Israel took 
over in 1 9 4 8 some 77 percent of the Palestinian 
territory, even though the UN part i t ion plan had 
assigned it only 55 percent of the total . During 
1987 was, Israel seized the remaining 23 percent 
as well. Soon after/ Israel starte setting up Jewish 
sett lemtns the West Bank and Gaza and East 
Jerusalem Conclusively article discussing the 
activities of the PLO and intifada for the struggle 
of peace and Palestinian rights. 
--—,--—,ROLE, US, 1917-48 . 
214 . AHMED (Hisham H). From the Balfour declaration 
to World War II: The US stand on Palestinians self 
determinat ion. Arab Studies Quarterly 12,2; 1990 
wint/spr . 9 -14 . 
The prolongat ion of conflict in the Middle East is 
mainly caused by Israeli's denied of the right of the 
Palestinian people to exercise elf determination in 
their homeland. United States, because of its 
uncondit ional political, moral, economic and 
military supports off the Israel occupation of 
Palestine, must bear heavy responsibility for 
containing state of unrest in the region Product of 
Zionist efforts was the Balfour's declaration, to use 
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their bes t endeavors to facilitate the achievement 
of the establishment in Palest ine of a national 
home for Jewish people. In this art icle, assessment 
of the role played by the United States in 
determining the fate of Palest ine from World War 
I until the 1947-48 is investigates the way in which 
American foreign policy makers have in theory and 
in p r a c t i c e , appl ied the p r inc ip l e of self 
de terminat ion to the Palestinian people . 
-—-,SETTLEMENT, JEWISH, HOUSING UNITS, 
JERUSALEM. 
215 . COBBAN (Helena). Redefining Jus t ice : Hopes for 
a lasting peace in Jerusalem. Journa l of Palestine 
Studies 2 5 , 2 ; 1996 wint; 6 0 - 7 0 . 
Describing the Israeli government ' s discrimination 
a g a i n s t Pa l e s t in i ans in t h e a r e a of land 
expropr ia t ion planning and building in Jerusalum. 
The most of the lands expropriated by Israel in the 
West Bank areas annexed in 1967 as part of the 
expended Jerusalem were privately owned by Arabs 
and some 3 8 , 5 0 0 0 housing units were built on this 
land for the Jewish population, but not one housing 
unit for Palestinians. Many Jewish Israelis do not 
consider settlements like French Hill, Gilo, and 
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Pisgat Ze'ev to be par t of East Jerusalem In case 
of residency rights one is that Palestinians in the 
holy city share with all their compatriots living 
under Israeli occupat ion. One difference is that 
Palestinians who are living inside expended city 
were given blue passbook as permanent resident of 
Jerusalem and those were out side were given an 
orange passbook as pe rmanen t resident of West 
Bank. Blue passbooks have to be renewed every 
seven years and can be confiscated and without for 
a member reasons, consequently, about forty 
thousand Palestinian have last their status as city 
residents since 1 9 6 8 , due to various-bureaucratic 
plays. 
,SOLUTION, TWO STATES; POST OSLO, 
1993 . 
2 1 6 . KARMI (Ghada). Life with the enemy: The one 
state solution World today. 53 ,8-9 ; 1997 Aug -
Sep; 200-02. 
A two state solution of the Palestinian Israeli 
conflict has become accepted dogma. It first raised 
in 1974 when PNC voted to establish a 
Palestinians authority on any liberated part of the 
Palestinian homeland. Since then Palestinian 
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l e ade r sh ip h a s cons i s t en t ly a imed for an 
independent s ta te , to be set up in the West Bank 
and Gaza, most of which is currently under Israeli 
occupation, with East Jerusalem as its capital Oslo 
accord were signed in 1993 , this position 
crystallized Exect boundaries of the p ropose state 
have not been defined even by Palestinian state. 
The latest may of occupied territories explains the 
position. This shows a West Bank pock marked by 
Jewish set t lements encircling Palestinian towns and 
seperating them from each other crisis crossed by 
so called bypass roads built for the exclusive use 
of Israeli's and breaking up Palestirvian territory 
even more. Sine 1993 the economic situation in 
the Palestinian terri tories has deteriorated further 
as a result of the Israel closures of Gaza and West 
Bank and the importation into Israeli of foreign 
labour. T h e P a l e s t i n i a n a r e a s a r e thus 
disadvantaged by high unemployment, trade 
restrictions, an undevelopment industrial base and 
poor natural resources . 
--—,STATE, PROBLEMS. 
217 . HELLER (Mark A). Towards a Palestine state 
Survival 3 9 , 2 ; 1997 , Sum; 5-22. 
A debate about a' Palestinians state has been 
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settled. An embryonic state already exists, and a 
more fully formed state will necessarily be part of 
any peace agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians. What remains to be decided are its 
form and content. Israel should be generous as 
possible in its at t i tude to the territorial and 
functional components of Palestinian statehood but 
it needs to incorporate the major settlement blocs 
in West Bank, retain military control of the Jordan 
Valley and insist on some restrictions on 
Palestinians sovereignty. The alternatives to this 
approach are few and far less promising. 
2 1 8 . TUTUNJI (Jenab) and KHALDI (Kamal). Rational 
s tate in Palest ine: the rational choice for 
Palestinians and the moral choice for Israelis. 
International Affairs. 7 3 , 1; 1997, Jan; 31 -58 . 
The creation of independent state will not satisfy 
the Palestinian people ' s dream of freedom, equality 
and political normalcy and is a remote probability 
at best. The Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza face a choice between living in a bantustan 
or transforming limited autonomy into a component 
of a binational state in which the Jewish and 
Palestinian ethno-national communities will be able 
to coexist while each preserves its own cultural 
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identity. The Palestinian need to reorient their 
struggle accordingly. This rational choice for 
Palest inians is also the moral choice for Israeli's 
and Palestinians alike. 
, , , JEWISH VIEWPOINT 
219 . IBNBAR (Efraim) and SANDLER (Shmuel). Risks of 
Palest inian statehood. Survival. 3 9 , 2; 1997, Sum; 
2 3 - 4 1 . 
In recent years the Arab-Israeli conflict has lost 
some of its severity, the Middle East is still a 
dangerous region. One suggestion that might 
ameliorate the situation is to establish a Palestinian 
s ta te . In terms of security and stability, this is a 
problemat ic proposition. Based upon current 
Palestnian politics, a Palestinian state will probably 
be authori tar ian and will include radical elements 
in its foreign policy. It could become a threat to 
its neighbors - Israel and Jordan and to the 
interests of Saudi Arabia and other western allies. 
A Palestinian state could also turn into a haven for 
internat ional terrorism. Since the Palestinian state 
is under construction, several precautions seem 
necessary: prolonging the tendable for establishing 
it; denying it control over critical strategic areas; 
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identity. The Palestinian need to reorient their 
struggle accordingly. This rational choice for 
Palestinians is also the moral choice for Israeli's 
and Palestinians alike. 
. . . . .^. . . . .^. . . . . , JEWISH VIEWPOINT 
219. IBNBAR (Efraim) and SANDLER (Shmuel). Risks of 
Palestinian s ta tehood. Survival. 39 , 2; 1 9 9 7 , Sum; 
2 3 - 4 1 . 
In recent years the Arab-Israeli conflict has lost 
some of its severity, the Middle East is still a 
dangerous region. One suggestion that might 
ameliorate the situation is to establish a Palestinian 
state. In terms of security and stability, this is a 
problematic proposi t ion . Based upon current 
Palcstnian politics, a Palestinian state will probably 
be authoritarian and will include radical elements 
in its foreign policy. It could become a threat to 
its neighbors - Israel and Jordan and to the 
interests of Saudi Arabia and other western allies. 
A Palestinian state could also turn into a haven for 
international terrorism. Since the Palestinian state 
is under construction, several precaut ions seem 
necessary: prolongirig the tendable for establishing 
it; denying it control over critical strategic areas; 
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and limiting its sovereignty. These measures would 
minimize the risk of Palestinian statehood. If not 
creat ing a Palestinian state will have proved to be 
a very costly experiment for that state 's neighbors 
and the region as a whole. 
^.....^.....^ NETANYAHU, VIEW POINT 
220. MENON (Kesava). Israel at fifty. Frontline. 1998, 
May, 22; 45-7 . 
The challenge before Israel in the 50th year of its 
existence is to discover a formula to resolve the 
divisions within and a norm that will guide its 
relat ions with its neighbours and the wider world. 
The prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu expresses 
the view that a Palestine state is unacceptable since 
that would be tantamount to creation of an 'Iraqi 
or Iran' on Israel's borders. The implicit message 
is that a Palestinian state could, like Iraq or Iran, 
be strong enough to threaten Israel's existence - a 
belief that is contrary to the view of most experts 
that none of these states will be able to extinguish 
Israel 's existence. Israel has set such an impossible 
test only to provide itself with a justifications 
which, among other things, will restore their land 
to them. The religious formation could provide the 
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most serious challenge to the evolution of the 
Israeli state and its ability to fit into the 
neighborhood. 
-—-, UN, RESOLUTION 181 (11), JERUSALEM 
2 2 1 . FELLOWS (Peregrine). Middle East II: A proposal 
for Jerusalem. World Today. 80, 5; 1994, May; 19-
20 
General Assembly of UN adopted Resolution 181 
(II), which partitioned Palest ine into a Jewish and 
an Arab state, with a corpus separatum for the city 
of Jerusalem. Jerusalem would be constituted as an 
independent city state within agreed boundaries 
with no sovereign power other than its own city 
government exercising authority over it. Within the 
boundaries of Holy City of Jerusalem these would 
be set aside two extra-territorial enclaves that 
would be Israeli and Arab national territory 
respectively. National flags could be flown within 
the enclaves. But the only flag to be flown 
anywhere else in Jerusalem would be that chosen 
to be emblem of Holy city. Resolution of the rival 
claims of Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews to 
possession of Holy city is going to be supremely 
difficult, and might well make further progress 
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towards a lasting peace impossible or dangerously 
long delayed. There is however no escaping 
Je rusa lem's strong religious connotat ion from the 
very earl iest time. Jerusalem's implications are 
paramount for the three great world faiths that find 
their inspirat ion there. 
, ,—--, 1 9 4 7 ' 
222 . KHALIDI (Walid). Revisiting the UNGA partition 
resolution. Journal of Palestine Studies. 27, 1; 
1997 , Aut; 5 - 2 1 . 
Examining the 1947 UN resolution recommending 
the part i t ion of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish 
state as the fulfillments of fifty years of Zionist 
efforts to establish a Jewish state in Palestine and 
as the opportunity tp expand the s ta te . The article 
analyzes the components of the parti t ion plan itself 
in the light of the demographic and land ownership 
realities of the time and discusses the implications 
to the presen t day of the general acceptance of the 
Zionist version of events. 
—--, UPRISING, INTIFADA 
2 2 3 . CHHABRA (Hari Sharan). Triumph of Intifadah, 
Arafat. World Focus. 9, 9; 1988 , Sep; 3-5. 
Issue of an independent state of Palest ine, which 
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is central to the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken 
some dramatic and ' unexpected twists and turns, 
since the beginning of the heroic national uprising 
by the Palestinians in the Israel occupied territories 
of West Bank and Gaza strip. The multidimensional 
outcome of the uprising, known by Palestinians as 
Intifadah will naturally be written in golden worlds 
in the post- independent history of Palestine. Many 
far-reaching developments concerning Palestine 
have taken place in the year 1988 but most 
significant is the rnajor or shift in Washington's 
pol icy on D e c e m b e r 15 , when Reagan 
administration expressed its willingness to have a 
substantive dialogue with the Palestine libration 
organization (PLO). US, thus reversed its 13-year 
ban on official contacts with the PLO, considered 
no more as a terrorist organization. 
224 . GOTTLIEB (Gidon). Israel and the Palestinians. 
Foreign Affairs. 68 , 4; 1989, Fall; 109-26 . 
In the wake of Palestinian uprising in the west Bank 
and Gaza, a number of dramatic events have taken 
place and both Israeli officials and Palestinians 
leaders have begun to draw the vague outlines of 
a possible solution. While it is still necessary to 
read beyond the hard-line rhetoric of both parties. 
557 
the subtexts coming from the Israeli and PLO 
leadership in Tunis actually converge on several 
points . Both camps have talked of a compromise 
involving a two or three-way confederation among 
the Palest inians, Jordan and Israel. Such a 
construct would allow an end to Israeli rule over 
Palestinian Arabs and treat the national and 
political r ights of all the peoples involved while 
providing adequate security guarantees for all 
parties and defuse the sovereignty question to some 
degree by placing it in the larger context of 
internat ional ties. A settlement thus based on 
association through separation, protect ing the 
different nat ional characters of the Jewish and Arab 
politics while creating economic and trade links, 
would certainly antagonize the opponents or 
negotiat ion and concession but it would be 
preferable to continued conflict. 
,—--, , ANTI-ISRAEL 
225 . AGWANI (MS). Struggle's decisive phase . World 
Focus. 9, 9; 1988 , Sep; 6-8. 
Ongoing uprising rnarks the culmination of the 
Palestinian people ' s struggle against the creeping 
colonization of their homeland by the Zionist over 
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the past fifty years. First Palestinian rebellion 
occurred in the late occurred in the late thirties and 
was directed against the British mandatory power 
which had opened the gates of Palestine for Jewish 
immigrants from E u r o p e . In 1 9 4 7 - 4 8 , the 
Palestinians resisted the United Nations' resolution 
to partition Palestine. The present uprising mirrors 
the accumulated anger of the Palestinian people 
against the oppressive occupation policies which 
successive Israeli governments have been pursuing 
since 1967 when Israel seized the remaining parts 
of Palestine in the six day war. Now the Palestinian 
uprising having entered the second ' year, king 
Hussain abandoning his claim on the West Bank 
and the PLO's declaration of an independent state 
of Palestine being acclaimed by all nations barring 
only the United States and Israel, the struggle of 
Palestinian people has certainly entered its most 
decisive phase. 
,--—, , CASE STUDY 
226 . FARSOUN (Samih K) and LANDIS (Jean M). 
Structure of the resistance and the "war of 
position": A case study of the Palestinian uprising. 
Arab Studies Quarterly. 1 1 , 4; 1989, Fall; 59-86 . 
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The intifada, a popular national libration movement 
of the Palest inian people under internal Israeli 
colonization, is an example par excellence of 
politics by other means. Under conditions not of 
their own choosing, the Palestinian people, men, 
women and children made dramatic history by 
developing the ideological, organizational and 
mobilizational means to resist oppression. Through 
their active participation in the dialectic of 
opp res s ion - r e s i s t ance , they have transformed 
qualitatively the balance of political, economic, 
social and ideological forces in the area; they have 
won the war of position. This feet is all the more 
remarkable when one consider the power resources 
and a r rogance of the colonizer. Article argues 
especially with the theoretical perspectives and 
colonial roots of the intifada. At test discuss the 
popular sovereignties and the conjunctural moment 
which have given the structural and mobilized seems 
to the intifada. 
—- , - -—, , EVENTS 
227 . GERNER (Deborah J). Palestinians, Israelis and 
Intifada: The third year and beyond. Arab Studies 
Quarterly. 1,3, 3-4; 1 9 9 1 . Sum-Fall; 19-64. 
Examining some of the most significant events 
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within the Palestinian, Israeli and international 
communities during 1990 and the first half of 1991 
in the context of their importance for the intifada. 
Analysing the data on violations of Palestinian 
human rights since 9 December 1987, and draw 
some conclusions on the effects of the intifada after 
three and a half years. 
, — - , , ISLAM ROLE, HAMAS 
228 . NADWI (MRK). Islamic side of Palestinian uprising. 
Journal of West Asian Studies. 8; 1992; 27-32. 
Describing the intifada or uprising of the 
Palestinians. From where it is started and at which 
step it took the Islamic side in form of Hamas. The 
intifada or popular uprising of Palestinian people 
in the occupied territories began in December 1987 
and continued unabated till the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. The uprising has receded after the 
American victory in the Gulf. The intifada spread 
all over the occupied territories like a bushfire 
which baffled both the occupation authorities as 
well as the Israeli establishment in Tel Aviv. The 
striking aspect of the Intifada has been its Islamic 
orientat ion. The nerve centres of the uprising all 
over the occupied' territories have infect been 
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mosques. Palestinian participated in the uprising 
but the leadership gradually slipped from their hands 
and went to Hamas, Islamic resistance movement. The 
Hamas is opposed to PLCs policy of continuous 
concessions and its participation in the peace process. 
It is clear that Islamists have gained unassailable ground 
in the occupied territories. It is also understandable that 
PLO will lose further ground to the Hamas if the 
ongoing peace talks fail in achieving a just and durable 
solution to the long standing Palestine problem. 
. . . . . . . . . . . OPINION, EFFECT, AMERICA 
229. GILBOA (Eytan). Palestinian uprising: Has it turned 
American public opinion? Orbis. 33, 1; 1989, Wint; 
21-37. 
The Palestinians and the PLO hoped that the uprising 
in the West Bank and Gaza would tilt American public 
opinion to their side at the expense of Israel. In view 
of the extensive media coverage of the uprising, and 
the criticism of Israel's response, one might suppose 
that this goal was achieved. But empirical evidence 
from available surveys of American attitudec toward the 
Middle East does not confirm this supposition. The 
violence did not alter in any significant way 
fundamental American opinions on key Israeli-
342 
Palestinian issues. At a very general level, 
American expressed more sympathy for and had 
more concern with the plight of the Palestinians. 
But these feelings were not translated into greater 
support for the main demands of PLO and the 
Palest inians. The absence of any major shifts in 
American public opinion toward Israeli-Palestinian 
issues may have several explanations. As Israel has 
enjoyed a solid base of public support in the United 
Sta tes , built over four decades and apparently 
capab le of sustaining considerable pressure. 
American have always advocated a resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict through peaceful -means, and 
have been dismayed by the seemingly endless 
violence. 
-.—^ ^.....^ ORGANIZATION, PLO, MEMBERS 
230. FRISCH (Hillel). Palestinian movement in the 
terr i tor ies: The middle command. Middle Eastern 
Studies. 29, 2; 1993. Apr; 254 -74 . 
Attempting to demonstrate that those responsible 
for the organisation of the intifada were not 'new 
men ' but veteran members of PLO factions involved 
in Palestinian institution-building and political 
mobilization long before the outbreak of the 
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intifada. Nor were they a leadership but a 
subordinate middle command used to obeying 
orders from the diaspora centre outside the 
territories. It was the very subordination of this 
command which encouraged the PLO factions to 
develop in the terr i tor ies the mass movement which 
wedded political mobilization with the provision of 
public services in the early 1980s, prior to the 
outbreak of intifada. Analysing the emergence of 
this middle c o m m a n d , its sociological and 
geographic composi t ion, its role in Palestinian 
institution building and its relationship to the PLO 
factions outside the territories. 
.^.....^ RESULTS 
2 3 1 . SAJAD IBRAHIM (KM) and SEETHI (KM). Intifada: A 
case of unremitting struggle. Radical Humanist. 56, 11; 
1993, Feb; 32-3. 
The biggest Palestinian revolt, uprising in the West 
Bank and Gaza, strip, called intifada. The world 
attention has shifted to this uprising at a time when 
the ongoing talks in search of a solution to the 
Palestine question get now here because of the Israeli 
intransigence and the inter-Arab rivalry. Ever since 
Palestinian lost their homeland, they have fighting for 
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a just cause and in the course of their struggle, they 
went under different periods. The intifada is by and 
large, the natural consequence of the accumulated 
frustration of the younger generation of Palestinians 
who have been subject to severe oppression since 
1967, when Israel occupied these areas. The intifada 
brought about two results. One, the efforts towards a 
settlements of Palestinian question as reflected in the 
recent middle east peace conference. Second, the 
public opinion generated by the intifada had a little 
effect on the Israeli society and politics. 
-—, WAR, EFFECT, ISLAM, THINKERS, 1967 
232. HADOAD (Yvonne). Islamists and the problem of Israel: 
The 1967 awakening. Middle East Journal. 46, 2; 
1992, Spr; 266-85. 
Describing the impact of 1967 Arab-Israeli war and 
its aftermath on Muslim thinkers , that the war and 
Arab defeat gave a strong boost to fundamentalist 
of both Muslim and Jewish, seems undeniable. It 
is less clear what the final impact of the Islamist 
revival will be on the peace p rocess . If the members 
of the Muslim establishment react as Hadded relates 
how much stronger must be the reactives of the 
radicals be? It underlines the seriousness of the 
react ions to 1967. 
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